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EXPLAINING EU’S EXTERNAL APPROACH 
TOWARD BOAT REFUGEES: A DISCREPANCY 
BETWEEN NORMS AND STATE INTERESTS? 
 
Abstract: 
The main interest that has motivated this thesis is the puzzle of why EU Member States, 
despite their commitment to uphold human rights declarations and human rights convention 
on refugees, do not seem to have an interest in having responsibility for these people who 
seek asylum in the EU. In an ambitious attempt to uncover such curiosities, the project has set 
a primary goal to: first, clarify the motivations and patterns of the EU Member States actions, 
and a secondary goal is to demonstrate the challenges for the researchers in this field.  
The main contention of this thesis is that the research in the field has neglected the underlying 
factors that determine state motivations. The dominant focus in the literature has so far been 
on descriptive case studies of EU Member States’ actions in the Mediterranean Sea that have 
documented the EU strategies to manage/limit refugees/irregular influxes. The literature has 
yet to come up with plausible answers as to ` why´ the EU Member States are undertaken steps 
to manage/limit the influxes of these extraterritorially in spite of their commitment to uphold 
refugee conventions in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This neglect leaves open 
interpretations as to `why´ EU Member States have responded in this way.  
This thesis attempts to address this gap in the research by testing theoretical predictions of 
state preferences in relation to specific developments in the EU’s external approach policy 
development. In conclusion, the thesis suggests that unsaid motivations have been a crucial 
factor that has determined EU’s response to the situation in the last decade. However, it is 
also a main finding that much more research on the EU’s asylum policymaking is required, if 
plausible answers are to be found. Future research need, in particular, to bridge research on 
EU’s internal asylum system with EU’s external approach (efforts to control irregular 
migration) if the answer to the `why´ question is to be understood.   
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1 PROBLEM AREA: REFUGEES IN THE MEDITTERANEAN SEA 
 
1.1 EU’S ASYLUM POLICY: CAUGHT BETWEEN CORE VALUES AND STATE INTERESTS? 
 
The humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea represents a worrisome challenge for top 
EU politicians. Media coverage of overloaded refugee boats are released in media, and the EU 
is being criticized by international human rights organizations for not living up to its 
humanitarian responsibilities (amnesty.org) (hrw.org). Attention and criticism have grown 
significantly to the issue in the recent years as the total number of forced displacements for 
the first time exceeded 50 million record, which is the highest number since the 2nd World War 
in 2014 (UNHCR.org/1). In 2014 alone, more than 207 000 people tried to cross the 
Mediterranean Sea, which doubles almost three times the last record in 2011, where about 
70 000 people undertook the dangerous journey following the Libyan uprising (Unhcr.org/2). 
The refugee numbers of 2014 show that almost 50 % of these people came from refugee-
producing countries such as Syria and Eritrea (Unhcr.org/2). In 2014 a total of 3 419 reported 
deaths has been documented by the United Nations Agency for Refugees (UNHCR), which 
makes the Mediterranean Sea route the deadliest route of organized smuggling crime in the 
World. What is more, these shocking statistical facts cannot be dismissed as a temporary event 
since deaths in the Mediterranean is nothing new. In the last 14 years a total of 23 000 
reported deaths has been documented by journalists, yet nobody knows the exact number as 
many deaths go unreported (Spiegel.de).   
 
These findings beg the critical question: Why is the EU not doing more to help these people? 
To address this curiosity, the following two sections address the problem of legal obligations 
and political response. In the end of this section, the implications of this situation for the EU’s 
asylum policy are discussed in relation to research on the topic. 
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1.2 EU’S LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO HELP REFUGEES: 
 
The criticism has been directed at the EU Member States for not living up to its responsibility 
to help rescue these people on sea, and for not upholding the key principles of non-
refoulement, non-discrimination and non-penalization described in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and later 1967 Protocol (hrw.org) (Amnesty int. rep/1). The 1951 Convention is 
the key refugee document in international relations that has been signed and ratified by 144 
states, which have obligated themselves to uphold the key principles in the Convention 
(Convention 1951, p. 3) (UNHCR states parties rep.). The EU has adopted this Convention as 
its own asylum policy/law in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (article 18), where it is 
stated that the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect to the 1951 Convention, 
the 1967 Protocol and the Treaty of Establishing the EU Community (EU Charter doc.).  
Scientific studies, media articles and reports published by human rights organizations have 
documented that the EU is undertaking creative/strategic measures to circumvent its 
international obligations (hrw.org) (europesworld.org) (Lutterbeck 2009) (ecre.org nr. 1) 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008) (Boswell, Christina 2003) (Gilbert, Geoff 2004) (Klepp, Silja 2010) 
(Lutterbeck, Derek 2009) (Carrera, Sergio 2007). The scientific studies document that the EU 
is undertaking “prevent departure and barring entry tactics” such as shifting asylum/migration 
operations to extraterritorial controls and operations in the Mediterranean Sea outside EU’s 
territorial jurisdiction, where international refugee law obligations do not apply. Research in 
this field has proofed that EU’s asylum/migration efforts have changed focus towards bi-lateral 
cooperation arrangements with 3rd states to ensure that these governments help the EU 
locate and intercept the refugee boats and combatting smuggling in North African state 
territory. EU Member States have, for example, expanded EU’s external border agency 
(FRONTEX1) role to conduct search and “rescue operations” at sea at the Canary Islands, Malta 
                                                          
1 FRONTEX was created in 2005. It stands for `the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU.´ 
 
  
3 
 
and Italy among other places. These operations are undertaken in close co-operations with 
North African states to return immigrants without allowing them the right to claim asylum in 
EU territory. Altogether, these studies show a trend of a political effort to circumvent the 
International Refugee Convention obligations, which may undermine the key principle of non-
refoulement. Why is the EU Member States doing this?  
 
EU’s political response 
The focus of casework on EU’s operations at the Mediterranean external borders of the 
European Union has received a dominant attention, but surprisingly little to non-attention 
(that I could find) have focused on explaining the motives for such policies. It is indeed unclear 
why the EU Member States continue to follow the prevent departure and barring entry tactics 
that circumvent international obligations. The high amount of media coverage and criticism 
has provoked statements from state officials and politicians of the Member States of the 
European Union, but it is unclear whether this issue has affected government policies in the 
EU or not. In an ambitious attempt to find explanations to such puzzles, this project will look 
into the political decision making in the EU on the issue. The aim of this project is to find 
explanations as to why the EU Member States are undertaking policies that may undermine 
the 1951 Convention key principle of non-refoulement. The main assertion put to test is 
concerned with the EU Member States response to the boat refugee situation. Does it reflect 
a discrepancy between norms (international refugee obligations) and Member State interests?  
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1.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION:  
  
 What factors have determined the EU Member States political response to the issue of 
Mediterranean boat refugees?  
 
1.4 MAIN CURIOSITY: 
 
The main interest of this thesis concerns the puzzle of why EU Member States, despite their 
commitment to uphold human rights declarations and human rights convention on refugees, 
do not seem to have an interest in having responsibility for these people who travel on a 
dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea to seek asylum in the EU. In an ambitious 
attempt to uncover such curiosities, the project has set a primary goal to first clarify the 
motivations and patterns of EU Member States actions, and a secondary goal of addressing 
the challenges in this field of research.  
 
1.4.1 Main research questions: 
 
Research interests:  
  
 How has the EU Member States responded to the situation?  
 
Analysis questions (main puzzles): 
 
 Explaining motivations: Why is the EU creating agencies and countermeasures 
designed to regulate the inflow of boat refugees instead of helping them?  
 Explaining patterns: How can the decision to integrate the EU’s asylum and 
migration policy to EU’s foreign policy (EU’s external approach) be explained?  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this brief literature review the project is put in context with the literature in the field. The 
research on EU’s asylum- and migration policy can broadly be categorized into two groups of:  
1) Research on EU’s new external approach (includes FRONTEX creation and activities) 
2) Research on EU’s internal asylum system that has focused on the distribution of refugees 
and developments toward a burden-sharing system. 
The project’s main focus is on the literature on EU’s “new external approach” that covers EU’s 
policies towards irregular migration. The project analyses also EU’s asylum system because 
this is key to explain Member State preferences and controversies, but this literature review 
is limited to research on EU’s external approach to asylum and immigration. The chapter starts 
with an assessment of the research on EU’s newer external approach. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH ON EU’S NEW EXTERNAL APPROACH2 
 
The research interest in EU’s external approach started to receive attention after the 
European Council Laken Summit in 2001 when European State leaders called for the 
integration of EU’s migration and asylum policy into EU’s foreign policy (Boswell 2003: 619-
620) (Haddad 2008: 191-192).  Since then scholars have studied two key policy pillars that are 
connected to the new external approach. These are:  
1) EU’s efforts to intensify cooperation with 3rd state transit countries and countries of origin.  
2) EU’s commitment to strenghten joint operation missions and FRONTEX (klepp 2010: 2).  
Scholars have generally focused on explaining the consequence and development of these 
policies, but have not paid much attention to the political motivation for this change. Most 
scholars have claimed that EU’s new external approach has been motivated by security 
concerns (Carrera 2007: 27) (Leonard 2009: 375-376) (Haddad 2008: 196-197) (Leonard 2009: 
376) (Lutterbeck 2006: 59-60). They argue that events such as the 9/11 2001 terrorism attack 
                                                          
2 The term EU’s newer external approach is used to describe EU’s entire political activities to handle 
asylum/migration issues in the Mediterranean that been implimented subsequently to the Tampere agreement 
(1999) and the Laken Summit (2001). 
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and the Eastern enlargement in 2004 provoked this change as EU top politicians believed the 
Schengen regime would be in danger if EU’s external borders were uncontrolled.  
However, explaining the decision making as a security act to protect the Schengen regime 
seem not to fully explain the EU Member States’ decision to form stronger cooperation in this 
area because little empirical evidence seem to support this claim (Pollak & Slominski 2009: 
908) (Neal 2009: 334+353). Indeed, this claim has been contested firstly on the grounds that 
there is scarce evidence of security discoursive acts, and secondly with regard to history 
(political measures to manage borders is not unique).  
 
Main findings:  
Many scholars have interpreted the EU’s new external approach as a response by Member 
States to uncontrolled migration (Haddad 2008: 196-197) (Boswell 2003: 619) (Marin 2011: 
485-486) (Boswell 2003: 619-624) (Gilbert 2004: 963-966). Scholars claim, for example, that 
EU’s newer external approach represent an opportunity for EU Member States to limit the 
influxes of irregular migration and refugees extraterritorially (Haddad 2008: 197) 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 28) (Andrijasevic 2010: 28) (Gilbert 2004: 963+987). These 
findings have been based on a claim that the external management of irregular migration 
opens for greater “manouverability” opportunies for EU Member States. Member States are 
for example not bound by refugee obligations if they  operate in the international 
Mediterranean Sea (according to a Westphalian interpretation of international law) 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 28). The argument of policy-makers seeking room for external 
manouverability development was first introduced by Guiradon in the early 00’s. This 
argument was basesd on a claim that EU’s external approach to asylum and migration best 
can be understood as an act of `venue-shopping´ (the search of rational policy-makers for new 
venues that allow for greater manouverability to persue preferences) (Kaunert et al 2003: 1).  
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Criticism:  
The principal criticism of the external approach concerns the mixing of migration and asylum 
policies in the management of EU’s external borders (Gilbert 2004: 963). According to this 
principal criticism, the EU policy efforts to control irregular migration neglect the asylum 
protection that is stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention and later Protocol in 1967. 
 
Some of the main events on the formation of EU’s external policy approach to handle irregular 
migration and refugee influexes is summarized in the following table:  
Tabel 1: Key developments in EU migration and asylum policy  (source Geddes 2009: 19-20) 
1985 The Schengen Agreement was initially an agreement between five states 
(Benelux countries, France and Germany) to move towards full application of the 
free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome (1957). It became a key 
‘laboratory’ for development of measures to underpin free movement with 
internal security controls.  
1986 The Single European Act was aimed to create a frontier-free Europe within 
which people, services, goods and capital could move freely. Compensating 
immigration and asylum measures were dealt with outside of the formal Treaty 
framework in informal patterns of intergovernmental co-operation.  
1992 Maastricht Treaty created an intergovernmental pillar of the EU dealing with 
JHA. 1997 Amsterdam Treaty created a new chapter (Title IV) of the main EU 
Treaty dealing with free movement, migration and asylum. 
1999 The Tampere Agreement outlined the framework for common migration and 
asylum policies with four main elements: • Partnership with countries of origin • 
A common European asylum system • Fair treatment of third country nationals • 
Management of migration flows  
 2001 The Nice Treaty developed decision-making rules to give the European 
Parliament (EP) co-decision-making power in key migration policy areas, such as 
asylum and the return of illegal immigrants and thus sought further development 
of the framework agreed at Amsterdam.  
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 2004 The Hague Programme mapped a five-year plan for the development of EU 
migration and asylum policy to cover the period 2005–10.  
 2008 The Immigration Pact staked out an agenda for EU migration and asylum 
policy in the areas of legal and illegal immigration, border controls, asylum and 
relations with third countries 
 
2.1.1 Introduction to FRONTEX 
 
One of the most studied policy initiatives to safeguard EU’s external borders is FRONTEX. 
FRONTEX has partly received attention (among media, scientific and NGO human rights 
organisations) is because the decision to create a common external border guard agency is 
unprecedented.  
FRONTEX has been a subject of contestation among EU top politicians since its creation in 26th 
of October 2004 (Leonard 2009: 372). It served initially as a testproject supervised by EU 
Member States, but has since then increased immensely in staff, organization, operations and 
more (Pollak & Slominsky 2009: 908-913). The official purpose of FRONTEX is to assist the EU 
Member States with safeguarding external borders. FRONTEX has been assigned main tasks 
that are formulated in the community regulation 2004/2007.  
The central assignments of FRONTEX are:  
1) Coordinating operational cooperation between EU Member States regarding EU external 
border management  
2) Risk assessments analyses  
3) Assisting EU Member States with the coordination of joint operations  
4) Training of border guards 
5) Following up on relevant research developments related to border surveillance  
6) Assisting the Member States with technical matters related to external border management  
7) Assisting Member States with shared of information stored in computer systems and data 
bases. Sources: (FRONTEX (1)) (council regulation no 2004/2007). 
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2.1.2 Main literature findings on FRONTEX creation and activities: 
 
Findings on FRONTEX creation:  
FRONTEX institutional creation has generally been understood as an important step since the 
Tampere agreement (1999) to strenghten EU’s external borders and control irregular migration. 
Political scientists have explained FRONTEX creation as a part of EU’s `extraterritorialization´ strategy 
to solve irregular migration issues, which as mentioned previously, is about setting strategies to 
manage/limit irregular migration in close cooperation with 3rd states; interception schemes and 
combatting smuggling and trafficking of human beings (Marin 2011: 485-486). One of the key 
findings concern FRONTEX close relation to EU Member States that has been a source of contestation. 
For example, scholars have studied the implications of FRONTEX lack of autonomy (FRONTEX 
dependency on EU Member States for its activities); lack of accountability (FRONTEX is minimally 
accountable to the EP and European Court of Justice (ECJ) and lastly FRONTEX lack of mandate to 
undertake rescue operations in relation to the principle of non-refoulement (Carrera 2007: 27-28) 
(Pollak & Slominsky 2009: 904+918+920) (Marin 2011: 486-487). 
Main findings on FRONTEX activities:  
With regard to EU’s external activities, some have criticized that FRONTEX has not been given a clear 
mandate to undertake rescue operations, which they claim may undermine the principle of non-
refoulement (Klepp 2010: 1-3+19-21) (Marin 2011: 485-487).  Research that supports this claim have 
documented interdictions3 on the high seas including operations that has returned thousands of 
boatrefugees/migrants. Examples of documented returns include (among others):FRONTEX 
operations at the Canary Islands (HERA II); the Nautilus operation preventing boatrefugees/migrants 
from Libya to enter Malta, Lampedusa or Sicily; the return of boatrefugees from Lampedusa to Libya 
in October 2004 reflecting an Italian-Libyan cooperation scheme on migration; increased millitary 
policing and deployment of navy vessel; cooperation schemes between Italy and Albania to return 
migrants/refugees in the late 1990’s andbilateral schemes between Spain and Morocco 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 16); (Klepp 2010: 4-6+14-18) (Lutterbeck 2006: 67-68+71-73).  
                                                          
3 Interdictions is used in the literature to describe how EU patrols and rescue operations have intercepted/stopped 
boat refugees at sea and returned them.  
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Based on such documented events scholars have claimed that the principle of non-
refoulement is in danger of being undermined in its universal interpretation.  
Based on the findings on FRONTEX creation and activities, the principal criticism of the 
literature concerns the question of whether an agency, with limited accountability to 
democratic institutions and questionable dependency on EU Member States, is fit to conduct 
border security operations designed to control inflows of refugees/irregular migrants. The 
design of FRONTEX can accordingly be interpreted as a move by EU Member States to 
circumvent obligations and constraint. The EP and ECJ has, for example, limited access and 
authority to FRONTEX activities that are carried out in secret. This may be interpreted as 
problematic for the accountabillity and protection of human rights for refugees. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents the methodological choices of the thesis starting with choice of theory. 
Thereafter it goes on with a presentation of the case study method used to test the predictions 
of the theory. The methods chapter concludes with a series of reflections on data collection 
and criticism of sources. 
3.2 CHOICE OF THEORY  
 
The choice of theory reflects an evaluation of the theory’s potential contribution to explain 
the political response of the EU Member States. In this regard, the most persuassive theory to 
address the curiosity of this thesis is considered to be the theoretical framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI). The theory of LI is selected because it provides a theoretical 
account of how the EU Member States preferences are formed, which links state preferences 
with resulting choices of integration or international cooperation in certain policy areas. Based 
on the knowledge of the subject, it is the main contention of this thesis that the theory of state 
preference formation allows for detailed analysis of state motivations as a main driver of 
integration, which may explain EU’s response to the immigration/refugee influxes at EU’s 
Southern maritime borders.  
The main reason why EU Member States preferences are seen as key to explain the 
development of EU’s asylum policy is because the EU Member States have the power 
(ressources and capabilities) to change the situation. In addition, it is based on the fact that 
other EU actors, such as the ECJ and EP, have been sidelined on matters related to EU’s 
external approach to irregular migration/refugee influxes. This may be because EU Member 
States maintain their sovereign right to handle border security policies extraterritorially. This 
point seems to be relevant since EU’s response to the migration and refugee influxes seem to 
reflect Member State preferences (such as controlling the immigration and refugee influxes) 
rather than efforts to abide international norms and values. A secondary reason for choosing 
this theory is the contention that no alternative theories of European Integration accounts 
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beeter for the formation of state preferences (motivations), and how it relates to European 
Integration developments.  
This thesis holds that it is important to understand causalities of Member State preferences 
to understand EU’s response. The analysis will therefore test theoretical LI predictions (e.g. 
whether integration has occurred as a result of diverging/harmonious state interests) in the 
complex area dimensions of the EU’s asylum policy. The project finds therefore the Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) framework suitable for testing in regards to whether it can explain 
EU’s response to the irregular migration/refugee influxes at EU’s borders or not.  
 
3.2.1 Presentation of the theory: 
 
The LI framwork rests on a rational framework that explains integration in a three step analysis 
of: 1) domestic preference formations, 2) intergovernmental barganing process and 3) choice 
to delegate/pool sovereignty.  
1. State preferences 
In the first step the rational commitment to integrate is explained as a result of domestic 
preference formation (societal groups form preferences and put pressure onto governments 
according to these preferences). The formation of domestic preferences vary according to the 
intensity of domestic preferences – if societal groups have intense preferences based on 
cost/benefit calculations in a certain policy issue area, then government constraint are 
expected to be high. If conversely domestic societal preferences are less intense, the 
government has a larger degree of maneuverability to act according to their own interests.  
 
2. Intergovernmental bargaining: 
However, in order to fulfill the interest of domestic societal groups, governments must 
undertake efforts to form international cooperation/integration that secure credible domestic 
outcomes. This leads us to the second step of interstate bargaining where governments 
voluntarily pledge themselves to binding agreements in international cooperation because 
they have an interest in securing credible outcomes for re-election purposes and more. In the 
interstate bargaining stage, the main objective is to find the determining factors of interstate 
bargaining and the outcome. The theory predicts that bargaining process is formed by factors 
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of asymmetrical dependence and relative power that determines the “distributional” 
outcomes. The outcomes depends in this respect on different factors such as: institutional 
context; factors of economic interdependence; intensity of preferences; alliance formations; 
unilateral alternative and possible compromises/issue linkages among other things.   
 
3. Choice to delegate/pool sovereignty: 
In the final third stage EU Member States decide to pool/delegate sovereignty based on an 
evaluation of the cost and benefits of doing so. The cost/benefit calculation is, for example, 
measured in regards to improving efficiency of international cooperation (e.g. changing 
decision-making from unanimous to qualified majority voting vs. maintaining the sovereign 
right to veto). 
 
Based on these three stages, Moravcsik claims that state actors are constrained both by the 
domestic societal pressures at home (who makes up the demand for certain policies), and 
abroad by the strategic environment state actors are embedded in (that determines the 
feasible options for governments in interstate bargaining). In this way the rationalist 
framework claims that state actors behavior is constrained by domestic societal pressures 
(demand side), and abroad by the strategic environment (the supply side that consist of the 
amount of options available) they are embedded in (Moravcsik 1993: 474).  
 
3.2.2 Criticism of Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) 
 
Criticism of Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
The theoretical framework of LI is one of the leading European integration theories when it 
comes to the explaination of state preferences and integration in the three stage framework. 
Yet it has still been criticized on different grounds with regard to its theoretical predictions.  
the theory has, for example, been criticized for its prediction of interstate bargaining as being 
characteristed by `asymmetrical interdependence´.  This claim rests on the prediction that 
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larger self-sufficient states have a relative stronger barganing power than smaller states that 
are economically interdependent4 In contradiction to this interpretation,  
The LI framework has been criticized for `overstating´ the larger EU Member States 
significance in barganing processes. Slapin have, for example, found that smaller states have 
outperformed larger states (with the exception of France) in negotiations with regard to 
conservative standings vs reformist preferences (Slapin in Franchino 2013: 329-330) 
Accordingly, the groundsworks for the the theoretical framework (Moravcsik’s main 
framework book “the choice of Europe”) has been criticized for not taking into account smaller 
states power in decision making in the treaty framework. Another important criticism of LI 
relates to the downgrading of supranational actors on the issue of explaining integration. 
 
LI: A demanding theoretical framework 
The project has had problems with living up to the demanding framework of LI.   
It has not been an easy task to determine what factors determine government preferences. 
Domestic societal interests are not “fixed” in the framework, and it is therefore up to the 
researcher to figure out what underlying societal interests that are transformed into state 
preferences (Moravcsik 1999: 21) (Moravcsik 1993: 484+487).  
The LI framework emphasizes underlying societal interest’s (liberal theories of constraint) as 
the most important factor of domestic constraint, but it does not specify which interests are 
most important in different political issue areas. The project has therefore sought to apply the 
LI framework best to the topic. It has, for example, left out the economic interdependence 
explanation (that Moravcsik emphasizes in his account of European Integration treaty 
framework) to instead focus on liberal societal constraint as determined by public opinion and 
societal groups. There appears to be little interest in the subject of boat refugees/immigrants 
among producers and firms, whereas the public attention and debate on asylum and irregular 
migration has been a continuous trend. In addition, asylum and immigration topics is a highly 
                                                          
4 Moravcsik claims this is the case in his book `The choice for Europe´ where he analysis the treaty 
framework from the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty. 
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publicized throughout EU Member States that also focus on economic and security aspects 
(such as welfare, job security, crime and employment) (Clandestino 2009: 2-3).  
With regard to the 2nd stage on interstate bargaining, the lack of public access to 
intergovernmental meetings makes the analysis part two insufficient according to the LI 
framework. It is in this respect important to stress that this project focuses mainly on 
explaining EU’s response as a consequence of conflict/harmonious Member State interests 
(based on statistics and analysis of statements). It is the contention of this project that the 
analysis employed is sufficient for the main purpose of the project: to determining factors for 
EU Member States responses and explaining key developments of EU’s asylum and migration 
policy. In order not to speculate on what happened during the meetings, the analysis focuses 
instead on the public statements of state officials and the outcome of interstate meetings.  
3.3 TERMINOLOGY 
 
The project uses mainly the term `refugee´ to describe the people who travel across the 
Mediterranean to enter the EU. The reason why this terminology is chosen is because these people, 
according to the Refugee Convention in 1951, are protected by the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement, which stipulate that refugees have an exceptional status in international law that 
allows them to travel across borders and breach immigration laws without fear of being returned. It 
specifies that refugees may not be expelled against his/her will to a territory where they fear that 
they are in danger of losing their life or freedom (Refugee Convention 1951: 3).  
The thesis has thus chosen to use the terminology of `refugees´ based on the universal 
interpretation of fundamental rights (such as non-discrimination, non-refoulement and non-
penalization). Since this convention has been ratified by the EU Member States, and is part 
of EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights article 18, it seems fair to use this terminology. The 
general definition of a refugee employed here is: “someone who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
(Refugee Convention 1951: 3). 
Researchers and EU officials use other terminologies such as `irregular migrants´ and `illegal 
migrants´. Underlying this debate of terminology is the limitations/unspecified legal responsibilities 
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for refugee protection extraterritorially (in foreign territory or Mediterranean Sea) in international 
law that reflects a contestation between the Westphalian interpretation (refugee responsibility only 
within state territory), and an universal interpretation of refugee protection in international law 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008: 28-29) 
3.4 CASE STUDY METHOD AND ANALYSIS STRUCTURE  
 
The analysis structure can be thought of as a series of case studies and statistical analysis.  
The case studies selected are: 
 EU’s external approach policy development (state preference analysis of selected 
Member States and main contestations/convergence). 
 
 Selected policy developments such as the Global Approach to Migration and 
Mobility (GAMM) and FRONTEX. 
 
 EU’s internal asylum system development (key policy developments of EU’s asylum 
policy development and state preference convergence/contestations).  
 
 A study of public statements from an empirical sample of newspaper articles (dating 
from the beginning of 2004 till the end of 2014) on the issue of `Mediterranean boat 
refugees´ and `EU’s asylum system´. 
 
The primary purpose of case studies (in this project) is to gather detailed insights that help 
explain the EU’s response to boat refugees/immigration influxes. They have also a secondary 
purpose of testing the LI framework’s ability to explain the EU Member States response.  
Case studies have, in general, been recognized for their ability to discover new puzzles and 
questions related to in theory building (Eckstein 2009: 14-15).  
The primary definition of case study employed here is drawn from John Gerring who defines 
a case study as: “an intense study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set 
of units” (Gerring 2004: 341).  
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These case studies are employed in the LI framework three stage analysis: 
1) Stage 1 of LI (analysis of state preferences): The first part of the analysis examines public 
statements of state officials from 2004-2014 to determine preferences of selected EU 
Member States. This analysis is substantiated with secondary research conclusions on 
public discourses as well as statistical analysis of public opinion.   
 
2) Stage 2 of LI (analysis of key developments in EU’s asylum and migration area): The second 
part of the analysis investigates key policy developments on the issue of EU’s asylum 
policies and irregular migration. The purpose is to locate the sources of 
contestation/agreement by looking into the EU’s external approach and EU’s internal 
asylum policies respectively.  
 
 Analysis of key developments on EU’s external approach:  
The analysis examines key developments of EU’s external policy development in an 
attempt to assess the harmonious/conflicting interests in this issue area (in relation to 
the findings in the first analysis part). Here, key policy developments since the 1999 
Tampere agreement are integrated in the analysis with a primary focus on the GAMM 
that is the overarching framework of EU’s external policy. 
 
 Analysis of key developments on EU’s internal asylum system:  
The policy development is similarly analyzed. The analysis addresses the main policy 
areas of agreement/contestation and analysis the outcomes of EU’s policy development 
in this issue area. This analysis focuses on the winners and losers of EU’s current asylum 
system and other elements such as burden-sharing (distribution of asylum seekers) and 
solidarity.  
 
3) Stage 3 of LI (sums up findings and discusses choices of delegation/pooling of sovereignty): 
In the final stage, the conclusions are drawn together and discussed in relation to the two 
issue areas of interest: EU’s internal asylum and EU’s external approach. This analysis part 
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seeks to find explanations (based on the findings) as to the EU Member States response 
to the boat refugee situation. 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION 
 
Time span and data collection:  
The empirical data is collected in the timespan from 2004 till the end of 2014. This timespan 
has been selected because policy debates on EU’s asylum and irregular migration began to 
receive public attention at this time5.  
The media coverage peaked in 2004 and 2011-2014 (based on the empirical sample of newspaper 
articles, see Annex). Although the media coverage has been low in the timespan 2004-2010 
compared to 2011-2014, the media coverage in 2004 stands out. With regard to 2004, the media 
attention may have been attributed to the single Lampedusa event where 778 boat refugees arrived 
at Lampedusa (Italy) in just one day (Barber 14.09.2004), which subsequently led EU leaders to 
discuss how this issue should be managed (Fisher & Bernstein 05.10.2004). 
The controversy and single events may have been an attributing factor that pressured state actors 
to act in this timespan, but the issue had not raised the same amount of publicity, which may be 
explained with regard to the low numbers of arrivals at this time. However, this changed in 2011 
when asylum policy and irregular migration became a main priority for EU Member States with an 
unprecedented number of boat refugees/irregular migrants in 2011 and 2014. The number of boat 
refugees arrivals climbed in 2011 to 64.300 from 4.500 in 2010 in the Central Mediterranean route 
alone (from Libya to Italy and Malta) (source: FRONTEX 2). Since then, the number of asylum claims 
and irregular migrants/refugees has increased significantly following the war in Syria, the Arab spring 
and Libyan uprising and a total of 51 million displaced people. A total of 207.000 crossed the 
Mediterranean to enter the EU in 2014, which doubles almost 3 times the last record in 2011 (Akkoc 
30-12-2014). In this sense, the thesis takes in interest to analyze how varying refugee influxes over 
time are reflected in the EU Member State preferences and EU responses. 
 
                                                          
5 A secondary reason for using the larger timespan is the concern of reliability when analyzing state preferences. 
For more information on this, look at end of the below section “Criticism of Sources”. 
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Primary “soft” data 
Due to limited access to data (such as interstate meetings) it has been necessary to find 
alternative sources. The analysis of state preferences relies therefore instead on “soft” 
primary sources that include newspaper articles of the Financial Times (FT) and the New York 
Times (NYT). The data collection has focused on finding official statements from executive 
ministers of foreign policy, justice and home affairs and prime ministers because they are the 
formal key decision makers on asylum and irregular migration. The facts of these articles (such 
as deaths in the Mediterranean and other relevant context facts) are also employed to 
understand the statements. The data has been categorized into 6 categories of articles on 
state preferences of selected countries (Italy, UK, Germany France and Malta) and a broader 
category of EU asylum developments that includes the broader picture of EU Member State 
developments and initiatives in the area of irregular migration and asylum (see appendix).  
The data has also been selected with the purpose of analyzing if EU’s policy development 
reflects the theoretical predictions of the selected LI framework. In this sense the statements 
have been collected with the purpose of verifying/falsifying theoretical predictions (e.g. we 
should expect greater integration where state preferences converge and less incentive to 
cooperate if the costs exceed the benefits). 
 
Primary hard data  
The thesis draws on reports of official reports released by the European Commission that 
describes the detailed regulations and directives on EU’s asylum system and the main 
documents on EU’s external approach.  
 
Secondary data  
The thesis uses finding of scientific journals in the analysis to support/compare the analysis 
claims to other findings. The project draws also heavily on statistical data from UNHCR, 
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FRONTEX, Euro Stat, and Global Research Pew Review among other sources to explain the 
context of EU responses and preferences.  
Criticism of sources 
The use of newspaper articles and secondary sources to predict state preferences can be 
criticized on the grounds that it is not based on “hard” primary sources (criticism of reliability). 
This argument will be further discussed below. 
 
3.5.1 The criticism of soft primary sources and secondary litterature 
 
Moravcsik criticzes, for example, in his book “the choice for Europe”6, the use of “soft” primary 
data (e.g. analysis of public statements in newspapers such as the Financial Times and the 
Economist) and vast use of secondary literature by EU integration scholars. He advocates 
instead for the use of “hard” primary sources (e.g. internal government reports, records of 
confidential deliberations of decision-makers, word for word diary entries, confirmed memoirs, 
lenghty interviews and archeive documents) (Moravcsik 1999: 82-83). His criticism is based on 
the claim that politicians, journalist and commentators deliberately manipulate or mislead the 
public where it is advantageous to do so – mainly because the cost of misleading is low 
(Moravcsik 1999: 81).  
This thesis contest this criticism of primary soft data and secondary literature as being 
unreliable for two main reasons.  
First, Moravcsik’s aim was to analyse what determining factors (economic or geopolitical 
motivations) that where most important for the treaty framework of the EU. This thesis does 
not pretend to give a comprehensive account of integration, and does therefore not share the 
research ambition to determine if EU’s political response reflect mainly political, economic or 
security motivations/preferences. It seeks instead to use an “open approach” to find plausible 
explanations as to EU’s response to the Mediterranean boat refugee situation, which can be 
                                                          
6  Moravcsik main framework are described in this book `the choice for Europe´. Here he analysis the treaty 
framework of the EU from the Treaty of Rome till the Maestricht Treaty using the LI framework. One of his main 
arguments is that the EU integration process was dominantly driven by economic preferences shaped by economic 
interdependence and not geopolitical preferences (Moravcsik 1999: 472-473). 
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attributed to a series of factors (state preferences does not have to be mainly economic, 
political or security related). In addition, this thesis requires arguably less hard primary data 
to understand the general conflicting/harmonous state interest in the policy area of asylum 
and irregular migration.  
Secondly, in regards to limitations of attaining hard primary sources in the course of unfolding 
events, Moravcsik admits himself that he has used secondary literature and primary “soft” 
sources when analyzing unfolding events, in his case the Maastricht Treaty, because “hard” 
primary data was not accessible in archieves, nor was it possible to collect reliable data from 
lengthy interviews while politicians maintained office (Moravcsik 1999: 83). The issue of boat 
refugees is also a living political subject that is actual, and it has thus not been possible to build 
a representative sample of “hard” primary sources. Even if it was the time limit of 5 months 
would be insufficient to make a `proper´ analysis. 
Nonetheless, the criticism of sources has, to a certain extent, been taken into account in the 
collection of data. For example, the relatively large time span from 2004 to 2014 is used to 
make the conclusion more reliable based on the conviction that politicians, commentators and 
journalists are unlikely to manipulate lie to the public in a longer time span.  
For example, serious newspapers like the Financial Times and the New York Times have 
arguably a standard of trustworthiness to preserve if they want to preserve subscribers. In 
addition, newspaper findings are less likely to be fabricated if other journal articles, authors 
and reviews state the same facts and confirm the events.  
Similarly, government officials are accountable to the public if they want to stay in power, and 
it is therefore unlikely that state officials would lie over a long time span. If state officials 
express the same preferences even after change of government it should therefore be 
reasonable to expect that this is likely not manipulation. Still, the project has attempted to 
take these things into account by adding statistical material that establish the context of 
preferences (e.g. the distribution of asylum seekers in the EU). 
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4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework used to analyze the empirical 
cases in the analysis. The following sections will attempt to clarify how the theoretical 
frameworks of LI helps identify state preferences and outcomes of state bargaining. In the end, 
the chapter sums up the main theoretical contribution of LI’s framework to the project. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM 
 
The theory of LI has been created by Andrew Moravcsik. Its central claim is that the 
integration process of the EU has been determined by factors of economic interdependence, 
which incentive state actor’s to form policy-coordination and delegate/pool sovereignty to 
international institutions (Moravcsik 1993: 474).  
 
The theory rests on a rational framework that contains three compounding theoretical 
dimensions: 
 
 A rational choice assumption (actors are rational and act on behalf of self-interest)  
 A liberal dimension (a theory of state preference formation)  
 An intergovernmentalist dimension (a theory of state bargaining) (Moravcsik 1993: 480) 
(Moravcsik 1999: 18-20) 
 
The most central component of the theory is possibly the rational assumption because it is 
used to explain key actors behavior in three stages of national preference formation, 
intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice. These three stages combined make up 
the EU integration process, and are therefore the main components of the theory (Moravcsik 
1993: 480). In the following part these three stages will be presented. 
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4.2 THE RATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LI IN THREE STAGES 
 
   Table 1: International cooperation: A rationalist framework, source: (Moravcsik 1999: 24) 
Stages of Negotiation 1. National Preference 
Formation (liberalism, the 
demand side) 
2. Interstate Bargaining 
(intergovernmentalism, 
the supply side) 
3. Institutional Choice (the 
delegation/pooling of 
sovereignty) 
Alternative independent 
variables underlying each 
stage 
What is the source of 
underlying national 
preferences? 
 
 
 
 
Economic interests or 
Geopolitical interests? 
 
 
Given national 
preferences, what 
explains the efficiency and 
distributional outcomes of 
interstate bargaining? 
 
Asymmetrical 
interdependence or 
Supranational 
entrepreneurship? 
 
 
Given substantive 
agreement, what explains 
the transfer of sovereignty 
to international 
institutions? 
 
Federalist ideology or 
Centralized technocratic 
management or More 
credible commitment? 
Observed Underlying national 
preferences 
Agreement on   
substance 
Choice to delegate or pool 
decision-making in 
international institutions 
 
4.3 LIBERALISM: STATE PREFERENCE FORMATION (THE DEMAND FOR INTEGRATION) 
 
The first stage of LI is the analysis of national preference formation based on liberal theory. 
The central claim of this framework can be summarized in two stages:  
 
1. First domestic societal groups put pressure onto governments (domestic demand) to 
represent their interests in international cooperation.  
2. Secondly, governments, on the basis of this pressure, coordinate policies to avoid negative 
externalities of economic interdependence (Moravcsik 1993: 485). In the following 
sections the process of these steps will be explained. 
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4.3.1 1st step: National preference formation and the demand for certain policy outcomes 
 
The first step is the analysis of societal groups and their demand for certain policy outcomes. 
The theory claims, in general, that governments are constrained by powerful domestic societal 
groups in situations where the interests of these groups are at stake. The reason why 
governments are constrained by these groups is because societal groups can obstruct 
government policies, and thus decrease the chances of governments to maintain themselves 
in office (Moravcsik 1993: 483-486). Domestic societal groups can be defined as domestic 
groups who have a significant influence on state behavior. They are, for example, made up of 
powerful groups such as economic officials, elites, ruling parties and chief executives who 
demand certain policies based the costs and benefit calculations (Moravcsik 1999: 28+35-36) 
(Moravcsik 1993: 483-485).   
 
The demand for international cooperation 
 
The LI frameworks builds on a liberal understanding of society preference formation, which 
predicts that societal groups pressure governments to overcome negative externalities 
(unintended consequences of economic interdependence) in international cooperation 
(Moravcsik 1999: 35). According to this view, the economic interdependence between 
countries leads to a vulnerable situation for domestic societal groups (such as producers and 
firms) because they are dependent on other countries political economic situation to 
maximize their own gains/production. Societal interest groups who are vulnerable to 
economic interdependence demand, therefore, that governments facilitate international 
cooperation, and create credible institutions to facilitate such cooperation. In response to the 
demand for international cooperation, governments undertake international cooperation 
since this allows for better control of domestic political economic outcomes (Moravcsik 1999: 
35).  
 
However, it is not the case that domestic societal pressures determine constraints 
governments and determine state preferences. The level of constraint depends on the 
intensity of preferences that we will now turn to.  
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Intensity of preferences (the determining factor of government constraint)  
 
The intensity of preferences is determined by interest groups who calculate the costs and 
benefits of policies. The pressure onto governments depends on how sharply defined interests 
are of societal interest groups, which varies across countries and policy issue areas. It is 
therefore important to understand the variance of interest groups across issue areas to 
predict the impact of constraint on governments (Moravcsik 1993: 484+487-488).  
 In situations/issue areas where societal groups calculate the stakes to be high (measured 
in cost/benefit analysis, risk assessment and certainty), the theory predicts a high degree 
of government constraint and potential efforts to obstruct government policies if 
necessary.  
 In situations/issue areas where there is little at stake, and general uncertainty as to the 
cost/benefits of certain policies, the theory predicts little pressure/constraint on 
governments. Governments have in the latter case greater maneuver room (high degree 
of autonomy) to pursue other political goals because societal groups are unlikely to 
mobilize and obstruct government policies in such situations (Moravcsik 1993: 487-488). 
 
Intensity of preferences in different issue areas: 
 
The table below lists the underlying preferences of states in three political issue areas of 
international cooperation. These are the 1) economic issue areas (commercial liberalization) 
2) social security and macroeconomic stability (socio-economic Public Goods Provision) and 3) 
Political, Institutional or Redistributional policies (this reflects both geopolitical and political-
economic underlying interests). 
 
The Li framework predicts that government constraint varies across issues and countries. It is 
therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, important to determine the level of societal pressure 
and consequent constraint on governments in the issue area of asylum policy and irregular 
migration if we are to understand the underlying factors for forming international cooperation 
(Moravcsik 1993: 487). According to Moravcsik’s predictions (see table below) we should 
expect asylum and migration policy to be somewhere in between the issue areas of socio-
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economics Publics Goods Provision (related to welfare, social security and macroeconomic 
stability) and the political institutional or redistribution policies issue areas (related to foreign 
policy, institutional policies and security policy). If the asylum and irregular migration policy 
fall into the category of socio-economics Public Goods Provisions, we should expect a high 
degree of constraint from public opinion. If, on the other hand, the issue area of asylum and 
irregular fits better the issue area categories of political, institutional and Redistributional 
areas we should find that government constraints are minimal due to diffuse and divided 
interests of public opinion/societal interest groups (Moravcsik 1999: 477) (Moravcsik 1993: 
494). The central decision making are in the latter case left to partisan elites, executives and 
parliaments with a secondary irregular constraint by mass publics (Moravcsik 1993: 494). 
These elites are expected to follow broader political goals based on ideology, personal 
commitments or interest-based conceptions of national interest. 
Table 2: LI - Economic interdependence and National Preferences, source: (Moravcsik 1999: 491-495) 
Predictions 
Issue Areas Sources of societal 
interests 
Determinants of state action 
Commercial 
Liberalization (e.g. 
tariffs and quotas, 
agricultural price 
policy 
Overt pressure, mostly 
from producers, whose 
net expected gains and 
losses reflect 
competitive position in 
international markets, 
levels of intra-industry 
trade, and the certainty 
of policy outcomes 
Where producer interests strong, 
unified and certain, governments 
will conform to them; otherwise, 
they are more likely to risk 
liberalization when faced with 
overt and intractable policy failure, 
signaled by low investment and 
growth, unsustainable external 
disequilibria, and/or intolerable 
fiscal compensation 
Socio-economics 
Public Goods 
Provision 
(e.g. 
macroeconomic 
stability, social 
Two-dimensional 
pressure: from 
producers, based on the 
criteria above, and from 
the public in favor of 
public goods provision 
When societal interests strong and 
unified, governments conform, 
when not, they co-ordinate actions 
to combat policy failure, judged on 
either of the two dimensions 
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security, 
environment  
Political, 
Institutional or 
Redistributional 
Policies (e.g. 
security and foreign 
policy, Euro-
parliamentary 
affairs) 
Pressure from narrow 
groups only where the 
impactions are 
calculable, otherwise 
only a loose public or 
elite opinion constraint 
Except where implications are 
calculable, governments and 
parliamentary elites enjoy 
relatively broad autonomy to 
pursue symbolic goals or side 
payments 
 
Based on this useful category of issue areas the analysis looks into the degree of constraint in 
regards to EU’s internal asylum system (distributional policies) and EU’s external approach to 
asylum and immigration. 
4.4 2ND STAGE: INTERSTATE BARGAINING AND ASYMMETRICAL INTERDEPENDENCE  
 
After the national preference formation stage is over, governments start forming state 
preferences and make up a strategy to maximize the chances of realizing their preferences in 
the outcome of interstate bargaining meetings. This is the second stage of the LI framework 
where the objective is to analyze the process of interstate bargaining in order to determine 
the distributional outcomes (Moravcsik 1993: 496).  
 
The framework of LI on intergovernmental bargaining rests on four assumptions: 
 
1. Interstate bargaining is voluntary (no threats of economic sanctions or military coercion 
to force agreement). This means that governments can reject agreements that make 
them worse off than a unilateral approach and will do so if it is in their best interest. 
Governments seek international cooperation only when it is in their interest compared 
to a unilateral approach alternative (Moravcsik 1999: 60+63) 
2. Full information (interstate bargaining meetings are rich on information).  
3. Transaction costs are low (negotiations span over a long time where governments can 
change positions and extend new offers at low costs) (Moravcsik 1993: 498)  
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4. Asymmetrical interdependence defines a government’s relative bargaining power. 
 
4.4.1 Asymmetrical interdependence 
 
The theory of LI rest on the claim that outcome of interstate bargaining reflect asymmetrical 
interdependences and relative bargaining power (Moravcsik 1999: 60). The LI framework 
predicts, in general, that dependent countries are more willing to compromise to achieve 
agreement (Moravcsik 1993: 499). This is because the alternative scenario of non-agreement 
will leave a dependent government in a worse off situation than if it had conceded to achieve 
agreement (Moravcsik 1999: 60-63). Thus the stronger ones preference to achieve 
agreement, the greater willingness is to compromise and the weaker the relative bargaining 
power. It follows that governments which are less dependent on other countries tend to have 
a strong relative bargaining power (Moravcsik 1999: 64). In this sense, the bargaining 
situations favor the larger, self-sufficient governments because they gain little by agreement 
compared to smaller countries with smaller markets and vulnerable open economies 
(Moravcsik 1993: 500). We should therefore expect the larger self-sufficient states to have the 
biggest say in the outcome of EU’s asylum and irregular migration policies.  
 
4.4.2 The Bargaining process and distributional outcomes 
 
The LI framework distinguishes between two determining factors of interstate bargaining: the 
unilateral approach and the amount alternative coalitions. These two factors manifests 
asymmetrical interdependence as a main determinant of interstate bargaining. 
 
The unilateral approach is, according to the LI framework, the most effective form of 
bargaining power. The unilateral approach concerns the threat of self-sufficient governments 
with large capabilities to veto or exit bargaining sessions, which forces more dependent states 
(usually smaller states with open economies) to make greater compromises/concessions to 
achieve agreement and cooperation. The unilateral approach forces therefore bargaining 
sessions to fall into a feasible frame for self-sufficient governments (Moravcsik 1999: 63-64).  
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Alternative coalitions: Alternative coalitions concerns the alternative option a government has 
to going alone (the unilateral approach). Governments may form/join an alternative coalition 
with the intention of threatening a state(s) with exclusion (Moravcsik 1993: 502-503). The 
threat of exclusion from a coalition can result in more significant cost for a government than 
if a single state threatens to exit (Moravcsik 1999: 64-65). As a result, Governments who are 
under the threat of exclusion, may in situations of high stakes accept cooperation even though 
it leaves them worse off than the status quo (the scenario of non-agreement) (Moravcsik 1993: 
503).  The option to form/join alternative coalitions favors large states which are necessary to 
form strong viable coalitions, but also government with preferences close to the median (since 
they can choose to join several coalitions).  
 
3RD STAGE: THE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE TO DELEGATE/POOL SOVEREIGNTY  
 
The institutional choice concerns the question why states choose to integrate and 
delegate/pool sovereignty to supranational institutions. The LI framework claims in general 
that states delegate/pool sovereignty whenever it is in their interest to do so. This claim rests 
on two grounds. First, interstate bargaining reduces transaction costs in interstate 
cooperation (in other words it creates an efficient voluntary decision making process). 
Secondly, it creates room for maneuverability of governments making them able to achieve 
domestic goals in intergovernmental cooperation that would otherwise not be possible.  
 
The fundamental way integration occurs is through sovereignty pooling (when governments 
change voting from unanimity to qualified majority voting) or sovereignty delegation (when 
governments delegate sovereign powers to supranational actors in certain issue areas) 
(Moravcsik 1999: 67). The choice to delegate/pool sovereignty is based on a rational 
cost/benefit analysis (Moravcsik 1993: 509-510). In both cases of delegation and pooling the 
governments calculates the cost/benefits of delegating sovereign powers in exchange for 
efficient and credible decision making. The benefits of pooling or delegating sovereignty 
depends on 1) the potential gains of cooperation exceeds the costs of non-agreement and 2) 
the level of political risk for domestic groups (Moravcsik 1993: 510-511). The need for an 
efficient bargaining environment requires in this sense both technical expertise, decision 
making facilitating bodies and external representation to handle the complexities of 
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integrating transnational economies (such as a natural agency that conducts external 
representation of the EU Member States, agenda setting and enforcement/compliance with 
EU decision making) (Moravcsik 1999: 71) (Moravcsik 1993: 511). The choice to delegate/pool 
sovereignty reflects in this way a desire of governments to control the domestic opposition 
(Moravcsik 1993: 515). The institutional choice of intergovernmental bargaining facilitates 
these desires in three different ways: 1) Bargaining sessions are undertaken taken in secrecy 
(national votes and meetings not accessible for the public) 2) parliaments have little 
opportunity to ratify intergovernmental agreements or decisions, 3) governments can 
undermine decision of national decision making by striking a deal in Brussels first.  
 
4.5 MAIN PREDICTIONS OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
After having presented the main theoretical framework of LI we can now move on to the next 
step of summing up the main theoretical predictions and expectations of its use to the project. 
 
1st stage: State Preference Formation 
 
Societal actors pressure governments to form credible international cooperation to 
avoid negative externalities of economic interdependence. Governments 
accommodate these societal preferences because it allows them to control the 
domestic societal outcomes and maintain office.  
 
Predictions: in political areas where economic interdependence (such as economic 
commercial liberalization and social goods provision) has a direct impact on domestic 
societal groups, the theory predicts high government constraint. In policy areas 
related to foreign- and security policy, the theory predicts minimal government 
constraint. Governments are in the latter case irregularly pressured by mass publics 
and media. 
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2nd stage: Interstate Bargaining 
 
The main purpose is to analyze the distribution of winners and losers of interstate 
bargaining processes, which are determined by asymmetrical interdependences and 
relative power.  
 
Predictions: The more dependent a government is on other countries to achieve 
policy goals, the weaker its bargaining power. The more independent and self-
sufficient a government is the stronger bargaining power.  
 
Bargaining sessions favor therefore:  
 
1) Larger states who are less dependent on other states for their political economic 
performance  
2) States (especially larger states) with preferences close to the median who can 
join/form several coalitions  
3) Wealthy states who can offer side payments to states with weaker bargaining 
power (usually smaller states) that make concessions to achieve agreement. 
 
 
3rd stage: Institutional choice  
 
The main reason why states delegate/pool sovereignty is to control domestic 
outcomes. International cooperation in the EU facilitates effective cooperation in 
institutions that ensures credible domestic outcomes. 
 
Predictions:  
 
 Delegation/pooling of sovereignty occur in political issue areas where the benefits of 
cooperation are high and where there is high risks/uncertainty of the future.  
 In scenarios of high conflict between states; small potential gains and/or low risk 
governments should prefer unanimity decision making or the status quo.  
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4.6 Analysis strategy and structure 
 
This section moves on to present the analysis strategy used to test the LI frameworks 
predictions in three steps: 
 
Analysis part one: analysis of state preference formation 
 
Analysis part one investigates public statements of EU governments from 2004-2014 to 
discern the preferences of selected governments in context with developments of EU’s 
external asylum approach and internal asylum distributional policies.  
 
In doing so, the analysis attempts to establish if government responses reflect underlying 
state motivations or constraint.  
 
The level of constraint: The theory predicts that policy areas where there are no direct 
consequences to economic interdependence, such as issues related to foreign policy, there 
should be minimal constraint. Based on this theoretical prediction, and the evidence from 
the literature review section on EU Member State external activities to manage/limit boat 
refugees, it is assumed that government behavior reflect minimal constraint in this specific 
policy area. On the other hand when it comes to EU’s internal asylum (welfare, social 
security and macroeconomic stability) we expect a higher degree of state constraint.  
 
Underlying preferences: The EU Member States preferences will accordingly be analyzed 
in regards to three underlying state preference factors: Economic motivations (the 
cost/benefits of protecting refugees), political motivations (such as promoting re-election, 
public opinion, ideology and party formations), and lastly security motivations (estimated 
security risk of taking in boat refugees).  
 
To narrow the framework, the analysis will focus on UK, Germany, Italy, Malta and France 
as primary country specific cases.  
Analysis part one conclusion: Conclusion on state preferences and government constraint. 
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Analysis part two: interstate bargaining and the distribution of outcomes  
 
The second part examines the current EU asylum system by asking: Who are the main 
winners and losers of the important political decisions on EU’s asylum policies?  
 
EU’s internal asylum policy: Here it looks into the current distribution of asylum seekers in 
the EU with focus on boat refugees, and the important rules and regulations. It takes 
careful notice of the main positions of the EU Member States in regards to uneven/even 
distribution, controversy and alternative policies (such as burden sharing and collective 
action/responsibility).  
 
EU’s external approach to asylum and irregular migration: Policy meetings conclusions on 
the strategy to integrate asylum and migration in EU’s foreign policy (winners & losers). 
This looks into EU Member State preferences in relation to key policy developments such 
as GAMM (the overarching work on EU’s external approach) and FRONTEX development 
and operations.  
 
Conclusion: Bargaining outcomes and preferences of Member States – what does these 
findings suggests about the selected EU Member States response? 
 
Analysis part three: The choice to delegate/pool sovereignty to handle the issue  
 
This analysis part seeks to find explanations (based on the previous findings) as to the EU 
Member States responses to the boat refugee/irregular migration refluxes in the issue areas 
of EU’s internal asylum system and external approach.  
 
It addresses the question of why EU Member States have chosen to delegate/pool 
sovereignty in certain issue areas and not others by looking into the controversy in the two 
issue areas of interest (EU’s internal asylum system and EU’s external approach to handle 
irregular migration/refugee influxes).  
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It addresses questions such as why the EU has not delegated competences to ensure 
collective burden-sharing (EU’s asylum system)? Why has EU Member States delegated 
competences to create the FRONTEX agency, and how can the EU Member States support 
of its purpose and activities be explained. In addition, it looks at the GAMM strategy and 
concludes on the pooling/delegation elements covered. 
 
 Conclusion: Controversy and competing state preferences (political 
disagreement/conflict) about the distribution of refugees, as well as unwillingness to take 
in refugees, has motivated EU Member States to handle the influxes of boat 
refugees/irregular migration externally. This is because they have a greater room for 
maneuverability and are pressured by public skepticism, security (liability to the Schengen 
agreement) and an economic interest in selecting the highly skilled migrants compared to 
irregular migrants/refugees.   
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5 ANALYSIS PART I: STATE PREFERENCES IN RELATION TO EU’S ASYLUM AND 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION POLICIES 
 
The analysis begins with an examination of the main trends of the EU’s asylum system in 
regards to:  
1. Mediterranean boat refugee routes and impact on the EU’s total asylum system  
2. Thereafter the analysis moves on to analyze public statements of the selected EU Member 
States, which are put in context with key policy events on EU’s asylum and irregular migration 
from 2004-2014.  
After the analysis of public statements is done, the results are compared with research 
conclusions from secondary statistical studies on public opinion on refugees and irregular 
migration and political discourses in the selected EU Member States.  
Lastly, the conclusions of the analysis part one are discussed in regards to underlying factors 
that determine government responses when confronted with refugee influxes (such as 
political-, economic- and security factors).  
 
5.1.1 Mapping the routes of refugee influxes: General trends and observations 
 
One of the general facts that are evident from statistical findings is that the patterns of refugee 
influxes and routes have varied over time. In figure 1 below the main routes and amount of refugees 
(here called `irregular migrants´) are displayed from 2000-2011.  
The most popular route has been the Central Mediterranean route (refugee boats from Tunisia and 
Libya towards Italy and Malta), which consistently has remained a top travelling route since 2002 
with about 20.000 `refugees´ arriving each year (with the exception of 2008 and 2011 where the 
number rose to 36.000 and 61.000 respectively) (UNHCR.org/3) (FRONTEX 2). The latest events from 
2011-2014 have since then varied greatly with a total of refugee arrivals of 13.200 in 2012, 42.925 
in 2013 and strikingly 207.000 in 2014 (Akkoc 30-12-2014) (UNHCR.org/3). According to this finding, 
Italy is one of the main destinations of boat refugee arrivals in these years. 
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The second of the most popular routes is the East Mediterranean route, where boat refugee’s travel 
from Turkey to Greece, Cyprus or Bulgaria. This route has remained since 2006 at the top (together 
with the Central Mediterranean route) with about 40.000-57.000 people arriving in the EU each year. 
It topped in 2011 with 57.000 boat refugee arrivals and declined since then in 2012-2013 with 37.200 
(2012) and 24.800 (2003) respectively, but increased again in 2014 to 50.830 (FRONTEX 2).  
Other important variations in the refugee influxes include the arrival of 32.000 refugees at the West 
African route, when the Canary Islands were a popular transit route, which was the highest number 
of boat refugees at the time. The boat refugees travelled from West Sahara, Morocco, Mauritania 
and Senegal to the Canary Islands (Spain) (FRONTEX 3).  
Figure 1: Migration in the Mediterranean source: (BBC 15.09.2014) original source: UNHCR   
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Figure 2: Map of the central boat refugee routes and land routes, source: (BBC 15.09.2014)
  
 
5.1.2 How big is the issue of the boat refugee arrivals?  
 
If we compare the data of total boat refugee arrivals (by sea) with the total amount of asylum 
applications, a few general trends can be observed. First, the Libyan uprising and later Syrian 
civil war seem to have had a significant impact on EU’s total asylum system judging by the total 
amount of asylum applications.  
In 2011, for example, the total amount of boat refugee arrivals (61.000) accounted for about 
1/5 of the total asylum applications (about 300.000).  In 2014 the total amount of boat refugee 
arrivals (207.000) accounted for about a 1/3 of the total asylum applications in the EU (about 
620.000 – see figure 4). Almost half of the boat refugees came from Syria and Eritrea following 
the conflict in these countries (see figure 6). 
Second, in comparison with the other years, the boat refugee arrivals have been relatively 
modest. For example, even though the boat refugee arrivals from the most popular 
Mediterranean routes grew in 2006 and 2008 to about almost 100.000, this does not seem to 
have affected the total amount of asylum applications in these years. Moreover, in the years 
2012 and 2013 the total number of boat arrivals decreased in all the main routes (FRONTEX 2) 
(FRONTEX 3), but the total amount of asylum seekers proliferated nonetheless. Therefore, it 
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seems plausible to assume that other factors, such as the total amount of refugees in the 
world, neighborhood instability and alternative routes by land or air, may have a more 
significant effect on the total asylum applications. However it is sufficient, for the purpose of 
this analysis, to conclude that the total amount of boat refugees’ arrivals (with the exception 
of 2014 and possibly 2011) has, in comparison to the total amount of non-EU asylum seekers, 
been relatively modest.  
Figure 3: Total number of arrivals by sea to Europe, source: (Akkoc 30.12.2014) – original source 
UN Refugee Agency) 
 
Figure 4: Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2004-2014 (thousands) 
(source: Eurostat 3)  
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5.1.3  Analysis of state preferences based on public statements from 2004 to 2014 
 
This section establishes that countries geographically located at the EU’s Southern maritime 
borders (such as Italy, Spain, Greece and Malta) have asked for assistance and solidarity from 
other EU countries since the beginning of 2004 till now. Their primary concern (based on 
statements) have been the need for burden-sharing with regard to the distribution, the 
suspension of the Dublin Regulation, and assistance (politically and financially) from other EU 
countries to help to solve the issue.  
Other countries, such as France, Germany and the UK, have in their actions shown a reluctance 
to change the EU asylum system (such as the Dublin Regulation). France has several times 
blocked refugees (they call them illegal migrants) in a dispute with Italy which threatened to 
allow these boat refugees to enter other EU Member States in violation of the Dublin 
Regulation.  
UK appears to have the strongest voice of critic in the EU. It has been since 2004 in favor of 
returning the boat people. Germany has remained relatively silent on the issue since the end 
of 2004 when Otto Schily, interior minister of Germany, proposed that boat refugees should 
be returned to their country of origin, or to camps in North African states, where they could 
apply for asylum. Since then, Germany has opposed change of immigration laws in the EU, and 
it  appears to be more worried about receiving more asylum seekers as a consequence of 
refugee influxes (from Greece or Italy).  
The EU developments and positions of governments seem to reflect an area of contest and 
controversy. There appears to be little will among several governments (such as UK, France 
and other countries not located at the Southern Maritime borders) to change the current EU 
asylum system with regard to the Dublin Regulation. Instead the majority of EU Member States 
appear reluctant toward taking in asylum seekers, or transferring sovereignty to the EU asylum 
and migration policies (to distribute asylum seekers and refugees evenly. Governments that 
are not directly affected by the boat refugee arrivals have remained silent on the issue (all the 
articles mentioned almost no statement of new 7  EU Member States – mostly Eastern 
European). Sweden has been an exception to the general reluctance toward burden-sharing 
                                                          
7 EU-new: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
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since it has taking in refugees and had one of the highest rates of approved asylum applications 
in the EU. All in all the EU’s collective response to the boat refugee situation seems to be 
nested in internal disputes on EU’s asylum system that reflect national preferences rather than 
solidarity or norms.  
 
5.1.3.1 Key EU policy development (2004-2010) 
 
Italy was at the center of the debate in the late 2004 (from August till the end of the year) 
following an increase in boat refugees at the end of this year in the Central Mediterranean 
route (see figure 1). Rocco Buttiglione, who was set to become Commissioner of Security and 
Justice, called for burden-sharing and co-ordination of the EU’s immigration policy. Similarly, 
Italy’s European Affairs Minister stated that the stability of the Schengen Agreement is not 
only a problem for Mediterranean countries (From FT 24.08.2004).   
In the start of October (2004) the Interior Ministers of the EU made a preliminary agreement 
to finance and manage migration transit camps in North Africa with the intention of sending 
back `migrants´. This was proposed by Germany’s Interior Minister Otto Schily (a plan that 
British government had proposed a year ago that was rejected) (Minder FT 02.10.2004) (Fisher 
FT 05.10.2004). Supporters of this plan were Germany, Italy and Britain (Fisher FT 31.10.2004) 
However, this plan was eventually opposed by several countries including: France, Belgium, 
Sweden and Ireland (Fisher FT 05.10.2004). Ireland and Sweden worried that these camps 
would be used as dumping grounds. The Swedish immigration Minister Barbro Holmberg 
stated, for example, that Sweden would not be for a new system that returned people back to 
North African camps (Minder FT 02.10.2004).  
A week later, Spain sought to put migration on the agenda at an EU Interior Affairs meeting 
and asked Brussel for financial aid (40m€) to help Morocco control borders. The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Moratinos stated that it was important for the EU to design an ambitious co-
operative policy to tackle immigration (Mulligan & Minder FT 11.10.2004).  
In October 25th (2004) following an Interior Minister meeting in the EU-25 little progress had 
been made due to disagreement and sensitivity (especially in regards to the decisions on 
whether to make asylum and immigration issues decided by qualified majority voting (QMV) 
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instead of unanimity (Minder FT 25.10.2004). However, this changed, as the EU Member 
States (Interior Ministers), with the expansion from 15 to 25 EU Member States, saw the need 
of qualified majority voting in the EU asylum and migration policy area and proposed to a 
change from unanimous decision making to QMV by April. Countries such as Spain and Italy 
had particular strong preferences in this area because then the unanimous decision making 
was insufficient in dealing with the problem of `illegal migration´. However, the obstacle of 
changing the voting procedure from unanimous to QMV was a sensitive one especially in the 
area of Justice and Home Affairs, where countries (in particular the UK) were reluctant to pool 
sovereignty. (Minder FT 31.10.2004).  
In August 2006 the Spanish Premier José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero called for the EU to help 
stating that controlling entry could not only be the responsibility for countries at EU’s gates 
(Caldwell FT 12.08.2006). This happened at the time when about 32.000 boat refugees arrived 
at the Canary Islands. In response, EU launched a FRONTEX led operation to confiscate boats 
and return the people (Fisher FT 26.08.2007). Military vessels and aircrafts were sent to 
control the situation (Caldwell FT 12.08.2006). The personnel and operation were financed by 
Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, France and Finland.   
In December 2006 the EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini suggested to make it a criminal 
offense to employ illegal migrants arguing that illegal work activity in Europe could be a great 
pull factor. Many EU Member States have already taken restrictive policies such as making 
employment of illegal migrants a criminal offense that can result in-jail sentences or financial 
fines (Laitner FT 01.12.2006).  
June 2007 Franco Fratiini, European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, called 
for the EU Member States to help as only 10 % of the helicopters, boats and aircrafts had been 
supplied to deal with the coming influx that summer.  He also suggested that the EU should 
share the burden of countries such as Malta and Cyprus, and stated that the current EU asylum 
system lacks solidarity (Parker FT 06.06.2007).  
In 2009 Jacques Barrot, EU Commissioner for Justice proposed to align EU’s asylum policy since 
asylum applications are treated differently (Pignal FT 19.02.2009). Barrot stated that in 
Sweden and Austria 25% of the asylum applicants are approved, which stands in striking 
contrast to other countries such as Greece and Slovakia (1 out of 30 applicants approved). In 
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2010 Greece was criticized by EU officials and EU Member States for breaching EU agreements 
on asylum procedures (Hope & Kontogiannis FT 25.10.2010). 
 
5.1.3.2 Selected Member States: Actions, preferences and statements (2004-2010) 
 
Italy 
In late 2004, the Italian conservative government, led by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, 
sought to limit the amount of boat arrivals by urging Libya to make greater efforts to stop the 
illegal migrants (Barber FT 14.09.2004). Rocco Buttiglione, who was to become European 
Commissioner, proposed camps/reception centers for immigration in North Africa that would 
take care of these migrants before they crossed the Mediterranean. In response to criticism 
for deporting migrants to Libya without allowing them to apply for asylum, the Interior 
Minister of Giuseppe Pisanu stated:  “We are confronting this emergency with the necessary 
determination and we will continue along these lines. The Assault on the Italian coast is 
organized by criminal gangs that ruthlessly cash in on illegal immigration” (Barber & Williams 
FT 04.10.2004). Gavino Angius, Democratic leader of the left, stated in response to the matter 
that “This new practice appears in clear conflict with the right to asylum recognized by our 
country” (Barber & Williams FT 04.10.2004). UNHCR asked for access to the people that was 
forcefully deported without success, and criticized also the Italian authorities on the grounds 
of discrimination by nationality. However, the Italian government appeared determined to 
deter these people from arriving to Italy based on Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu’s 
statement: "The desperate people who think they can land in Italy illegally must know that 
they will be sent back to where they came from as soon as they have received humanitarian 
aid," (Fisher & Bernstein 05.10.2004). In the last two months Silvio Berlusconi had travelled 
two times to Libya and made plans for coastal patrols and for the supply of training and 
equipment from Italy to Libya (White FT 11.10.2004).  Italy pushed for the creation of 
reception centers in Libya, and returned refugees to Libya after the arrival of two large boat 
refugees’ ships at Lampedusa. 
In 2007 after the change of government there has not been a major change in Italy’s asylum 
and immigration policy. This may have been because the left-wing government coalition only 
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narrowly controlled the opposition in the parliament (Fisher FT 26.08.2007). Possibly due to 
better relationships with Europe, Libya struck an informal agreement to combat smugglers 
and track down boat refugees. 
In 2009 Italy was again criticized for returning hundreds of boat refugees that came from Libya. 
This was at the time when the right-wing Berlusconi government had assumed office (Imeson 
04.06.2009) (Pignal 11.10.2009).  
In conclusion, Italy has in this period conducted restrictive policies to deter boat refugees from 
travelling to Italy, and been in favor of return policies and 3rd state co-operation (with Libya) 
to stop migration, trafficking and smuggling. 
 
France 
In 2004 the French Interior Minister, Dominque de Villepin, stated, in relation to the German 
proposal to create a refugee transit camps in North Africa, that the EU’s goal should be to 
return sub-Saharan illegal immigrants, who travel to North African states with the intend of 
migration to Europe, to their countries of origin (Minder 02.10.2004). France has also 
contributed with vessels, aircrafts and boats to FRONTEX operation in 2006 (Caldwell FT 
12.08.2006). Otherwise France has not been much involved in the matter publicly at least, 
judging by the low amount of public statements in NYT and FT in this time span.  
 
Germany 
 
In 2004 Germany assumed a leading role by proposing a plan to make return camps/centers 
for boat `migrants´ who are incepted on their travel to EU (Parker 17.09.2004). Since then 
Germany has remained silently publicly with regard to their preferences. However, similar to 
France, it has supported FRONTEX operations (Caldwell 12.08.2006). German authorities 
have also been strong opponents of delegating/pooling sovereignty to EU’s institutions to 
make common EU laws on migration (Laitner 01.12.2006).  
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Malta 
 
On the 4th of June 2009, before a meeting with the EU Interior Ministers was to take place, 
Financial Times (FT) interviewed Lawrence Gonzi, Malta’s Prime Minister, who expressed 
that he was disappointed that other EU countries did not share a larger burden of the asylum 
seekers. This interview took place a year after an increase in the boat arrivals at Malta in 
2008 (a total of 2 775 compared last year about 1 700, the majority of these people came 
from Somalia) (UNHCR.org/5).   
 
UK 
 
In late 2004 UK drew attention due to its history of being opposed to sovereignty 
delegation/pooling to the EU on asylum and migration matters (Minder FT 31.10.2004). 
David Blunkett, home secretary, stated that UK was being forced into joint processing of 
asylum seekers, and that Britain had contributed to FRONTEX operations to help Italy and 
Malta guard EU’s external borders (Jaggi FT 26.10.2004).  
During the time when the interior EU ministers discussed moving from unanimity voting to 
QMV, it sparked a domestic debate in Britain between the conservative opposition and the 
labor leader, Tony Blair. The debate in the UK on asylum and migration in late 2004 
remained intense even though numbers of asylum applicants had dwindled in this year from 
49,405 (2003) to 23,900 applications (2004) (Jaggi FT 26.10.2004).  
 
Internally, the UK has adopted restrictive policies. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work 
and they cannot claim welfare benefits. They are housed according to the asylum convention 
and the EU law, but they are only given about 40£ a week if they are poor.  
5.1.3.3 Key EU policy developments (2011-2014) 
 
From the start of February 2011 the Italian Interior Minister warned/predicted the rest of 
the EU countries that a possible invasion of 1.5 million North African would arrive at Italy’s 
shores following the unrest in Libya, and suggested that EU Member States should make a 
solidarity fund to Italy (100 million €) to help Italy and other EU Member States at EU’s 
Southern Maritime borders (Chaffin FT 25.02.2011). Cecilia Malmström, European 
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Commissioner for Home Affairs, called for the EU Member States to agree on suspending the 
Dublin Regulation in light of the refugee influx that were expected that summer (Pignal 
19.02.2011). Spain and France were among the countries that supplied money to border 
patrols (Pignal FT 19.02.2011). 
 
However, the suggestion by Italy’s Interior Minister was met by cool skepticism by other EU 
Member States that showed an unwillingness to spend money for preparation to FRONTEX 
patrol operations (Pignal FT 27.02.2011). Germany captured the skeptical mood of other 
countries (in particular Northern countries) when he stated that there is no reason to 
provoke talk when there is no refugee influx at the moment (Chaffin 25.02.2011). According 
to several diplomats Italy’s request for burden-sharing was met by skepticism since other EU 
Member States (such as Sweden) that had accepted far more asylum seekers (per thousand 
habitant) without complaint than Italy. According to an EU diplomat the blocking of Romania 
and Bulgaria’s entry into the Schengen agreement In June 2011 (mostly by Germany and 
France) reflected a concern that Greece’s debt crisis had impaired its ability to control 
`irregular migration´ (Barber 14.06.2011). The exclusion of Greece from the Schengen was 
later in September discussed in EU official circles (Pignal FT 12.09.2011). Tobias Billström, 
the Swedish Interior Minister, stated for example, that the exclusion of a country from the 
Schengen regime is an extreme measure, but “you cannot exclude it from the agenda” 
(Pignal FT 12.09.2011).  
 
In October 2013 Cecilia Malmström, EU’s Commissioner for Home Affairs, stated that EU’s 
Interior Ministers had agreed to bolster FRONTEX capabilities and “that more had to be 
done”, but this was not followed up by concrete action as no concrete agreement had been 
established. FRONTEX budget went from €120m in 2011 to €85m in 2012, and the EU 
Member States had, according to an EU official, decided to cap FRONTEX budget at €90m 
from 2014-2020 (Fontanella-Khan 08.10.2013). The following day, the EU Member States 
decided not to grant FRONTEX additional funding (Fontanella-Khan 09.10.2013).  Cecilia 
Malmström stated in a speech on Lampedusa next to 300 coffins that it was now or never: 
“Member States had to turn words to action” (Fontanella-Khan 09.10.2013). 
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Italy began its Mare Nostrum rescue operation in October 2013 (Fontanella-Khan 
09.10.2013) and had since then called for help by the EU Member States, since the budget of 
the Mare Nostrum costed the government €9.5m a month. The EU Member States decided 
to launch a FRONTEX led operation called `triton´ to replace Mare Nostrum (which patrolled 
from Italy’s coast all the way to Libya’s territory) that, however, turned out to be far less 
ambitious than the Mare Nostrum because it patrols a smaller area close to Italy’s shores, 
and operates with a third of the Mare Nostrum budget (FT (no author) 29.10.2014) (Schere 
31.10.2014).  
 
5.1.3.4 Selected Member States: Actions, preferences and statements 
 
Italy 
 
Italy has continued to call for the EU Member States to help addressing the situation, and 
used predictions of refugee influxes up to the summer (the season, where most boat arrivals 
occur) to make the other EU countries act (Pignal 27.02.2011). Skeptics in Italy, such as the 
Northern league party, have stated that the boat refugees should be sent to Germany and 
France (Segreti 22.02.2011). The Italian government appears, based on the repeated 
statements of Interior Minister Alfano, to be for the strengthening of FRONTEX and for 
changing EU Dublin Regulation (Fontanella-Khan 08.10.2013) (Dinmore & Segreti 
04.22.2014). Internally in Italy, the far right parties (opposition) have been skeptic towards 
the Mare Nostrum operation launched in October 2013. The Right wing leader of the 
Northern League party, Matteo Salvini, stated, for example, that he would try to stop the 
Mare Nostrum operation, because it encouraged migration (Dinmore & Segreti 04.22.2014). 
Maurizio Gasparri from Silvio Berlusconi’s party, Forza Italia, stated that Mare Nostrum had 
become a taxi service for migrants and that Italy was supporting the “merchants of death” 
that profit from human trafficking (Dinmore & Segreti 04.22.2014).   
In response to the criticism from the right wing parties, Mr. Alfano, leader of the New Centre 
Right party, stated that 19.000 lives had been saved, and this government would not 
exchange these lives for percentage points at the elections (Dinmore & Segreti 04.22.2014). 
Since then the Italian government has pushed for the EU to take over the Mare Nostrum 
operation (O’Leary 13.05.2014). Alfrono stated, for example, that if EU countries do not 
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contribute to the Mare Nostrum Italy will let asylum seekers enter other EU countries 
(O’Leary 13.05.2014).  
 
Germany 
 
During the proposals to bolster FRONTEX in 2013 Germany was one of the skeptics since it 
has no direct benefits (Fontenna-Khan 09.10.2013). It appears that Germany has been 
worried about that the refugee influxes might have affected it if the Dublin Regulation was to 
collapse. A spokesman from German Interior Ministry stated, for example, that officials in 
Berlin assume that the boat refugees will journey to Germany (Abé et al 15.04.2014). 
Germany’s response to the situation seems to be nested in domestic politics and 
skepticism/reluctance towards taking more refugees.  
 
Officials from the Interior Ministry stated, for example, that they did not see any reason for 
`special programs´ to handle the boat refugee situation in Italy since Germany was already 
taking 127.000 asylum seekers compared to Italy (27.000) (Abé et al 15.04.2014). With 
regard to politics Bernd Lucke, spokesmen for the euro-critical party, stated that they would 
use anti-immigration in their campaign up to parliament elections to ensure that the 
refugees that enter Germany illegally should be transferred to a safe African country, 
“otherwise more will risk taking the trip”, he added. (Abé et al 15.04.2014).  
 
Similarly Andreas Scheuer, general secretary of the Christian Social Union (CSU), stated that 
CSU would position itself among the anti-immigration camp during elections – stating that 
experience tell us that people arriving in Italy by boat seek asylum in Germany. Gerd Müller, 
Minister of German Development of the CSU stated that the main effort is to prevent further 
illegal migration to Europe from Africa (Abé et al 15.04.2014. In addition to such political 
statements, Public opinion seems to be a determining factor for Germany’s position. 
According to a survey by pollster Forsa, in March, one third of the German population wants 
Germany to take in more refugees (Abé et al 15.04.2014). 
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France 
 
The French authorities have since April 2011 been involved in cases of controversy with Italy. 
Italian authorities tried to circumvent the Schengen rules by issuing legal temporary 
residence permits to thousands of Tunisian arrivals so they could travel to the rest of the EU, 
but the French government countered this move by tightening migration rules for non-EU 
citizens (Pignal 07.04.2011) (Barber 14.06.2011). According to French interpretation of 
Schengen rules, one is not allowed to travel freely with a temporary residence without 
accompaniment of passport or a separate authoritasation. The French government 
responded by making addition police check measures at the borders. This culminated in an 
incident, where French authorities blocked train services (French authorities had at that time 
already intercepted 2.000 Tunisians) from Italy, which was a move intended to stop the 
Tunisian people from entering in France (Pignal 17.04.2011). France has also contributed to 
FRONTEX missions to stop boat refugees (Pignal 19.02.2011). With a change of the 
government (that was harsher on immigration issues), Jean-Marc Ayrault, French Prime 
Minister, has called for greater burden-sharing in the EU, and the French Foreign Minister 
has called for action to stop the deaths in the Mediterranean sea  (Fontanella-Khan 
09.10.2013). France along with UK, Sweden and Germany took in 70 % of the total asylum 
seekers in 2003 (FT view, no author 29.10.2014). All in all it appears that France has interests 
in burden-sharing internally with regard to the total distribution of asylum seekers and 
funding of FRONTEX operations to limit the amount of boat arrivals, but it seems apparent 
that France is not in favor of changing the Dublin Regulation.  
  
UK 
 
The UK seems not be in favor of changing existing asylum rules similar to many other 
countries as only nine countries were in favor of changing the Dublin Regulation (Parker & 
Chaffin 24.06.2011). Perhaps due to skepticism in the UK public on EU-related matters, most 
politicians see the EU as a bureaucratic burden (Moulson 03.11.2014 2014). Cameron has 
discussed making it harder for residents of other EU Member States to enter the UK, and the 
UK government has also opposed rescue operations in the Mediterranean by stating that it 
encourages people to travel (Moulson 03.11.2014 2014) (Smyth 06.11.2014). 
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Malta 
 
Malta has (again) called for solidarity and help from EU Member States to share the 
burden in response to the refugee influx expected from Libya (Pignal 24.02.2011). In 
response to the situation Joseph Muscat, leader of Malta’s opposition labor party 
stated that the EU is responding to the Eurozone Crisis (more Europe), but the 
immigration is being met with less Europe (Barber 14.06.2011).  Following shipwreck 
incident, where hundreds of people perished Joseph Muscat, Malta’s Prime Minister, 
declared in an interview with BBC that he was joining Italy in the next European 
Council meeting, and stated that: “until now we have encountered statements, words but 
little more than that” (Mackenzie 12.10.2014). 
 
  
5.2 PUBLIC OPINION AND SECONDARY STUDIES ON THE ISSUE OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
 
This section examines the public opinion on migration and asylum in the EU. The purpose is to 
analyze if public preferences are clear and unified, and whether this may explain government 
actions from the LI “constrain” argument. The analysis draws on statistical data on public 
opinion and comparative analysis of secondary studies.  
Throughout this section it is demonstrated that the EU public in general are skeptic toward 
asylum seekers and migrants. In the selected EU Member States, it is demonstrated that the 
public view asylum seekers as a burden to society, which both statistical data and the 
comparative discursive analysis findings seem to support. Whether this skepticism has 
developed through discourses from governments, media or other forms is unknown. However, 
for the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to conclude that discourses and public opinion 
appear to favor a restrictive policy toward irregular migration since irregular migrants are 
often associated with criminality, liabilities to security and economic burden for the society.  
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5.2.1 Statistical review: Public opinion 
 
It is difficult to decipher the public opinion in regards to the `boat people´ that travel towards 
the EU because most statistical studies have focused on the general public attitude towards 
immigrants (I could not find any statistical surveys on attitude towards asylum-seekers). `Boat 
immigrants´ is arguably not the same as `boat refugees´. The boat `people´ are made up of a 
mixed group of people that fall into groups of `migrants´ or `refugees´ after the asylum 
procedure is complete.  
Nonetheless, it is arguably not farfetched to use statistics of public opinion on immigrants for 
the sake of showing general trends of attitudes toward non-EU immigrants. Based on 
statistical data from Pew Global Research Center and Euro Stat (see figures below) It appears 
evident that many people are reluctant to take in more immigrants (see figure 4)  
Figure 5: Public opinion on irregular migration 2014 (Source: voxeurop.eu – original data 
source, Public Tableau 19.01.2015). The data is based on surveys of attitudes towards 
immigrants from non-EU countries (based on 5 categories of answers: don’t know, very 
negative, negative, positive and very positive). The figure below displays the percentage of 
positive attitudes by country.  
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Overall the general attitude towards immigrants from non-EU countries seems therefore to 
be skeptical (with the exception of Sweden). The most skeptical of countries in 2014 were 
Latvia (79 %), Italy (75 %), Greece (75 %), Cyprus (75 %), Czech Republic (74 %), Slovenia (74 %), 
Malta (73 %), Estonia (71 %), Hungary (67 %), Belgium (67 %) and Bulgaria (66 %) (Public 
Tableau 19.01.2015). Based on this data, it would seem that most skeptical countries are 
located at the external borders of the EU (southern and eastern) with the exception of Poland 
(only 44 % negative), Romania (only 38 % negative) and Belgium (not located at EU’s external 
borders).   
On the other end (by negative attitudes): Sweden (only 25%), Romania (38 %), Croatia (41 %), 
Spain (42 %), Portugal (44 %), Poland (44 %), Ireland (48 %), Netherlands 50 %), Finland (51 %), 
Luxembourg (52 %), Denmark (52 %) and the UK (57 %) (Public Tableau 19.01.2015). 
When asking the EU public (in 2014) if their country should accept more immigration or not 
there appears to be a general resentment in Italy (80 %) and Greece (86 %) compared to other 
countries, although the majority of the public in UK (55 %) and France (57 %) are skeptic as 
well (see figure 5 below). Interestingly, over half the population in Greece (based on this 
sample) answered that immigrants are more responsible for crime than other groups followed 
by Germany (48 %) and Italy (45 %). Moreover, a majority in Greece (70 %), Italy 69 (%), France 
(52 %) and Poland (52 %) agreed that immigrants are a burden to society because they steal 
jobs and social benefits. 
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Figure 6: Selected countries - public opinion on immigration (source: Poushter, Jacob 
(24.04.2015) – original data source pewresearch.org) 
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 Interestingly, the mainstream belief of the 
population in Italy, Germany, France, 
Greece, Spain, UK and Poland is that 
immigrants do not want to 
assimilate/integrate (see table 3). This 
belief seems to be most common in Italy 
(77 %), Germany (59%) and France (54 %) 
where the majority of the population 
(based on the sample) seem to agree that 
immigrants do not want to 
integrate/assimilate.  
 With regard to the views on immigration by 
ideology, it can be observed that most right 
wing governments are skeptic towards 
immigration. In France, Germany and UK 
the % difference is notably high between 
left- and right wing views on immigration 
(table 4). To some extend the previous 
analysis of state preferences showed that a 
stricter policy towards immigration under 
Sarkozy and Italy (from the right wing 
government led by Berlusconi) to the next 
government of Democratic Party leaders.  
 Table 5 shows that only in the UK, 
Germany and Spain are immigrants seen as 
a benefitting resource, whereas in France, 
Poland, Italy and Greece they are largely 
seen as a burden to society because they 
take jobs and social benefits. 
 
  
Table 3, Source: Pewresearch.org (19.05.2015) 
Table 4, Source, Pewresearch.org (19.05.2015) 
Table 5, Source: Pewresearch.org (19.05.2015) 
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Lastly, if we look at the difference between public opinion on immigrants from inside the EU 
and outside (see table 6), it can be observed that the public in all countries (Greece, Italy, 
France, Spain, Britain, Germany and Poland) are more skeptic toward immigrants from outside. 
The countries that are most skeptical are Greece, Italy, France, Poland and Germany whereas 
the public in Spain and Britain are almost equally concerned about immigration from the EU 
compared to outside.  
 
Table 6, Source: Economist (19.05.2015) – original source Pew Research. 
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5.2.2 Political discourses results from the clandestine project8:  
 
The Clandestine report9 (published October 2009) is based on quantitative data analysis on 
irregular migration and qualitative interviews with key informants spanning from 2000-2007. 
It is drawn in here to get a better general understanding of the domestic debates in the EU, 
and how the issue of irregular migration is discussed across countries. The second purpose is 
to understand the context of the statistical data and analysis of state preferences in the 
previous sections. The study has studied the following countries: Greece, Italy, France and 
Spain in Southern Europe; Netherlands, UK, Germany and Austria in Western and Central 
Europe; Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in Central Eastern Europe. In 
conclusion, the study finds three main trends on irregular migration:  
 
3 main conclusions on EU political discourses (based on the 12 countries above): 
 
1. Irregular migration is highly politicized: Numbers and figures tend to be downplayed or 
exaggerated even though irregular migration numbers are largely unknown (Clandestino 
2009: 2). This is partly due to limited data on irregular migration. Consequently, it is largely 
unknown how many irregular migrants reside in the EU Member States and how irregular 
migration has affected EU Member State policies (Clandestine 2009: 1-2). The Clandestine 
project finds that the lack of knowledge has contributed to an ill-informed policy debate. 
Politicians have, for example, often cited policy documents that overestimated the amount of 
irregular migrants in the EU to between 4-8 million, but according to Clandestine data there 
were only about 1.9 to 3.8 million residing in the EU-27 in 2008 (Clandestine 2009: 2). 
Moreover, due to the limited data on irregular migration it is largely unknown how many 
irregular migrants that reside in the EU. The lack of knowledge has led the media and 
politicians to cite wrong information on the number of irregular immigrants, which serve their 
interests (Clandestine 2009: 3).  
                                                          
8 The Clandestine project was an EU funded project that investigated irregular migration in 12 EU countries that 
looked into discourses in domestic debates and facts related to irregular migration among other things.  
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Another interesting finding is that irregular migration has been framed in relation to a `threat´ 
to `national security´ (e.g. violation of law and criminality, undermining sovereignty, illegal 
crossing of borders and a source of disorder); threat to the ` welfare system´ (irregular migrants 
erode our welfare system, steal jobs and do not pay taxes); threat to `national culture´ 
(Irregular migrants erode our culture, traditions and society) (Clandestine 2009: 4). This may 
explain the general reluctance to take in irregular migrants across the EU countries. 
2. The crisis of irregular migration is solved by appeal to effective governance (restrictive 
policies such as border security, deportation, financial resources spent on preventing irregular 
migration on hiring border guards and border equipment). This, in effect, shifts the debate of 
`irregular migration´ to the sphere of criminality (such as trafficking and smuggling) and 
stigmatizes irregular migrant groups (Clandestine 2009: 2). Other legitimizing move to 
enhance restrictive policies toward irregular migration is the rhetoric of irregular migrants 
having an unfair access to jobs or illegitimate claim to social benefits and public services. The 
clandestine report mentions the Immigration Law in Germany (2005), the Bossi-Fini law in Italy, 
and irregular migration related legislations in 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 in the UK as 
examples of restrictive policies (Clandestine 2009: 2-3). 
3. The side effect of these two trends has left politicians to worry about marginalization and 
vulnerability (international human rights protection has become a concern among political 
stakeholders). The UN and NGO’s have among others fought for the rights of irregular 
migration that has created a discourse of irregular migrants as a vulnerable and marginalized 
group (Clandestine 2009: 4). 
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5.3 SUB CONCLUSIVE REMARKS: 
 
We established in the first analysis part that EU Member States preferences were diverse, and 
that much of the controversy on EU’s asylum distribution seemed to have an influence on the 
EU Member States willingness to contribute to the EU’s external approach. 
The issue of boat refugees and irregular migration seem to be in the midst of this controversy. 
States have different interest in regards to distribution and EU migration rules (such as the 
Dublin Regulation), and altogether there appear to be a general reluctance among all EU 
Member States (except for Sweden) to take in more irregular migrants/boat refugees. The 
general reluctance toward immigration in the EU Member States may be a result of public 
skepticism toward non-EU immigrants across EU countries.  
The political discourses in EU countries may have been a contributing factor to the skepticism. 
The clandestine report has studied the public discourse in 12 EU Member States and seems to 
support the interpretation that asylum and irregular migration is a highly politicized issue in 
media and politics. This, it concludes, is largely a result of scarce information/knowledge on 
irregular migrants in the EU. The discourses and public skepticism may explain why EU 
governments have retorted to restrictive policies with a public appeal to effective governance. 
In the analysis of state preferences we saw that most vulnerable Southern EU countries (Italy, 
Malta and Greece) have been in favor of changing the EU asylum system. These countries 
appear to have the strongest preferences on the issue of changing EU’s asylum system with 
regard to greater burden-sharing (distribution of boat arrivals, participation in FRONTEX led 
operations and change of the Dublin Regulation). However, other governments such as France, 
Germany and the UK have stood their ground in regards to the Dublin Regulation. Based on 
statements they do not seem interested in having responsibility for more asylum-seekers or 
irregular migrants. Most of the Eastern European countries, and other EU countries that are 
not directly involved with the issue, have remained silent on the issue, and have not 
contributed with funding to FRONTEX operations to deter irregular migrants, nor have they 
answered Malta and Italy’s call to start burden-sharing.  
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6 ANALYSIS PART TWO: KEY POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ON ASYLUM AND 
IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND INTERSTATE BARGAINING 
 
The second analysis looks into the key developments of EU’s asylum and irregular migration policies 
separately to make sense of the integration developments in both issue areas (in context with 
conclusions from the first analysis).  
 The chapter starts by presenting the main directives and regulations that make up the EU asylum 
system, and goes thereafter on to analyze the distribution of asylum seekers internally in the EU to 
determine winners and losers of the current EU asylum system. It is concluded that EU’s asylum 
distribution remains remarkably uneven and controversial.  
 
 Thereafter the analysis moves on to analyze some of the key developments in the issue of EU’s 
external asylum and migration approach. The analysis suggests that both strategies are tied to a 
Member State policy goals of limiting/managing the influxes of immigrants and refugees. This is 
based on the first analysis where it was established that most EU governments were reluctant to 
have responsibility for these people. 
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6.1 EU’S ASYLUM SYSTEM: POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS  
 
In the following section the key developments of EU’s asylum system is presented and 
discussed. The analysis moves thereafter on to analyze the distribution of asylum seekers in 
the EU from 2004-2014 with the purpose of analyzing distributional winners/losers of the EU’s 
asylum policy with regard to burden-sharing.  
Subsequently the key developments of EU’s external policies is examined with a focus on 
FRONTEX, GAMM and other key developments related to EU’s external policy approach.  
The chapter ends with a discussion of EU’s asylum and migration policies in relation to the LI 
framework that pays specific attention to a particular question: Does the EU’s asylum and 
external approach to handle irregular migration reflect a case of asymmetrical 
interdependence? 
 
6.1.1 Key developments of EU’s (internal) asylum policy: 
 
The EU’s internal asylum and migration system rests on a set of directives, regulations strategies 
and proposals that are set in motion by the EC to ensure that the Refugee Convention 1951 and 
later protocol 1967 is carried out by EU Member States (ec.europa.eu 1). Some of the initiatives 
can be categorized into burden-sharing and the distribution of asylum-seekers, while others focus 
on the harmonization of standards in the EU. All in all these directives and regulations in the 
timespan 2004-2014 have sought to deal with problems of divergent asylum procedure treatment 
by country; divergent treatment of asylum seekers (reception directive); problems with 
refoulement (qualification directive) and burden-sharing (the Dublin Regulation). However, most 
of these problems seem to persist in particular with regards to the non-refoulement and burden-
sharing. The latter will be elaborated on in the section “distribution of asylum-seekers” below.  
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6.1.2 Main directives on the harmonization of standards: 
 
 The revised Asylum Procedures Directive 
- Sets clearer rules for asylum applications. 
-  Make asylum procedures faster and easier to do.  
 - Assist policy-makers and asylum applicants with training. 
-  Special help for children and other people who need support. 
- General rules on procedures (such as when not-likely-to-make-it applications can be 
accelerated) and rules on appeals to courts. (ec.europe.eu 2) 
 
 The revised Reception Conditions Directive 
According to the EC diverging treatment of asylum-seekers has been observed in EU Member 
States along with “inadequate” material care of applicants (ec.europa.eu 3). The old directive 
included minimal short-term standards with regards to the reception of asylum applicants 
(Council Directive 2003/9/EC: 18).  
The new directive, which is applicable in July 21st 2015, specifies that asylum seekers have a 
guaranteed right to housing, food, health care, employment, medical and psychological care 
(ec.europa.eu 3). In addition, it aims to create clear rules on detention policies by setting clear 
grounds for detention rules in EU (e.g. assisting immigrants/asylum-seekers with guarantees 
of legal assistance and access to communication with families and NGO human right 
organizations).  
 
 The revised Qualification Directive 
 
The new qualification directive (December 2011) has sought to protect 3rd nationals and 
stateless persons who seek asylum from refoulement since the old one allowed for divergent 
interpretations in national law (ec.europa.eu 4). The new provides a series of rights such as 
residence permits, travel documents, access to employment, education, welfare and 
healthcare etc. (DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU). 
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6.1.3 Burden-sharing  
 
 The Dublin Regulation:  
The aim of the Dublin Regulation is to establish what the EU Member States have the 
responsibility of processing the asylum application to avoid asylum shopping (asylum 
applicants applying to multiple Member States) and the phenomenon of asylum-seekers in 
orbit (no Member State take care of a refugee) (Thielemann 2008: 5). The Dublin Regulation 
has been criticized by UNHCR among others for creating a heavier burden for certain EU 
Member States (Thielemann 2008: 6). The EC has admitted that the Dublin System may result 
in extra burdens for countries with “limited absorption capabilities” that are particular under 
pressure due to their geographical location (Thielemann 2008: 5).  
 
The revised Dublin regulation has sought to address the negative tendencies, but there appear 
not to be any game breaking directives that solve the negative tendency of some countries 
having a larger burden then others due to geographical reasons (ec.europa.eu 5). 
 
6.1.4 The distribution of asylum-seekers  
 
As we saw in analysis part one the asylum distribution was a significant factor in the 
statements of EU country officials from selected Member State countries. In this section the 
distribution of refugees internally in the EU will be looked through to locate the source of 
contestation in regards to EU’s asylum system. Based on statistical data, it is argued that the 
distribution of refugees/asylum seekers in the EU reflects an uneven distribution pattern that 
can be traced from 2004 till the end of 2014. 
This claim rests on the statistical finding that certain EU Member States are responsible for 
the largest asylum `burden´. This seems to be the case both when we look at the amount of 
refugees/asylum seekers residing in EU Member States and the distribution of refugees and 
asylum seekers per habitant by country.  
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2004-2010 
The data of asylum distribution is listed in table 7 below, which displays the annual asylum 
applications on average in a five years period. The data shows generally a significant variation 
in regard to asylum distribution measured in total asylum claims, per habitant and GDP. 
Total asylum claims:  
In regards to total asylum applications (in thousands), countries such as Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, Sweden and The United Kingdom seem to share 
the largest burden both between 2001-2005 and 2006-2010. In 2006-2010 Belgium received 
(14, 4), Austria (13.0), France (37.1), Germany (37.1) Greece (16.7), Netherlands (12.6), 
Sweden (28.2) and United Kingdom (28.1). In contrast, the countries with the least share of 
total asylum applications were mostly Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria (0.9), Czech 
Republic (1.7), Estonia (0.0), Latvia (0.0), Lithuania (0.2), Luxembourg (0.5), Portugal (0.2) 
Romania (0.8), Slovak Republic (1.6) and Slovenia (0.3). The EU-1510 share of the total asylum 
applications amounted in the five years period to a stunning 88, 88 %. In 2006-2010 the EU-
15 shared 90, 6% of the total asylum applications (Hatton 2012: 10-11).  
Asylum claims per thousand habitant: 
 if we look on applications per thousand habitants from 2006-2010 (column 4), it can be seen 
that countries like Cyprus (4.97), Malta (3.8) and Sweden (3.07) share more than 3 asylum 
applicants per thousand, while other countries share more or less than 1 per thousand 
habitant. In this case Eastern European countries stand out (again) as having the least share 
with: Estonia (0.01), Latvia (0.02), Lithuania (0.06), Bulgaria (0.11), Romania (0.04), Slovenia 
(0.16), Poland (0.19), Czech Republic (0.16) and Hungary (0.31). Some of the EU-15 countries 
have also a low share of asylum applicants per habitant such as Germany (0.32), Italy (0.27), 
Spain (0.10), Portugal (0.02) and United Kingdom (0.46).   
 
 
                                                          
10 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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Asylum applicants compared with GDP:  
With regard to the last category, the pattern repeats itself but with different rankings. Cyprus 
(0.211) Malta (0.172), Sweden (0.091) take the lead with highest applications according to 
GDP while other almost all other countries share are minimal in comparison. Countries with 
the least share in this measure are: Estonia (0.001), Bulgaria (0.010), France (0.019), Germany 
(0.010), Italy (0.010), Latvia (0.001), Lithuania (0.004), Luxembourg (0.015), Netherlands 
(0.021), Poland (0.012), Portugal (0.001), Romania (0.003), Slovenia (0.006), Spain (0.004) and 
United Kingdom (0.014). 
Table 7: Annual Average Asylum Applications by Five Years Period (Source: Hatton 2012: 11) 
 1996-
2000 
2001-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2006-2010 2006-2010 
 Asylum applications (000s) Apps/pop Apps/GDP 
Austria 13.2 29.8 13.0 1.56 0.044 
Belgium  24.9 18.3 14.4 1.35 0.041 
Bulgaria  0.9 1.8 0.9 0.11 0.010 
Cyprus 0.4 4.9 4.3 4.97 0.211 
Czech Republic 4.9 9.5 1.7 0.16 0.007 
Denmark 9.0 5.7 3.0 0.54 0.016 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.001 
Finland 1.8 3.1 3.5 0.67 0.021 
France 26.2 56.3 37.1 0.60 0.019 
Germany 98.6 54.9 26.3 0.32 0.010 
Greece 2.7 6.6 16.7 1.49 0.056 
Hungary 5.4 4.3 3.2 0.31 0.018 
Ireland 5.7 7.8 3.4 0.77 0.020 
Italy 12.5 11.7 16.1 0.27 0.010 
Latvia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.001 
Lithuania 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.004 
Luxembourg 1.2 1.1 0.5 1.09 0.015 
Malta 0.1 0.6 1.6 3.8 0.172 
Netherlands 37.7 17.4 12.6 0.77 0.021 
Poland 3.5 6.3 7.2 0.19 0.012 
Portugal 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.02 0.001 
Romania 1.3 3.3 0.8 0.04 0.003 
Slovak Republic 0.9 6.6 1.6 0.29 0.015 
Slovenia 2.1 2.1 0.3 0.16 0.006 
Spain 6.5 10.0 4.6 0.10 0.004 
Sweden 11.2 29.2 28.2 3.07 0.091 
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United Kingdom  65.4 65.2 28.1 0.46 0.014 
EU-27 336.6 357.1 229.4 0.46 0.017 
EU-15 316.9 317.4 207.8 0.53 0.017 
 
2011-2014 
Total asylum distribution:  
The pattern of uneven distribution seem to have continued from 2011 till the end of 2014 
despite increasing total asylum applications in the EU (see figure 3). Although the total 
applicants in new EU countries 40 % increased from 2011 till 2012, the EU-old countries still 
share about 92 % of the total asylum applicants. However, in 2011 the share of asylum 
applications increased from 3 % in 2010 to 8 % in 2011 following an influx of boat refugees. 
The same trend happened also in 2008 where Italy’s share increased from 4 % in 2007 to 8 % 
in 2008 (UNHCR 2011: 12). 
Table 6: Asylum claims lodged in selected regions: (UNHCR 2012: 8) 
Regions 2010 2011 2012 Change 12-
11 
EU-
total  
240 410 277 800 296 690 7 % 
EU-
old11 
244 850 262 840 275 790 5 % 
EU-
new12 
15 560 14 960  20 900 40 % 
 
Asylum per thousand habitant 2012:  
According to the UNHCR statistics, the 27 EU Member States received on average 2.6 asylum 
seekers per one thousand habitant.  
Sixteen of the countries ranked below the average and 10 (out of 12) of the new EU Member 
States were below the average. The only exceptions were Malta and Cyprus which, similarly 
to the 2004-2010 analysis, ranked high on the asylum per habitant. This may be explained with 
                                                          
11 EU old: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
12 EU new: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia. 
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regard to Malta and Cyprus position at EU’s external southern maritime borders. The countries 
which ranked the highest were largely from the EU “old” countries (except Malta and Cyprus): 
Malta (21.7), Sweden (16.4), Lichtenstein (16.1), Norway (12.4), Cyprus (12.4), Switzerland 
(11.7), Luxembourg (11.5), Belgium (8.9), Austria (8.5) and Greece (5.7) (UNHCR 2012: 13). 
Asylum seekers compared to GDP:  
When comparing the amount of asylum seekers to the GDP by country, the UNHCR data shows 
(similarly to the previous analysis) that France ranked highest with (6.5 per capita), Germany 
(5.2 per capita), UK (3.7 per capita), Sweden (3.6 per capita), Italy (3.6 per capita), Greece (2.6 
per capita) and Belgium (2.4 per capita) (UNHCR 2012: 13). 
In 2013 the total amount of asylum applications proved to be uneven both in regard to asylum 
applications by country and asylum per 1 million habitants.  
The distribution of total asylum applicants were as follows:  
1st Germany (29 % of total applicants with a total of 127.000 applications), 2nd France (15 %, 
with a total of 65.000 applicants), 3rd Sweden (54.000 or 13 % of total applicants), 4th the 
United Kingdom (7 % with a total of 30.000 applicants) and 5th Italy (6 % of total, or 28.000 
applicants). Together these 5 countries accounted for about 70 % of all applicants registered 
in the EU (Euro Stat 4).  
The distribution of asylum applicants per 1 million habitant:  
The countries with the highest rates were Sweden (5 700), Malta (5 300), Austria (2 100), 
Luxembourg (2 000) Hungary and Belgium (both 1 900). This stands in a striking contrast to 
countries with the lowest rates: Portugal (50), the Czech Republic (65), Estonia (70), Romania 
(75), Slovakia (80), Latvia and Spain (both 95). Measured up there were on average 860 asylum 
applicants per million inhabitants in the EU28 in 2013 (Euro Stat 4). 
 
 
 
 
  
66 
 
In 2014 not much has changed with regard to the distribution between EU old and EU new. 
Total asylum applicants:  
The ranking of countries has, however, changed as Germany took the first place (202 700 
applicants, or 32 %) followed by Sweden (81 200, or 13%), Italy (64 600, or 10 %), France (62 
800, or 10 % and Hungary (42 800, or 7 %) (Euro Stat 5). The asylum applicants increased with 
in Italy with a striking 143 %, Hungary 126 %, Germany 60 %, Sweden 50 %, while it decreased 
in France with 5 %.  
Asylum per thousand habitants: Sweden ranked first (8.4 applicants per thousand habitants), 
Hungary (4.3), Austria (3.3), Malta (3.2), Denmark (2.6) and Germany (2.5). The lowest ranks 
observed was Portugal, Slovakia and Romania.   
 Figure 7: asylum seeker decisions (Source Economist 19.05.2015)  
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6.2 KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN EU’S EXTERNAL APPROACH TO HANDLE IRREGULAR MIGRATION 
 
The external approach to irregular migration is an interesting development in EU’s asylum and 
migration policies. The Tampere agreement in 1999 (European Council) was the first key 
development that led to the development of multiple strategies to handle EU Member States 
asylum and migration concerns. The Tampere agreement focused on four key areas of co-
operation: 1) partnership with 3rd state countries, 2) creating a common European Asylum 
System 3) fair treatment of third country nationals 4) management of migration flows ((source 
Geddes 2009: 19-20) 
This strategy has since then expanded into multiple platforms (such as the development of 
FRONTEX, eurosur (a surveillance system), co-operation with euro-pol and more (ec.europa.eu 
8).  
6.2.1 GAMM 
 
The GAMM (2005 later revised in 2011) is perhaps the best starting point because it has 
remained the overarching framework for the EU’s external asylum and migration policy 
(ec.europe.eu 6). The GAMM was created in response to a European Council meeting where 
a framework on the EU relations with 3rd states in regards to asylum and immigration was 
asked for (GAMM doc. 2011: 2).  
The GAMM report focuses on four key priorities of co-operation with 3rd states: 
1) Improving mobility of 3rd nationals to the EU 
2) Better organizing of legal migration 
3) Preventing and combatting irregular migration and eliminating the trafficking of human beings. 
4) Promoting international protection in regards to ` enhancing´ the external dimension of asylum    
The GAMM strategy distinguishes between different thematic interests. For example, the 
creation of greater room for `legal´ migration and maneuverability relates to an economic 
interests in attracting high skilled labor to travel to the EU and work (the first two priorities), 
but also students and other groups of `high qualified people´ are mentioned (GAMM 2011: 5-
6+12). Interestingly, the prevention of trafficking of human beings is seen as vital to fulfill such 
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goals of improving the legal `migration´ mobility that `can help improve the economic 
competitiveness in the EU´.  
6.2.2 Smuggling and trafficking: 
 
The GAMM report focuses on one hand on tough combatting of irregular migration and 
returns whilst it, on the other hand, stresses that `vulnerable´ immigrants should be treated 
as asylum seekers and be cared for (GAMM 2011: 5-6). How an immigrant is screened in the 
open sea is not mentioned. In addition, it states that:  
“A broad understanding of security means that irregular migration also needs to be considered 
in connection with organized crime and lack of rule of law and justice, feeding on corruption 
and inadequate regulation. The EU should continue to give priority to transfers of skills, 
capacity and resources to its partners [3rd states], in order to prevent and reduce trafficking, 
smuggling and irregular migration, and to strengthening integrated border management.” 
(GAMM 2011: 15).    
The combat on trafficking and smuggling of human beings seems therefore to be a vital part 
of EU’s external approach that seeks to stop `illegal activity´ of tracking human beings to 
Europe. The focus is on the traffickers as the GAMM report adds that EU Member States 
should collaborate with 3rd states to ensure that immigrant’s human rights are protected. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Refugee Convention 1951 and later Protocol 
1967 stipulates that refugees (internationally) should have a right to travel across borders and 
apply for asylum. This seem to question the ` legality´ of FRONTEX and Member States to return 
these boat people at sea where they have no chance to apply for asylum.  
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6.2.3 FRONTEX 
 
The research on frontex creation have examined frontex institutional creation in regards to 
questions of autonomy, accountability, financial dependency, purpose and activities. The 
research on frontex creation is limited as most studies have focused on frontex operations at 
EU’s external frontiers. 
Carrera (2007) has studied FRONTEX creation and operations. He claims that the development 
of frontex is part of “EU’s global and integrated strategy” (GAMM) to secure EU’s external 
borders from threats of irregular migration through umbrella cooperations (such as frontex) 
that help Member States co-ordinate intelligence, surveillance and co-ordinate joint 
operations (Carrera 2007: 1-2+27). He concludes that frontex is a highly-politicied that is 
dependent on EU Member States for its personel and activities13. In addition he finds that 
FRONTEX lacks democratic accountability as the European Parlament (EP) and the public have 
been sidelined with regard to non-transparrent frontex activities (Carrera 2007: 27-28).  
The conclusion about frontex lack of democratic accountability is supported by Pollak and 
Slominsky who similarely find that non-governmental actors such as the EP and national 
parliaments have been sidelined on information. However, they go a bit further in their 
analysis by concluding that frontex non-accountability is problematic because FRONTEX is not 
subject to important law principles such as the principle of non-refoulement (Pollak & 
Slominsky 2009: 904+918). In addition, they claim that frontex would be more effective if the 
EU Member States decided to make the agency more autonomous and give it steady support, 
since ` frontex is entirely dependent on the good will of EU Member States´ (Pollak & Slominsky 
2009: 904+920).  
Leonard has investigated the institutional complex process of frontex creation and unveilled a 
process of controversy and contestation between EU Member States (power struggles) and 
outside critic from human right organisations (Leonard 2009: 371-372). In a close examination 
of frontex organization he too documents that EU’s Member States exercise control over 
                                                          
13 The findings in analysis one confirms this conclusion as FRONTEX was dependent on financial contribution from 
EU Member States to operate 
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frontex activities in the management board (the organizations head body) where the 
decisionmaking is decided by voting. Here 1 vote is allowed for each participant and the EU 
Member States make up the large majority of votes with 1 representative each who are 
allowed to vote, the commission with two representatives that are allowed to vote, and the 
director of frontex who is is not allowed to vote (Leonard 2009: 382). He finds that the 
sidelining of the EP (the human rights champion in the EU) demonstrates the low priority given 
to human rights (Leonard 2009: 385). 
Luisa Marin has studied the connection between frontex creation and its activities on the 
Southern Maritime borders. Similare to other studies she finds that frontex coordination of EU 
Member State operations to police the Southern maritime frontier borders of the EU is 
undermining the principles of law (human rights and the principle of non-refoulement) (Marin 
2011: 486-487). 
 
6.2.4 Target areas of EU’s external asylum and migration approach 
 
Recent target areas of the EC to combat trafficking and smuggling of human beings concern:  
 
 Proposals to sanction irregular labor workers 
 Strengthening of FRONTEX and the improvement of border security (close co-operation with eurosur 
surveillance system). 
 An effective return directive for irregular immigrants (non-EU) and close cooperation with countries 
of origin (ec.europa.eu 7) 
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6.2.5 Recap research conclusions (EU’s external approach irregular migration): 
 
The above section has traced EU’s migration and asylum policy from the European Council 
decision in 1999 where the EU state leaders called for the integration of EU’s asylum and 
migration policy till now. Based on the brief presentation of key events, it has been established 
that EU’s asylum and migration policy seem to follow a strategy to manage/limit the inflow of 
irregular migration/boat refugees through policy initaitives such as setting up a new agency 
(frontex), 3rd state partnership (GAMM) to return these people and the combatting of 
trafficking and smuggling networks. Based on this small presentation of key developments in 
EU’s external approach, it seems that EU Member States preferences are more unified in this 
issue area. As has been previously argued, the EU Member States seem to have an interest in 
limiting/managing the immigration/refugee influxes due to public skepticism and a concern of 
EU’s asylum system breaking down.  
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ANALYSIS PART 3 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
The choice to delegate or pool sovereignty by each issue area (EU’s asylum system and EU’s 
external approach to irregular migration)  
 
Key findings on state preferences:  
It has throughout the analysis been established that public skepticism has been an important 
factor that may explain EU Member State reluctance towards non-EU immigrants. The general 
public skepticism may, for example, account for government interests in following restrictive 
policies toward non-EU immigration, and the efforts to limit/reduce the immigration of boat 
refugees/migrants. It may also explain why most EU Member States are skeptical toward 
burden-sharing, and why Sweden stands out as an exception to the general picture.  
Although the analysis has not found any evidence on the issue of Member State votes on 
burden-sharing, it is reasonable to predict, on the basis of the statistical findings on EU’s 
distribution of asylum-seekers in first and second analysis, that there is no qualified majority 
for burden-sharing. This is because there is a relative small number of states (and not the 
largest ones such as Germany, France and UK) that are willing to delegate/pool sovereignty to 
create a more even asylum distribution system.  
Moreover, the QMV system in the Council (interior ministers) has from 1. January 2007 until 
31. October 2014 been decided by the Nice Treaty where 255 votes out of a total of 345 are 
required to make a qualified majority (about 74 % of the votes). The Treaty of Lisbon has since 
then entered into force. It rules that 55 % of the Council voters (15) is needed, or 65 % of the 
European Union population (Europa.eu/legislation). It seems therefore reasonable to assume 
that integrating (delegating/pooling of sovereignty) has not occurred because of two 
important factors: 1) public skepticism toward non-EU immigrants and 2) no qualified majority 
to solve burden-sharing issues. 
The public skepticism (constraint) seems therefore to explain the reluctance of Member States 
to delegate/pool sovereignty to EU institutions in this issue area. In contradiction to economic 
and security factors, it gives a convincing account of Sweden’s exceptional rate of application 
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approvals and its relative large share of asylum-seekers in all measures (GDP, per habitant and 
in total).  
 
2. The outcome of EU’s asylum policy may be explained with regard to distributional 
winners/losers and competing Member State interests.  
 
We saw in the first analysis that the losers of the current asylum appeared to be the frontline 
states (such as Malta, Italy, Greece and Cyprus). The frontline states appeared to have the 
most intense preferences with regard to changing EU’s asylum system (such as the Dublin 
Regulation and the distribution of irregular migrants/asylum seekers on arrival). Most East 
European states (10 out of 12), along with other states who have kept low profile (notably 
most in the EU-new compared to the EU-old Member States), almost did not take any asylum 
seekers, and did not comment on the situation. There appear therefore to be a lot of states 
who enjoy the `free-rider mentality´ that are reluctant to change the EU asylum system in 
regards to more even burden-sharing. This may be because they do not worry about negative 
externalities (sanctions or consequences), or simply perhaps because most East European 
states have a skeptic public.  
  
The frontline states – a case of asymmetrical interdependence? 
Theoretically, from an LI interpretation, the frontline states decisions to comply with the rules 
of the Dublin Regulation (with few exceptional cases of exceptions in Greece and Italy) may be 
explained by the concept of asymmetrical interdependence. The countries at EU’s external 
border front lines seem to be dependent on the help of other EU Member States to address 
the immigration crisis to their country (based on statements). If they do not comply with the 
Schengen rules (such as the Dublin Regulation) they may be excluded from co-operation in 
extreme cases. The situation of status quo (non-agreement) would leave the frontline states 
worse off because this leaves the issue unsolved, which may be costly financially to provide 
for immigrants, conduct rescue operations and maintain coastal patrols.  
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The case of a potential breakdown  
 
However, the reverse could also be true. If the front line states, for example, get overwhelmed 
and run out of options to absorb the immigrants/refugees it may result in a breakdown of the 
asylum system that would result in negative externalities for other states. Thus, frontline 
states can use predictions of huge refugee influx pressure to convince the other countries to 
participate in burden-sharing for fear that the asylum system collapse. However, there is 
insufficient evidence to support such a claim based on the statistics of asylum distribution 
from 2011-2014 (the extraordinary refugee/immigration influx years) has not changed 
significantly. This may be because states such as UK, Germany and France have been skeptic 
toward Italy’s calls for burden-sharing since Italy has not accepted a high burden compared to 
other countries (such as Sweden). Italy and Greece have, for example, not taken in an 
impressive amount of asylum seekers compared to other countries when measuring approval 
of asylum seekers per thousand habitants and according to GDP. Yet still, the distribution of 
winners and losers appear to be an effective tool to understand the EU’s asylum policies. 
  
 The EU policy developments on EU’s external approach seem to be more promising 
(integration wise) since most EU Member States have agreed on strategies to combat 
smuggling and human trafficking as well as strengthening EU’s external borders (for example, 
FRONTEX led operations to reduce/limit `irregular migration´). However, controversy on the 
collective burden-sharing continue to be an issue with regard to FRONTEX external operations 
and Member State commitments to contribute. The distribution of burden-sharing is also a 
room for contention as many EU Member States appear unwilling to spend resources on 
collective missions (when not threatened with refugee influxes), nor are they willing to share 
a burden if they can “free ride” without negative externalities (no sanctions from other EU 
Member States). Although such obstacles present challenges to the integration in this issue 
area there appears to be a larger consensus on the external activities toward asylum and 
migration. This, as pointed out, seems to reflect Member States interest in limiting/managing 
`immigration´ externally (foreign policies), where the EU Member States are less constrained 
by international obligations and domestic constraint (public skepticism).  
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7 CONCLUSION 
This project has attempted to clarify EU’s response to the boat refugee problem by analyzing two 
related issue areas of EU’s asylum system and EU’s external approach to asylum and migration. The LI 
framework assisted the analysis with a three step framework that helped structure the analysis into 
three key parts of: 
1) Determining factors for state preference formations. 
2) Analysis of key developments in EU’s asylum system and EU’s external approach to asylum and 
migration. 
3) A discussion of the prospects for integration in both areas in relation to key findings from the 
previous two analysis. 
The project concludes that EU’s response seem to reflect narrow state interests and a general 
reluctance toward taking in non-EU migrants in most of the EU Member States.  
The most important determining factor appears to be the majority of public skepticism toward non-EU 
nationals in the EU Member States (with few exceptions such as Sweden). In addition, it has been 
established the asylum and immigration are highly politicized in several EU Member States.  
The public skepticism seem to explain the patterns of Member State activities in regard to:  
 Creating restrictive nationals policies in EU Member States toward immigrants.  
 The strife between EU Member States on asylum system subjects such as the Dublin Regulation 
and the distribution of asylum seekers internally in the EU. 
 The deadlock in the area of EU’s internal asylum system integration as most states prefer not to 
pool/delegate sovereignty in this area.   
 The shift of focus toward limiting/managing immigration and asylum externally due to domestic 
constraint.  
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The deadlock in EU’s asylum system may explain why EU Member States have enhanced co-
operation in the EU’s external approach, where the majority of states have agreed to:  
 
1. Combat trafficking and smuggling 
2. Enhance co-operation with transit countries and countries of origin to reduce 
immigration and refugee influxes (GAMM). 
3. Strengthen EU’s external borders (FRONTEX)  
 
Altogether the evidence seems to confirm LI’s prediction that EU Member States decision to 
seek international co-operation can be explained in regards to an interest in controlling 
domestic outcomes. The shift toward enhancing EU’s efforts to limit immigration and refugee 
influxes externally (in EU’s foreign policy) seem to create more effective means to secure 
preferences. The results seem to be a downgrading of EU’s image in regard to norms of 
human rights and refugee protection in exchange for greater control of domestic outcomes 
and efficiency.  
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9 ANNEX 
 
Annex 1 newspaper sources from the Financial Times and the New York Times 
collected from 2004-2014.  
Collective response: 
EU’s collective response is enlisted from page 2 to page 45.  
Selected EU Member States: 
Italy’s public statements can be found from page 46 to page 59. 
France’s public statements can be found from page 59 to page 64.  
Germany’s public statements can be found from page 64 to page 70. 
UK’s public statements can be found from page 70 to page 77. 
Malta’s public statements can be found from page 78 to page 82. 
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2004 
 
October 1, 2004 7:49 pm 
Title: EU aims to turn back would-be migrants 
By Raphael Minder in The Hague 
The pilot camps will not be used for repatriating illegal immigrants caught in the EU. 
Sweden and Ireland, leading opponents of such camps, had feared that they would be 
used as dumping grounds. 
However, Barbro Holmberg, the Swedish immigration minister, said that "what is very 
clear is that we are not going to use any new system to send people back to camps 
outside the EU". 
 
October 2, 2004 7:49 pm 
Title: EU aims to turn back would-be migrants 
By Raphael Minder in The Hague 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/980c0914-140e-11d9-aa94-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
EU actions: 
 
 
The European Union's interior ministers on Friday entered a preliminary agreement to 
finance and manage immigration transit camps in North Africa. 
The agreement is a turnround from a year ago, when EU governments rejected a 
British-led plan to check asylum seekers at immigration camps outside the EU's 
borders. 
 
Context: 
“As a first step, the European Commission said it would finance four-fifths of the €1m 
(£689,630) cost of five pilot schemes in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and 
Libya, provided Libya signs the Geneva convention on refugees. 
 
The pilot projects will be under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, with the remaining funding coming from the Netherlands, which holds the 
EU's rotating presidency. 
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The new tack reflects political frustration about the lack of progress on curbing 
clandestine immigration and on avoiding the death of migrants who drown in the 
Mediterranean as they attempt to reach Italy and Spain. 
Yesterday four boats carrying hundreds of would-be immigrants landed on Lampedusa, 
an island south of Sicily, bringing the total number of arrivals in 24 hours to about 800, 
police said. 
 
The pilot camps will not be used for repatriating illegal immigrants caught in the EU. 
Sweden and Ireland, leading opponents of EU-established immigration transit camps 
outside the EU, had feared they would be used as dumping grounds. 
But Barbro Holmberg, the Swedish immigration minister, said: "What is very clear is that 
we are not going to use any new system to send people back to camps outside the EU.'' 
Several ministers nevertheless insisted the existing camps would be a bulwark against 
immigration. 
 
Antonio Vitorino, the EU's commissioner for home affairs, insisted yesterday that the 
aim was "not burden-shifting but real burden- sharing" with Africa. However, some 
ministers went much further in showing their determination to deal with illegal 
immigration from Africa.” 
 
Title: On Italian Isle, Migrant Plight Draws Scrutiny 
By IAN FISHER 
and RICHARD BERNSTEIN 
Link: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/05/international/europe/05asylum.html?_r=0 
Published: October 5, 2004 
(…) Those events underscore a serious problem that European governments have 
tried, and so far failed, to solve. It is what to do about the flow of asylum seekers 
coming to Europe, mostly from Asia and Africa, many hundreds of whom have 
drowned while trying to cross the Mediterranean after being put into unseaworthy 
boats by human traffickers. 
In recent weeks, European leaders have been sparring over a plan proposed by 
Germany's interior minister, Otto Schily, to stem the flow by building holding centers 
in North Africa and allowing only those whose asylum applications are approved 
there to proceed to Europe. 
"It's an offer to help those who are in danger," Mr. Schily said, arguing that his plan 
was aimed, among other things, at helping to avoid the hazards of a sea voyage. 
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Mr. Schily's idea, discussed last week at a meeting of European interior ministers in 
the Netherlands, has gotten a mixed reception. Italy, which has received the largest 
number of African refugees, announced its support several weeks ago. 
Representatives of Spain and Portugal said after the meeting last week that the plan 
should be studied. 
But officials from France, Belgium and Sweden object that the camps would be set up 
in countries that do not have good records in protecting refugees' rights. Human rights 
groups and the United Nations have warned that it could seal Europe off from 
legitimate asylum seekers. 
"We are not taking part in this plan," said the French interior minister, Dominique de 
Villepin, The Associated Press reported. 
 
 
October 25, 2004 6:28 pm 
Title: EU ministers agree loose commitment on asylum 
By Raphael Minder in Luxembourg and Jimmy Burns in London 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/59822094-26aa-11d9-9157-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
The difficulty of agreeing on a common European Union asylum and immigration policy was 
highlighted on Monday when ministers stuck to a tentative timetable that leaves the door open 
for further negotiations. 
EU interior ministers agreed that the 25-nation bloc should aim to have in place a 
common asylum policy in 2010, but watered down the text of that commitment to allow 
for more discussions. The final text, which sets out the EU's plans for justice and home 
affairs legislation for the coming five years, is one of the main items on the agenda at a 
meeting of EU leaders next week. 
 
With Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, under domestic pressure over Britain's relations 
with Europe, Antonio Vitorino, the EU's outgoing justice commissioner, yesterday urged 
governments not to use Brussels as a scapegoat for their own inability to co-ordinate 
better and faster on issues such as asylum. 
 
"The European instruments are not sufficient because there are a lot of national 
exceptions and a low level of acceptance," Mr Vitorino said. "We need to move to a 
second stage with a clear timetable because target dates are helpful to put pressure on 
countries to move forward." 
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One of the most sensitive issues is whether the EU should take decisions on asylum 
and immigration issues by qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. 
 
Title: Somali Refugees Find a New Kind of Hardship in Italy 
By IAN FISHER 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/31/international/europe/31refugees.html?pagewanted=1 
Published: October 31, 2004 
(…) or the conservative government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, this 
movement from Italy to other European countries proves his government's central 
point: that Italy bears a disproportionate burden of migration given its closeness to 
Africa, and that there must be a unified European immigration policy. One such 
proposal is deeply dividing European governments: Italy, Britain and Germany 
support the establishment of so-called reception centers in North Africa so asylum 
cases can be processed outside Europe. 
Supporters say this would deter people from making the hazardous trip across the 
Mediterranean and would prevent loss of life at sea. Critics say this puts the best face 
on a policy that, in reality, would create camps that would allow Europe to distance 
itself from its legal obligations to provide asylum - and to, in effect, subcontract that 
obligation to nations without the same laws or respect for human rights. 
Critics also say it is unlikely to stop the most desperate from the world's worst places, 
people like Abuker Sheekh, 35, who crossed from Libya only three months ago. He 
knew life would be hard here. But comparing it with life in Somalia, he said he did 
not care. 
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October 31, 2004 5:48 pm 
Title, Brussels agenda: Missed objectives 
By Raphael Minder 
 
On Friday EU government leaders are expected finalise a programme that will set the 
EU's policy goals in justice and home affairs for the coming five years. 
One of the more pressing issues on their agenda will be whether to switch by next April 
to a qualified majority voting system for asylum and immigration issues, which would 
make it easier to avoid the kind of deadlock often brought about by unanimity voting 
procedures. 
 
The expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 member states has forced a rethink of the way 
the EU monitors its external borders. At the same time, governments, in particular in 
southern Europe, have grown increasingly frustrated about the lack of progress in 
curbing illegal immigration and avoiding the kind of humanitarian tragedies that have 
seen hundreds of people drown in the Mediterranean as they attempted to reach the 
shores of Italy and Spain. 
 
Yet recognition of this common challenge has run headlong into concerns about 
maintaining national sovereignty, in particular in countries like the UK. Alongside 
defence and taxation, justice and home affairs is arguably the one area of policy where 
EU governments appear most reluctant to cede control to Brussels and the EU's 
institutional mechanism. 
 
Title: All EU countries ‘should bear border control costs' 
24. august 2004 
By Thomas Fromm in Milan 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/018db5d4-f5f8-11d8-b814-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Rocco Buttiglione, who is set to take responsibility for justice and security in the new EU 
commission, wants all member states to share the burden of securing the bloc's 
external borders. 
Italy's European affairs minister says countries such as Luxembourg also benefit from 
cost-intensive coastal protection and security provided by member states such as Italy 
and Spain. 
 
“In the light of the EU's open borders this security service must have its price. Schengen 
[the accord dispensing with border controls] is not only the problem of the 
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Mediterranean countries,” he said in an interview with FT Deutschland, the FT's sister 
paper. 
 
Mr Buttiglione added that any form of burden-sharing of costs would have to be 
preceded by establishing a common European immigration policy. “If countries are 
going to pay coastal security services, they must have a say on how and for what the 
money is spent on,” he said. 
 
He has been pushing towards a common European policy on immigration involving 
better co-operation in the area of immigration and border control. 
 
Italy, the biggest target for illegal immigration, has been at the centre of the immigration 
debate, because it has had to bear a high cost as a gateway for immigrants from the 
Balkans and North Africa who often then want to travel further north. 
 
Guiseppe Pisanu, Italy's interior minister has recently called for a common European 
border police to help regulate the wave of illegal immigrants. Mr Buttiglione also seeks 
stronger EU action to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into Europe from North Africa 
and elsewhere. 
 
For Mr Buttiglione, what is important is not so much the need for a multinational police 
force but “efficient co-ordination of a common European immigration policy”. 
 
2005 
 
October 11, 2005 5:48 pm 
Spain, Morocco demand EU action on immigration 
By Mark Mulligan and Raphael Minder 
 
Spain [like Italy] has asked Brussels for €40m to help Morocco control its borders and combat 
human trafficking. Madrid is also expected to press today for greater EU cooperation on 
immigration at a meeting of EU justice and interior ministers. Mr Moratinos insists it is “an 
important and urgent priority not only for Spain but for the entire EU to design a very ambitious 
policy for cooperation in tackling immigration.” 
 
But the cautious response by Brussels and other EU nations to the Moroccan refugee 
crisis highlights the limits of EU cooperation in immigration and asylum policy. EU 
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ministers, who have been debating common asylum standards for almost a decade, last 
year made a general commitment to establish a common asylum policy by 2010. 
The dramatic refugee situation also shows the shortcomings of the EU's neighbourhood 
policy, even though Brussels considers Morocco one of the relative success stories in 
its 10 year-program to deepen ties with countries on the southern side of the 
Mediterranean. 
 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister and member of the European 
parliament, said: “Europe needs to make claims on these countries and condition its 
support as far as the modernisation process, human rights and democracy are 
concerned.” 
 
Apart from drawing fire from aid agencies, the latest episode has revived debate about 
Spain's role as a transit point for African migrants. Domestic and European critics of 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, prime minister, say a virtual amnesty for many of the 
estimated 1.5m illegal workers in Spain had encouraged a flood of sub-Saharan 
Africans to try their luck . 
 
In a weekend German newspaper interview, Otto Schily, the German interior minister, 
criticised Spain's unilateral decision to grant such an amnesty. He said: “Wide-ranging 
campaigns to legalise immigrants such as in Spain mean more illegal immigrants are 
drawn to Europe . . . In the long term immigration and refugee problems cannot be 
solved with unilateral action.” 
Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister, said his country's experience with such an 
amnesty policy had yielded “very mixed results”. 
 
2006 
 
August 12, 2006 3:00 am 
Utopia with border control 
By Christopher Caldwell  
 
 
For the past year, Spanish premier José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has been calling for 
help from the EU. "Regulating the conditions for entry", he wrote, "cannot be the 
exclusive responsibility of those who are near the gate." In one respect, this is 
hypocritical effrontery. Exclusive responsibility is just what Mr Zapatero claimed in April 
2005 when he offered amnesty to more than half a million illegal immigrants, freeing 
them to take up residency elsewhere in the EU. 
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But that does not mean Mr Zapatero is wrong. Far from saddling the EU with an 
onerous responsibility, the immigration crisis has provided its first opportunity for 
meaningful institution-building since the Franco-Dutch repudiation of the EU 
constitutional treaty in 2005. Military vessels and aircraft, with personnel from Spain, 
Italy, Germany, Portugal, France and Finland, are already patrolling the Mediterranean 
under the aegis of Frontex - the EU border guard launched by Franco Frattini, Italy's 
European commissioner, last year. Frontex forces are scheduled to begin patrolling the 
Mauritanian route in coming days. 
 
Many leaders are keen to cast border patrol as a humanitarian mission. They stress that 
6,000 people have died trying to enter Europe since 1993 and that human traffickers in 
Africa are running a €300m-a-year business. All that is true enough, but it is being used 
as rationalisation and window dressing. What is happening is that, after years of 
proclaiming a "solidarity" based on inclusion and values, the EU is beginning to practise 
a less utopian solidarity based on exclusion and defence. Frontex may have 
humanitarian effects, but these are incidental to missions that will be primarily military. 
 
December 1, 2006 2:00 am 
EU plans crackdown on employers over illegals 
By Sarah Laitner in Brussels 
 
Employers who give jobs to illegal immigrants in the European Union face the prospect of fines 
or even imprisonment as part of legislative plans under consideration by Brussels. 
Franco Frattini, EU justice commissioner, views the shadow economy as a big "pull" 
factor for thousands of would-be illegal entrants who each year embark on perilous 
journeys to reach the EU. 
He has his sights on the farming, building and catering sectors in an effort to prevent 
employers exploiting clandestine workers and to reduce people trafficking. 
 
An EU official said yesterday many of the EU's 25 members made it a criminal offence 
to employ illegal immigrants, but the nature of the punishments varied widely. Mr 
Frattini's measures are designed to usher in a more unified approach. 
 
In the UK, employers can be fined under toughened laws dating from 2004, but do not 
face jail terms. EU officials are considering proposing punishments including prison 
sentences. 
 
However, some countries such as Germany have resisted moves towards common EU 
rules on immigration. 
 
Certain governments have also been critical of moves by Brussels to reach into criminal 
law, traditionally the remit of member states. 
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2007 
June 6, 2007 7:57 pm 
Title: Europe warned on migrants 
By George Parker in Brussels 
 
 
Europe’s half-hearted attempt to patrol its maritime borders was exposed on 
Wednesday, as the EU’s justice commissioner predicted another wave of migrants 
heading across the sea from Africa this summer. 
Franco Frattini said only one-tenth of the aircraft, helicopters and planes promised by 
member states to address the issue had been supplied. 
 
Context: 
 
His comments came the week after 27 shipwrecked Africans spent three days clinging 
to tuna nets in the Mediterranean while Malta and Libya argued over who should pick 
them up. 
 
Mr Frattini said he was “shocked” by the images, but he feared there would be other 
such scenes unless Europe patrolled the seas effectively and provided rescue services 
for migrants who got into trouble. 
 
“I believe this summer there will be many attempts made by desperate people to get to 
Europe,” he said. 
 
Mr Frattini will next week urge interior ministers to honour their commitments to provide 
115 boats and 50 helicopters and planes to patrol coastal waters, claiming that Europe 
had only a “virtual toolbox” for tackling the problem. 
 
The sea and air patrol is supposed to be provided by member states under the co-
ordination of Frontex, the EU’s fledgling border control agency. 
 
Mr Frattini also proposed that all EU members should share the burden of dealing with 
large-scale migration with those countries on the front line such as Malta and Cyprus. 
That could include financial help for the countries most affected or an agreement by 
other member states to resettle refugees and asylum seekers. 
 
“The current system shows a lack of burden sharing or solidarity,” he said. “One day all 
member states will probably face the same problem.” 
Mr Frattini has been outspoken in his criticism of Malta over its handling of the recent 
shipwreck in the Mediterranean. 
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”The obligation to save lives at sea comes from international tradition that no country 
has ever violated in such a manifest way,” Mr Frattini told Italy’s La Repubblica last 
weekend. 
 
Malta’s foreign minister, Michael Frendo, told France’s Le Figaro newspaper on 
Wednesday that criticism of his country was “too hasty, misinformed and badly 
directed”. 
 
Title: For African Migrants, Europe Gets Further Away 
By IAN FISHER 
Published: August 26, 2007 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/europe/26mediterranean.html 
For years, the clandestine flotilla of boats — sailing over the Mediterranean for Southern 
Europe, or in the case of Spain also over the east Atlantic for an initial stop in the Canary 
Islands — has stood as the most disturbing symbol for Europe’s larger problem of 
immigration. The migrants wash up, alive and dead, most often in summer, at times along 
the beaches where Europeans vacation. 
They are perhaps the most stark component of a quandary Europe has had much trouble 
solving: how to continue to meet its international obligation to protect those fleeing war and 
persecution while keeping out those it fears will form a permanent underclass or, in the 
worst cases, expose their countries to terrorism. 
(…) 
Last year, Frontex, a new European Union agency charged with border security, began 
patrolling the Mediterranean with boats and aircraft. Spain has engaged in joint patrols with 
Morocco and Senegal, confiscating boats before they sail and intercepting others that make 
it out to sea. 
Spain has also initiated programs praised by many advocacy groups that have opened up 
more legal ways to enter the country for immigrants who might otherwise make dangerous 
sea crossings. 
 
2009 
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February 18, 2009 11:47 pm 
Title: EU proposes team to align asylum policy 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
Human rights groups, including the UNHCR, the United Nations’ refugee agency have 
in the past criticised the EU for the wide differences in how asylum seekers are treated 
in different parts of the bloc. 
 
By Mr Barrot’s own admission, member states’ responses to refugees vary widely in 
spite of increasing co-ordination in the field since 2004. 
 
An estimated one in four asylum demands are responded to positively in countries such 
as Sweden and Austria, compared with about one in 30 in Slovakia or Greece, he said. 
The conditions under which asylum seekers are processed have also been criticised, 
with Mediterranean islands in particular struggling to cope with levels of asylum 
demands disproportionate to local population levels. 
 
Mr Barrot stressed that asylum rules remained a national issue but said the new agency 
would ensure “asylum seekers are treated in more or less the same way”, wherever 
they land. 
 
The funding and mooted staffing for the putative agency – with fewer than 100 
personnel and €15m ($18.8m, £13.2m) running costs by 2013 – reflects member states’ 
desire to keep asylum policy firmly within their mandate, one diplomat said. 
“The EU cannot run asylum policies for any country,” he said, “but it can shine a light on 
and point the finger at those countries that are not pulling their weight.” 
 
Title: Brussels wants more refugees settled 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
September 2, 2009 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bed935e4-97e9-11de-8d3d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
 
The European Union unveiled proposals on Wednesday aimed at pushing its member 
states to resettle more refugees within its borders as a row flared between Brussels and 
the Italian government over its treatment of boat people. 
The new proposals would enable Brussels to offer financial help to countries that 
resettle recognised refugees outside their borders, for example Iraqis in Jordan or 
Somalis in Kenya. 
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Ultimately, the Commission hopes it can persuade member states to use standardised 
guidelines when processing refugees, thus ending discrepancies in which some 
members reject virtually all asylum demands. 
 
Meanwhile, it is trying to induce member states that receive few asylum applications 
voluntarily to take in up to 2,000 of those that have landed in Malta and Italy, which 
have received the bulk of asylum applications because of their Mediterranean 
coastlines. 
 
EU, Malta and Italy: 
 
The unveiling of the new proposal was largely overshadowed by the spat with the Italian 
authorities, however. Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister, on Wednesday 
reiterated calls made on Tuesday by Silvio Berlusconi, the prime minister, that EU 
officials should be barred from making public statements lest they interfere in domestic 
politics. 
The Italian government’s ire followed a Commission spokesman’s confirmation this 
week that Brussels had sent Italy and Malta a letter questioning an incident in which a 
boat full of immigrants was turned back without giving its passengers the chance to 
request asylum, apparently contravening international law. 
An earlier, similar letter sought to verify reports that 73 Eritreans had died last month 
while attempting to reach European shores from Libya. 
The Commission’s chief spokesman said on Wednesday that its questions in no way 
implied any wrongdoing by Italy. “There is no need to take this polemic much further,” 
he said, adding that individual commissioners and their spokesmen would continue to 
make public comments to reflect the body’s “collegiate” composition. 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Italy has since May 
pushed back at least 900 people trying to reach it by sea, most of them being returned 
to Libya. The refugee agency expressed serious concern over the legality of such 
moves. 
 
 
 
 
 
October 11, 2009 6:53 pm 
UN warns EU against scapegoating migrants 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/81fcb4b8-b687-11de-8a28-00144feab49a.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
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“You cannot have a single European space in which you can circulate freely without a 
passport, with different criteria in the asylum system. 
“This dysfunctionality needs to be addressed,” said Mr Guterres, who is encouraging 
tentative moves that would boost co-operation at EU level. 
It is virtually impossible to obtain asylum in Greece, for example, whereas northern 
European countries tend to be welcoming, he pointed out. 
Mr Guterres welcomed evidence that EU members were voluntarily resettling more 
people who had been granted refugee status by other countries, for example Iraqis 
stranded in Syria who were being given the right to move to Sweden. 
 
But he worried that “the development of attitudes in public opinion that tend to transform 
foreigners in general, and asylum seekers in particular, as scapegoats of the current 
economic crisis”. 
 
2010 
 
 
October 25, 2010 7:58 pm 
Asylum crisis adds to Athens’ EU woes 
 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e632f9b8-e068-11df-99a3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
“Greece’s asylum system has come under added pressure in recent months as other 
entry points into the EU have been shut down, notably those using the Mediterranean 
sea route,” says Liz Collett, a policy fellow at the Migration Policy Institute, a think-tank. 
That Greece is the venue for such a rapid influx is a headache for the European Union, 
which has criticised the country for its poor record of dealing with asylum seekers in 
recent years. 
 
The Greek government currently faces being taken to the European Court of Justice by 
Brussels for breaching EU agreements on asylum procedures. It receives grants from 
the EU to deal with border and migration issues, but claims that its current fiscal 
troubles prevent it from spending more in those areas. 
 
An official from the Greek ministry of citizen protection called the situation “critical” and 
argued more should be done by its European partners to help out. “Greece’s borders 
are EU borders and [it] asks for EU solidarity to deal with a serious humanitarian issue,” 
the official said. 
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Until now, Greece has struggled to find support for its policies. Athens has faced 
repeated attacks by Brussels, EU governments and rights groups for its apparently 
systematic turning-down of asylum applications. 
 
“If you are an Afghan seeking asylum in Greece, your chances of success are less than 
1 per cent, but if you go to Sweden or Finland, that rises to above 90 per cent,” says 
Martin Watson, director of advocacy at the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. 
The situation is straining long-running conventions in the EU about how to process 
asylum seekers. 
 
Under rules in place since 1990, asylum seekers have to request refugee status in the 
first EU country they arrive in, to avoid a single asylum seeker making multiple requests. 
But in recent months, many Nordic countries, the UK and Germany among others have 
stopped transferring those asylum seekers that entered the EU through Greece, worried 
that the refugees’ cases will not be assessed thoroughly. 
 
“Most interior ministries, given the chance, will take up any opportunity to rid themselves 
of potential refugees, especially if they can do so within European rules,” one diplomat 
says. “That they would stop sending [asylum seekers] back to Greece just highlights 
how concerned they are.” 
 
Those interior ministries now worry that potential asylum seekers will travel through 
Greece without seeking refuge there, instead waiting until they reach other EU 
countries. 
 
The Greek problem also threatens expansion of the Schengen passport-free zone, 
which currently extends to all nations bar the UK, Ireland, Bulgaria and Romania; as 
well as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. 
 
 
October 25, 2010 8:09 pm 
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Brussels to help guard Greece’s Turkish border 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
 
European authorities have agreed to send a team of border guards to help patrol 
Greece’s frontier with Turkey, which has emerged as the main point of entry for illegal 
immigrants to the European Union. 
 
It is the first time Brussels has had to help secure an EU border and follows a request 
from the Greek government after an explosion in the number of asylum seekers and 
migrants looking to gain access to the bloc via Greece. 
 
According to the European Commission, 90 per cent of illegal entries into the EU are 
now made at the Greek-Turkish border – 45,000 in the first half of 2010 alone. 
Once in Greece, most migrants seek to access other parts of the bloc, many of whose 
borders have been abolished as a result of the 1985 Schengen Agreement. 
“The flows of people crossing the border irregularly have reached alarming proportions, 
and Greece is manifestly not able to face this situation alone,” said Cecilia Malmström, 
European commissioner for home affairs. 
 
Frontex, the EU border agency, has yet to decide how many staff will be deployed and 
for how long. 
 
Migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and eastern Africa – many of them guided by 
people-smugglers – have identified a 12.5km isolated stretch in north-eastern Thrace 
province as an easy way into Greece and into the EU, officials said. 
 
The surge at the Greek-Turkish border follows EU agreements with north African 
states, notably Libya, which made it harder for asylum seekers to cross the 
Mediterranean, until recently the most popular migration route to Europe. 
 
 
2011 
 
February 19, 2011 3:35 am 
EU to step up Mediterranean control 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
  
106 
 
The European Union is to coordinate border patrol missions in the Mediterranean 
because of concern that unrest in North Africa could lead to waves of migration towards 
Europe, its top home affairs official said on Friday. 
 
The patrol, to be operational as early as the start of next week, will focus on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, which has seen nearly 6,000 migrants from Tunisia reach its 
shores since the country’s authoritarian regime collapsed a month ago. 
 
France and Spain are understood to be among the countries that will provide support for the 
mission, which will be coordinated by the EU’s Frontex border agency. 
Cecilia Malmström, European commissioner for home affairs, warned that further unrest 
in North Africa would increase migration flows to Europe. 
 
“There’s a realistic prospect that people will come to Europe on a short-term basis, 
because democracy will take time to build in that region,” she said in an interview. 
 
The Frontex patrol will include an element of air support to give early indication of 
increased sea-crossing activity. 
 
“It will send a signal to Tunisia that we are better guarding the waters,” said Ms 
Malmström. 
 
It will be the second EU mission in southern Europe in recent months responding to a 
sudden migration influx. Nearly 200 border controllers were deployed in northern 
Greece in October to stem the flow of migrants crossing its porous border with Turkey. 
Ms Malmström called for a new strategy to engage with North Africa which would help 
reduce migration pressures into the EU, by increasing trade and investment, but also by 
creating clearer paths for legal migration. 
 
“We know that the demographic situation in Europe is dramatic. We need millions of 
qualified and [low-skilled] workers to sustain our economies. So we can engage our 
neighbours in a holistic approach to the migration situation.” 
 
She also called for a mechanism to suspend EU rules, known as the Dublin regulations, 
which dictate that asylum seekers must be processed in the first EU country in which 
they arrive. 
 
Such rules should be put aside in exceptional circumstances, to help countries unable 
to cope with a sudden increase in immigration. 
 
EU ministers of justice and home affairs meet next week in Brussels. 
 
 
February 25, 2011 2:09 am 
Title: EU ministers cool to Italy’s call for aid 
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By Joshua Chaffin in Brussels 
Italy’s request for assistance to cope with what it called a possible “invasion” of North 
African migrants drew a tepid response at a meeting of European interior ministers in 
Brussels. 
 
As unrest in Libya continued, Roberto Maroni, Italy’s home affairs minister, predicted 
that as many as 1.5m migrants were poised to land on his country’s shores – a looming 
“invasion” that would bring Italy “to its knees”. 
 
We cannot be left alone,” said Mr Maroni, who last week asked the European Union to 
create a €100m ($138m) solidarity fund to help Italy and other Mediterranean countries 
deal with an influx of migrants fleeing the turmoil in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. In Rome, 
officials said the country faced “an exodus of biblical proportions”. 
 
Despite the impassioned rhetoric, several member states expressed misgivings about 
writing cheques to deal with a catastrophe that had not yet materialised. 
 
“We shouldn’t paint a picture of the devil on the wall until he appears,” said Sandor 
Pinter, interior minister for Hungary, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency. 
Another Italian proposal to distribute North African migrants throughout the 27-member 
bloc was also met with a cool response. 
 
Cecilia Malmström, the commissioner for justice and home affairs, said member states 
had agreed that the crisis was a European problem and were willing to provide 
assistance. But Ms Malmström suggested that the EU should first focus its efforts on 
helping neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt cope with migrants from Libya. 
 
“For the moment, we have not seen any people come to Europe from Libya,” she said. 
Earlier in the day, Thomas De Maiziere, Germany’s interior minister, captured the 
sceptical mood of many northern countries when he told reporters: “There’s no refugee 
influx right now. Let’s not provoke one by talking about it.” 
 
Privately, several diplomats said Italy’s request for burden-sharing rang hollow since 
other member states had absorbed far more migrants in recent years without complaint. 
Sweden, for example, with a population of just 9m, took in more than 30,000 asylum 
seekers last year. By contrast, Italy, with a population of 53m, was demanding aid even 
though only 6,000 Tunisian migrants had so far landed on its southern island 
of Lampedusa. 
 
A contingent from Frontex, the EU’s border control agency, is based on the island to 
monitor the situation and told the Financial Times on Thursday that flows of Tunisian 
migrants were decreasing. They cautioned, however, that the situation remained highly 
unpredictable. 
 
  
108 
 
The issue of immigration, which is particularly acute in the bloc’s southern member 
states, is one factor that has complicated EU efforts to mount a forceful and unified 
response to a crisis unfolding on its doorstep. At the insistence of Silvio Berlusconi, the 
Italian prime minister, fellow European heads of government will grapple with the matter 
at their summit next month. 
 
As interior ministers debated migration, European policymakers were struggling to get a 
grip on a fast-evolving situation in a country where they conceded they had few contacts 
or levers of influence. 
 
“The first thing we are lacking is precise information on the ground,” one senior EU 
official said. 
 
That dearth of information was complicating the task of trying to evacuate EU citizens 
stranded in Libya. EU officials said they believed that roughly 5,000 citizens had been 
evacuated, with 5,000 to 6,000 remaining – 1,000 of whom were in the eastern city of 
Benghazi. 
 
 
February 27, 2011 6:14 pm 
Malta braces for North African exodus 
By Stanley Pignal in Valletta, Malta 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2fbf5e98-429b-11e0-8b34-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Southern Europe has so far received little help from the European Union to plan for an 
influx. 
 
EU officials said because refugees have yet to show up, they are unwilling to spend 
money to prepare for arrivals. The EU’s effort has been limited to co-ordinating a small 
border patrol team. 
 
Last updated: May 4, 2011 8:03 pm 
EU eyes travel curbs to fight migration 
Joshua Chaffin in Brussels 
Italy, the destination for most of the 27,000 migrants who have crossed the 
Mediterranean since January, has demanded tougher action from Brussels and more 
help from fellow member states to cope with the inflow. 
 
France has stepped up police patrols on its borders to block Tunisian immigrants 
seeking to cross from Italy, an act some observers viewed as a threat to the EU’s 
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landmark 1995 Schengen agreement, which enshrines border-free travel across most of 
the bloc. 
 
Ms Malmström, a Swede, has sought to balance demands for action against the 
responsibility to uphold one of the EU’s fundamental freedoms. 
 
On Wednesday, she called the Schengen agreement “a fantastic achievement” but said 
she supported the temporary reintroduction of border controls, urging that such moves 
should be taken only “under very exceptional circumstances”. 
 
The commissioner declined to say whether the situation in France and Italy met her 
criteria. Ms Malmström argued that the European Commission should have a stronger 
legal hand in determining when such controls were permitted – a departure from the 
current regulation, in which member states are free to introduce such controls on their 
own for up to 30 days. “The Commission will have to have a role in this,” she said. 
The centre-left Party of European Socialists attacked the proposals, saying the changes 
would undermine Schengen and accusing Ms Malmström of caving in to pressure from 
France and Italy. 
 
“[We are] outraged by the concessions made to Sarkozy [French president] and 
Berlusconi [Italian prime minister] by the European Commission, which should rather be 
standing tall as the guardian of the EU treaty – its legal obligation – instead of 
threatening such an important principle as freedom of movement,” said Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, the former Danish prime minister, who is party president. 
 
Ms Malmström said she was not motivated by populist pressure and defended her call 
to strengthen the EU’s external borders. “Secure borders does not mean that we are 
creating fortress Europe,” she said. 
 
European interior ministers will discuss the proposals at a special meeting on May 12. 
The Commission is hoping they will form the basis of a legislative package to be 
launched by the end of the month. 
Medecins sans Frontiere, a non-profit group that aids migrants coming by sea from 
north Africa to Italy, said more than 27,000 people had landed since January – mostly 
Tunisians but increasingly African asylum-seekers from Libya, with 2,600 arriving last 
weekend. 
 
It also criticised Italy for providing poor reception conditions for migrants and refugees 
“which fail to meet the minimum standards”. 
 
June 14, 2011 9:48 pm 
Title: Fortress Europe: Immigration 
By Tony Barber 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/30085d52-96b8-11e0-baca-00144feab49a.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
  
110 
 
 
While the eurozone’s troubles are driving governments, in fits and starts, towards closer 
economic integration, the asylum-seekers and economic migrants arriving from outside the bloc 
threaten to create the opposite reaction, putting at risk the commitment to the free movement of 
people enshrined in the Schengen agreement. “The eurozone crisis is being met with more 
Europe. The immigration crisis is being met with less Europe,” says Joseph Muscat, leader of 
Malta’s opposition Labour party. 
Some experts say these apocalyptic visions distort reality. “We must anticipate an 
increase in the arrival of boats on European shores. Yet one element is certain: it is 
most likely that the influx will not exceed current capacity,” says Peter Widermann, head 
of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, a group founded in 1993 
by Austria and Switzerland to promote “innovative, comprehensive and sustainable 
migration policies”. 
About 100,000 people crossed illegally into the EU between early 2010 and early 2011, 
according to official data. This equals 0.02 per cent of the bloc’s 500m population. But 
the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the outbreak of civil war in Libya and the endemic 
instability of many sub-Saharan countries raise the prospect of an unending, 
unstoppable tide of immigrants – a theme exploited by populist, ultra-right political 
parties that have made substantial gains in elections across western Europe in the past 
10 years, recently in Finland and Sweden. 
 
As a result, mainstream politicians feel obliged to sound tougher than ever on the need 
for tight border controls. “We can’t just accept a flow of hundreds of thousands or 
millions of people into southern Europe and then coming beyond that,” says William 
Hague, the UK foreign secretary. 
 
According to Clandestino, an EU research project that compiles data on irregular 
migration, ignorance and prejudice pervade certain countries. In France, it says: “Public 
opinion is informed by fearful and erroneous images of a flood of irregular migrants, 
often portrayed as an invasion, and of a form of religious fundamentalism that allegedly 
aims to insidiously convert the French population.” 
 
Such arguments do not go down well in Italy and Malta, the nations most exposed to the 
boats from Africa. “All these refugees should leave Malta. Malta is not in a position to 
integrate these people,” says Carm Mifsud Bonnici, justice minister. “What can Malta 
do? We cannot expand the size of our island. In the time of the Knights of St John [from 
1530 to 1798], there were only 20,000 people here. Now there are 400,000. Whatever 
we do, we are at our limits.” 
 
Joseph Cassar, director of Malta’s Jesuit Refugee Service, which assists irregular 
immigrants, agrees that “Malta’s capacity to absorb and integrate these people 
effectively is limited”. But he points out the human tragedies behind the numbers. 
“Some people have been beaten and practically forced on to the boats. We’ve met them 
and heard their stories. Many have been in Libyan jails and detention centres for 
months or even years. Or they have been in the hands of smugglers, who run their own 
centres and collect people to hand on to the next set of smugglers,” he says. 
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Government ministers in Italy and Malta blame Muammer Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, 
for the recent rise in the number of boats arriving. Often, these vessels are barely 
seaworthy and packed with west Africans as well as Somalis and Eritreans. They 
contend that the Gaddafi regime is seeking to sow discord among EU countries, some 
of which are carrying out air strikes on his forces, by making Africans board boats for 
Europe. 
 
Even so, as in many policy areas, governments are often unable to resist the temptation 
to blame EU institutions for failing to solve the problem. Where immigration is 
concerned, this means pointing the finger at Frontex, the EU border control agency. 
. . . 
Frontex headquarters are in Warsaw, far from the heart of Europe’s refugee crisis. But 
that does not stop Ilkka Laitinen, the agency’s executive director, delivering a robust 
defence of its operations. Interviewed at an event in the Polish capital ceremoniously 
styled the European Day for Border Guards, the soft-spoken Finn observes: “There are 
two persistent illusions. One, that border control is the panacea that solves all irregular 
immigration and cross-border crime. Two, that Frontex is responsible for controlling the 
EU’s borders.” 
 
As he points out, border control remains overwhelmingly the responsibility of each 
government. The annual Frontex budget is just over €100m, increased this year from 
€88m but still a drop in the ocean compared with the tens of billions the EU spends on 
regional aid programmes and agricultural subsidies. When Frontex sets up an operation 
to tighten border controls, as it did on the Greek-Turkish frontier last year, it needs 
member states to provide everything from helicopters and vessels to thermal vision 
equipment. 
 
“Frontex can offer added value – good risk analysis. Training is important. We can 
encourage best practice. We can stimulate mutual trust,” Mr Laitinen says. “But the vast 
bulk of border control measures are taken by the member states themselves, in terms of 
personnel, equipment and financing. We at Frontex can’t even begin to compare our 
tiny budget with theirs.” 
 
The Frontex operation in Greece has produced mixed results. Before its launch, about 
350 people a day were detected attempting to cross from Turkey. None were Turks; 
many came from Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East and Russia. By April, Frontex had 
brought the number down to 50 or 60. Now, however, it has crept up to between 100 
and 150. 
 
Cecilia Malmström, EU home affairs commissioner, says Greece’s debt crisis has 
harmed its ability to cope with irregular migrants. “To defend the borders is a matter of 
resources, and they lack that today. Member states are really trying to assist. All are 
present to some extent – administrators, experts and so on. But it takes time. There is a 
huge backlog of asylum-seekers. By the end of last year, it was 60,000. Probably more 
now.” 
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Greece’s stretched resources partly account for the increasing strains on the Schengen 
accord, a cornerstone of integration that permits border-free travel among 22 EU 
nations plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Though they have fulfilled technical 
requirements for entry, Bulgaria and Romania were blocked this month from joining the 
system, largely because of French and German resistance. The underlying problem lies 
in Greece; the inclusion of these countries would create a land bridge for illegal 
immigrants to cross from there to the rest of the EU. “Until Greece has proper control of 
its borders, Bulgaria and Romania won’t be admitted to Schengen,” says a EU diplomat. 
 
High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using 
the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more 
detail. Email ftsales.support@ft.com to buy additional 
rights. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/30085d52-96b8-11e0-baca-
00144feab49a.html#ixzz3cyP4IyBy 
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Fortress Europe: Immigration 
By Tony Barber 
Immigration fears boost popular nationalism 
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Tension: Would-be immigrants wait in Lampedusa, a small Italian island that has seen an 
influx of refugees after the popular uprisings in Northern Africa and the Middle East 
At an austere army barracks in southern Malta that serves as a detention centre for illegal 
immigrants, Abdur Rahman, a young Somali, describes the turbulent journey that took him 
almost 5,000km from the Horn of Africa to the smallest country in the European Union. 
 
“First I went by truck from Somalia to Libya. Then I went in a boat. It was going to Italy. 
But the boat was in trouble. We were picked up and brought to Malta,” says Mr Rahman, 
the son of a policeman. “I have been here two months. The military treat us well. My 
main problem is that I’m separated from my wife.” 
 
About 200 African refugees occupy the barracks, built by British forces after the first 
world war, when Malta was a colony. But across the southern Mediterranean island 
there are 5,000-6,000 refugees – a large number for a state whose existing population 
barely exceeds 400,000, and testimony to the fact that unauthorised or “irregular” 
immigration is, next to the eurozone debt crisis, the most urgent problem facing the 27-
nation EU. 
 
From the Greek-Turkish border in the east to the Spanish-owned Canaries off the west 
coast of Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa, the arrival of tens of thousands of 
refugees from places as far-flung as Eritrea, Iraq, Afghanistan and Bangladesh is testing 
to the limit the EU’s principles of solidarity, burden-sharing and protection of human 
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rights. Countries in northern, western and central Europe are reluctant to take in more 
than token numbers of illegal immigrants who arrive in the bloc’s southern and south-
eastern frontier states. 
 
While the eurozone’s troubles are driving governments, in fits and starts, towards closer 
economic integration, the asylum-seekers and economic migrants arriving from outside 
the bloc threaten to create the opposite reaction, putting at risk the commitment to the 
free movement of people enshrined in the Schengen agreement. “The eurozone crisis is 
being met with more Europe. The immigration crisis is being met with less Europe,” 
says Joseph Muscat, leader of Malta’s opposition Labour party. 
 
Some experts say these apocalyptic visions distort reality. “We must anticipate an 
increase in the arrival of boats on European shores. Yet one element is certain: it is most 
likely that the influx will not exceed current capacity,” says Peter Widermann, head of 
the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, a group founded in 1993 by 
Austria and Switzerland to promote “innovative, comprehensive and sustainable 
migration policies”. 
 
About 100,000 people crossed illegally into the EU between early 2010 and early 2011, 
according to official data. This equals 0.02 per cent of the bloc’s 500m population. But 
the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the outbreak of civil war in Libya and the endemic 
instability of many sub-Saharan countries raise the prospect of an unending, 
unstoppable tide of immigrants – a theme exploited by populist, ultra-right political 
parties that have made substantial gains in elections across western Europe in the past 
10 years, recently in Finland and Sweden. 
As a result, mainstream politicians feel obliged to sound tougher than ever on the need 
for tight border controls. “We can’t just accept a flow of hundreds of thousands or 
millions of people into southern Europe and then coming beyond that,” says William 
Hague, the UK foreign secretary. 
 
According to Clandestino, an EU research project that compiles data on irregular 
migration, ignorance and prejudice pervade certain countries. In France, it says: “Public 
opinion is informed by fearful and erroneous images of a flood of irregular migrants, 
often portrayed as an invasion, and of a form of religious fundamentalism that allegedly 
aims to insidiously convert the French population.” 
 
Such arguments do not go down well in Italy and Malta, the nations most exposed to the 
boats from Africa. “All these refugees should leave Malta. Malta is not in a position to 
integrate these people,” says Carm Mifsud Bonnici, justice minister. “What can Malta 
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do? We cannot expand the size of our island. In the time of the Knights of St John [from 
1530 to 1798], there were only 20,000 people here. Now there are 400,000. Whatever 
we do, we are at our limits.” 
 
Joseph Cassar, director of Malta’s Jesuit Refugee Service, which assists irregular 
immigrants, agrees that “Malta’s capacity to absorb and integrate these people 
effectively is limited”. But he points out the human tragedies behind the numbers. 
“Some people have been beaten and practically forced on to the boats. We’ve met them 
and heard their stories. Many have been in Libyan jails and detention centres for 
months or even years. Or they have been in the hands of smugglers, who run their own 
centres and collect people to hand on to the next set of smugglers,” he says. 
 
Government ministers in Italy and Malta blame Muammer Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, 
for the recent rise in the number of boats arriving. Often, these vessels are barely 
seaworthy and packed with west Africans as well as Somalis and Eritreans. They 
contend that the Gaddafi regime is seeking to sow discord among EU countries, some of 
which are carrying out air strikes on his forces, by making Africans board boats for 
Europe. 
 
Even so, as in many policy areas, governments are often unable to resist the temptation 
to blame EU institutions for failing to solve the problem. Where immigration is 
concerned, this means pointing the finger at Frontex, the EU border control agency. 
. . . 
 
Frontex headquarters are in Warsaw, far from the heart of Europe’s refugee crisis. But 
that does not stop Ilkka Laitinen, the agency’s executive director, delivering a robust 
defence of its operations. Interviewed at an event in the Polish capital ceremoniously 
styled the European Day for Border Guards, the soft-spoken Finn observes: “There are 
two persistent illusions. One, that border control is the panacea that solves all irregular 
immigration and cross-border crime. Two, that Frontex is responsible for controlling 
the EU’s borders.” 
 
As he points out, border control remains overwhelmingly the responsibility of each 
government. The annual Frontex budget is just over €100m, increased this year from 
€88m but still a drop in the ocean compared with the tens of billions the EU spends on 
regional aid programmes and agricultural subsidies. When Frontex sets up an operation 
to tighten border controls, as it did on the Greek-Turkish frontier last year, it needs 
member states to provide everything from helicopters and vessels to thermal vision 
equipment. 
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“Frontex can offer added value – good risk analysis. Training is important. We can 
encourage best practice. We can stimulate mutual trust,” Mr Laitinen says. “But the vast 
bulk of border control measures are taken by the member states themselves, in terms of 
personnel, equipment and financing. We at Frontex can’t even begin to compare our 
tiny budget with theirs.” 
 
The Frontex operation in Greece has produced mixed results. Before its launch, about 
350 people a day were detected attempting to cross from Turkey. None were Turks; 
many came from Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East and Russia. By April, Frontex had 
brought the number down to 50 or 60. Now, however, it has crept up to between 100 
and 150. 
 
Cecilia Malmström, EU home affairs commissioner, says Greece’s debt crisis has 
harmed its ability to cope with irregular migrants. “To defend the borders is a matter of 
resources, and they lack that today. Member states are really trying to assist. All are 
present to some extent – administrators, experts and so on. But it takes time. There is a 
huge backlog of asylum-seekers. By the end of last year, it was 60,000. Probably more 
now.” 
 
Greece’s stretched resources partly account for the increasing strains on the Schengen 
accord, a cornerstone of integration that permits border-free travel among 22 EU 
nations plus Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Though they have fulfilled technical 
requirements for entry, Bulgaria and Romania were blocked this month from joining the 
system, largely because of French and German resistance. The underlying problem lies 
in Greece; the inclusion of these countries would create a land bridge for illegal 
immigrants to cross from there to the rest of the EU. “Until Greece has proper control of 
its borders, Bulgaria and Romania won’t be admitted to Schengen,” says a EU diplomat. 
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Still more threatening in its implications for Schengen was an initiative launched in 
April by Nicolas Sarkozy, French president, and Silvio Berlusconi, Italian premier, to 
revise the rules so that border controls could be re-established in certain circumstances. 
The proposal arose after France expressed anger with Italy for issuing temporary 
residence papers to thousands of French-speaking Tunisian refugees who had arrived in 
Italy but wanted to move to France, where many had relatives and friends. 
 
Last month the anti-Schengen mood spread to Denmark, whose government announced 
plans to reinstate border controls. At face value, it appeared a significant concession to 
the populist, anti-immigrant Danish People’s party, which seized almost 14 per cent of 
the vote in the 2007 national election and provides essential parliamentary support for 
the government. But Ms Malmström thinks the true picture may be less alarming. “It 
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was a political decision, but not a piece of legislation. We’re in discussions with the 
Danish government,” she says. 
. . . 
Perhaps the most sensitive and least discussed aspect of the problem is that, according 
to many experts, the EU will need more immigrants in coming decades to compensate 
for ageing populations and low birth rates. Peter Sutherland, the UN secretary-general’s 
special representative for migration, wrote in the European Voice newspaper last month 
that the bloc should find ways to deter uncontrolled mass North African immigration 
and attract legal migrants. “We should seriously consider liberalising trade regimes, 
opening new avenues for legal migration, and vastly expanding the number of students 
from the region who come to Europe for education and professional training.” 
 
No one is more aware than Ms Malmström of the obstacles to such a proposal. “When I 
meet ministers responsible for labour policies, they almost all speak of the need for 
immigrant workers – and it’s true, we need hundreds of thousands, millions in the long 
term. But when the ministers go and speak in front of their national publics, this 
message is not to be heard at all.” 
 
She concedes: “The need for immigrants is hard to explain in a climate of high 
unemployment, riots in the streets, financial crisis and people in extreme difficulties.” 
Back in Malta, politicians such as Mr Muscat concur whole-heartedly. Yes, there are 
long-term demographic pressures in Europe, he says. “But it doesn’t comfort anyone 
here in Malta who is on the front line.” 
 
June 14, 2011 10:56 pm 
Italy main gateway for illegal migration to EU 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels and Kerin Hope in Athens 
The fallout prompted the European Commission to propose a mechanism to suspend 
the EU’s Schengen passport-free travel system for countries unable to control illegal 
immigration. 
 
The revision to Schengen will be discussed by EU leaders in Brussels next week. Gil 
Arias Fernandez, Frontex deputy director, said the situation in the central Mediterranean 
was “dramatic” and likely to remain so for months. 
Migration to Lampedusa had fallen in recent years as Italy forcibly returned arrivals to 
Libya under a deal decried by activists as breaching human rights. 
 
Fewer than 150 people made the journey in the first three months of 2010. 
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Shutting the central Mediterranean route was partly blamed for a rapid increase in 
migration to Greece, whose asylum system subsequently collapsed. 
 
The renewed ease in reaching Italy has lifted the pressure on Greece this year. But 
Greek officials fear the Libyan unrest could spill over to their own Mediterranean 
islands. 
 
“So long as the fighting continues in Libya, we have a potential problem,” said an official 
at the Citizens’ Protection ministry. 
 
 
 
September 12, 2011 10:26 pm 
EU plans to exclude wayward Schengen nations 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
The European Union will on Friday propose a mechanism to suspend countries from 
the passport-free Schengen travel area, in a move diplomats say is partly aimed at putting 
pressure on Greece to keep illegal immigrants out of the bloc. 
Greece, the country at the heart of Europe’s debt crisis, has for a decade been the 
weakest link in the EU’s common border system, struggling to control its eastern frontier 
with Turkey and its island-strewn Mediterranean coastline. 
 
Since the Schengen agreement of 1995, which allows for the free movement of people 
and goods across most of the EU, passport-free travel has been viewed as one of the 
cornerstones of European integration. 
 
However, when the European Commission, the EU’s executive branch, unveils 
proposals to overhaul rules governing the border-free zone, it is expected to reveal what 
Brussels officials privately refer to as “the Greece clause”, a provision allowing for a 
country to be temporarily kicked out of Schengen. Border controls would then be 
reimposed between the country and the rest of the EU. 
 
“Any move to exclude countries would clearly be targeting Greece, among others, which 
has been a problem for Schengen ever since it joined in 2000,” says Hugo Brady, fellow 
at the Centre for European Reform, a Brussels-based think-tank. 
Of the estimated 104,000 migrants that crossed illegally into the EU in 2010, nearly 
88,000 arrived through Greece’s borders. Even with a spike in migrants arriving in Malta 
and Italy from Libya and Tunisia in recent months, Greece will probably emerge as the 
primary gateway to Europe once again in 2011. 
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The Commission’s proposals, seen by the Financial Times, say the prospect of 
suspension from Schengen would be meant as a deterrent, only to be used as a last 
resort after a country had failed to respond to EU assistance. 
 
But some officials believe Greece has already reached this point. More than 26,000 
migrants have come through the country’s border with Turkey since the start of the year, 
according to Frontex, Europe’s nascent border agency. That is despite numerous 
Frontex missions to help strengthen the border, and the fact that in the EU’s seven-year 
budget to 2013, Greece should receive around €350m from Brussels to secure its 
borders and administer refugees. 
 
Some believe it is necessary to quarantine wayward countries to preserve the integrity 
of the Schengen scheme. 
 
“It is necessary for member states to live up to their obligations,” says Tobias Billström, 
Sweden’s immigration minister. “Such a measure [to exclude a country] has to be seen 
as a radical one, but you cannot exclude it from the agenda.” 
 
Greece has also lost sympathy for the ways it treats migrants. Only 1 per cent of 
applications for asylum are typically approved, compared with 70 per cent in Sweden. 
Inadequate facilities for migrants prompted several EU countries to suspend co-
operation with Greece on processing asylum seekers last year. 
 
Athens has pledged to bolster its border controls, with an official at the ministry of 
citizens’ protection saying Greece was “in the process of taking measures to fulfil all its 
obligations.” 
 
But faced with an unprecedented budget shortfall and the need for deep spending cuts, 
doubts remain on whether controlling migration is a priority. 
 
Athens has pledged to bolster its border controls, with an official at the ministry of 
citizens’ protection saying Greece was “in the process of taking measures to fulfil all its 
obligations.” 
 
But faced with an unprecedented budget shortfall and the need for deep spending cuts, 
doubts remain on whether controlling migration is a priority. 
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2013 
 
 
 
October 4, 2013 6:28 pm 
Title: Europe ignores the tragedy at its gates 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/37e92a3a-2cf0-11e3-a0ac-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
European politicians find it hard to respond. No EU member state is minded to legalise 
this refugee flow by relaxing visa controls or work and residence permits. But the 
Lampedusa tragedy should put a focus on three areas of policy. 
 
First, there must be a more co-ordinated effort by EU member states to survey 
Mediterranean waters. The EU is this year setting up a new surveillance system called 
Eurosur to track and identify small vessels. This is good. But the EU cannot just 
passively defend its borders. As the UN has argued, all migrant vessels in the 
Mediterranean should be considered to be potentially in distress and liable for rescue. 
Second, the EU should try to establish partnerships on the issue of migration with those 
countries that are the source of refugees. This is difficult, given the poor governance in 
the states we are talking about. But common action – whether it means cracking down 
on human traffickers or allowing controlled migration of skilled workers to Europe – is 
essential. 
 
Third, EU member states must engage in a more robust debate among themselves on 
how to share the burden of these migrant flows. The most recent data suggest that 
Germany, France, the UK and Italy take most migrants and asylum seekers. But other 
EU states need to face up to their obligations. 
 
None of these issues is easy to tackle. But scenes like the ones we are witnessing off Lampedusa will 
only get worse unless solutions are found. Immigration reform is an issue that needs a lot more 
attention than it is currently getting in Europe’s corridors of power. 
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Last updated: October 8, 2013 7:22 pm 
Title: Brussels seeks extra funds to bolster sea patrols 
By James Fontanella-Khan in Brussels 
 
Brussels has asked EU member states to allocate extra funds to bolster sea patrols 
across the Mediterranean in an effort to prevent further tragedies involving migrant 
boats, such as last week’s disaster off the coast of Lampedusa in which at least 250 
people died. 
 
Cecilia Malmström, the EU’s commissioner for home affairs, said she obtained the 
political support of EU interior ministers meeting in Luxembourg on Tuesday to bolster 
the capabilities of Frontex, the EU’s border patrol agency, but added that more time was 
needed to come up with a concrete action plan. 
 
“All member states who expressed themselves said that Frontex could do more,” said 
Ms Malmström. “We will talk to Frontex to make a concrete proposal, of course counting 
on the resources that we need . . . and then [we will] come to member states [with a 
plan], so it’s a little bit to early to give more details.” 
 
Ahead of the ministerial meeting Ms Malmström said she would propose a major 
“Frontex operation right across the Mediterranean, from Cyprus to Spain, for a big save 
and rescue operation.” 
 
EU ministers agreed that more had to be done, although no concrete agreement was 
reached to boost aid for Frontex or support Italy in the immediate crisis. 
EU funding for Frontex has been slashed from about €120m in 2011 to €85m in 2012, a 
commission official said. During recent negotiations for the EU’s 2014-2020 budget, 
annual funding for Frontex was capped at about €90m. 
 
Angelino Alfano, Italy’s deputy premier and interior minister, said Ms Malmström’s 
proposal was an encouraging sign and a concrete move towards meeting the country’s 
demands that Frontex be streghthened. 
 
“Europe must do more and contribute to the saving of human lives. We are in the middle 
of the Mediterranean and we have saved thousands and thousands of lives, we now 
ask for some help from Europe,” said Mr Alfano. 
 
Lampedusa, Italy’s southernmost island – which is closer to Tunisia than to Sicily – has 
over the past decade become one of the main entry points into the EU for migrants 
escaping unrest and civil war in the Middle East and Africa. 
 
However, the latest tragedy, in which a boat loaded with people sank off the coast of the 
island, is one of the worst in Europe’s decades-long migrant crisis and has added to 
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pressure on the EU to come up with a common strategy to deter human trafficking 
across the Mediterranean. 
 
Between January 1 and September 30 this year, 30,100 migrants reached Italy on boats 
from north Africa, according to UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency. Meanwhile, since 
1993 at least 20,000 people have died as they tried to reach Italy’s shores, according to 
the International Organisation for Migration. 
 
Mr Alfano said Italy was aslo seeking ways to improve the EU ‘s asylum policy, which 
forces people fleeing persecution to seek asylum in the first EU country in which they 
arrive. 
 
After more than six days of rescue operations, Italian divers have pulled more bodies 
from the Lampedusa shipwreck, pushing the death toll to 250. 
 
However, the overall number of dead is expected to be more than 300 as Italian officials 
believe about 500 were on board the boat. Only 155 survived. 
 
Most of the migrants came from Eritrea and Somalia, according to the UN. Among the 
250 bodies recovered by Tuesday, 70 were those of women and seven were children, 
the Associated Press reported. 
 
 
October 9, 2013 6:38 pm 
Brussels denies border agency funds to deal with refugees 
By James Fontanella-Khan in Brussels 
As civil war raged in Syria, the head of the EU’s border agency last year went to the 
authorities in Brussels with a request for a contingency fund. Ilkka Laitinen warned 
unrest in the Middle East would lead to a huge flow of refugees. 
But the director of Frontex, the border protection agency, said that his request fell on 
deaf ears, with the three institutions forming the bloc’s budget authority – the European 
Commission, parliament and national ministers – denying his request. He said that no 
specific amount was demanded but €10m would have been sufficient. 
 
But the budget authority at the time was discussing cutting the [overall EU] budget and 
austerity measures, so they took a deliberate risk not to establish the budget reserve 
and this is now the situation,” Mr Laitinen said. 
 
European leaders expressed outrage at a collective failure to prevent the deaths of at 
least 297 migrants after their ship sank off the Italian island of Lampedusa. 
However, as Mr Laitinen’s disappointment illustrates, EU leaders have repeatedly 
refused to give Frontex the kind of funding it has requested to cope with refugees 
fleeing political turmoil in the Middle East and north Africa. 
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The refusal of member states to fund the border agency is emblematic, critics say, of 
the bloc’s failure to develop a co-ordinated response to illegal migration. 
 
With more than 30,000 migrants reaching Italy on boats from north Africa since January, 
according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Europe seems no better 
equipped to deal with the human influx than it was at the time of the Libyan uprising in 
2011. 
 
“What we are witnessing now seems to be a bit of a déjà vu,” said an EU diplomat. “I 
want to see who will follow through with actual cash on the table in the next few weeks.” 
Some officials from southern EU members and the European Commission expressed 
optimism after a meeting of interior ministers this week that the Lampedusa tragedy 
could finally lead to action. 
 
“For the first time I really felt that the northern European countries were willing to help 
and take concrete steps to address our demands for greater help,” Angelino Alfano, the 
Italian interior minister, told the Financial Times after the meeting. 
 
“We will create a task force now to discuss ways to strengthen Frontex and put the 
agency in the position to protect the EU’s borders and save lives,” he added. 
 
But many other officials, citing the post-Libya response, are more sceptical that cash-
strapped member states, who have shown reluctance to hand over control of their 
border crossings to a nine-year-old Europe-wide agency. 
 
“EU governments and politicians have consistently blocked attempts to ensure EU 
border policies can focus on saving lives at sea and deciding which countries take 
responsibility for those saved: they have also failed to ensure that those seeking refuge 
can access asylum systems safely,” said Jean Lambert, a Green member of the 
European parliament. “Therefore, it is hard to take such rhetoric at face value.” 
Even before the upheaval brought by the Arab uprising and Libyan civil war, the 
European Commission pushed for more authority to be granted Frontex, arguing that it 
should be in a position to buy its own equipment and carry out operations more 
autonomously. 
 
The proposal languished for months until the Libyan crisis, when 40,000 migrants reach 
the southern tip of Italy on rickety boats. It was eventually adopted but funding to the 
organisation was cut from €120m in 2011 to about €85m last year. 
 
EU officials privately blame French foot-dragging, particularly under the centre-right 
government of Nicolas Sarkozy, although his socialist successor François Hollande 
seems more open to EU co-operation. 
Jean-Marc Ayrault, France’s prime minister, has called for greater solidarity among EU 
member states and Laurent Fabius, the foreign minister, has warned the Mediterranean 
had become a “huge cemetery under the open skies”. 
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Germany has also been reluctant to bolster an agency from which it is unlikely to see 
much direct benefit even if it receives the highest number of asylum-seekers in the EU – 
77,540 last year, compared with 15,715 in Italy. 
 
Speaking from Lampedusa on Wednesday, Cecilia Malmström, the EU’s home affairs 
chief, said that the sight of nearly 300 coffins would stay with her forever and 
strengthened her conviction that member states had to turn “words to action”. 
 
 
 
October 22, 2013 6:24 pm 
Lampedusa brings shame on the European Union 
By Bernard Kouchner 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3602ce00-3a5c-11e3-9243-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Lampedusa is a metaphor for the EU: there were once high hopes but there are no 
longer any expectations. At the bottom of the Mediterranean lie the bodies of fugitives 
from nearby poverty. They embarked for Europe believing they would find salvation and 
a new life for their families on a continent that is not even capable of agreeing to throw 
them a lifebelt. Already 20,000 have drowned, says Migreurop, the non-governmental 
network. They are the wretched of the sea and they are building the liquid tomb of our 
European illusions. 
 
The EU has proved unable to forge a harmonised immigration policy, still less a foreign 
and defence policy. It is not even able to rescue those who still believe in the European 
dream. 
 
However, the momentum has gone. Our leaders keep saying: “The migrants are illegals, there 
is no place for them.” Five hundred million Europeans cannot agree to share the human burden 
of several thousand needy. Our governments lack both the imagination and the generosity. 
Ask the inhabitants of Lampedusa, gateway of the immigrants, what they think of 
Europe. The islanders do not accept that their fishermen alone must be prepared to 
save those who are drowning. The Italian and Maltese navies provide at least some 
relief in this cursed passage between Africa and Europe. It is not enough. 
 
The boat people of the Mediterranean are men, women and children hounded out of 
sub-Saharan Africa by the poverty of nations such as Eritrea and Somalia; or, from 
further afield, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others flee war in Syria and bombings in Iraq. 
The latter, not unlike the Vietnamese boat people, seek political asylum. Ferried by well-
paid smugglers, they are promised an Eldorado. 
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For those who survive, seeking asylum is a painful process. On arrival, they are parked 
in camps under police surveillance. Then begins their long, uncertain bureaucratic 
journey. Legally, our system allows us to help only those about to drown. We must 
change this perverse welcome. 
 
What must we do? First, reinforce Frontex, the European border agency, with money, 
resources and the primary objective of watching the maritime corridor off the African 
coast. I propose a “one country, one boat” mission, so that all 28 EU countries 
participate in this rescue plan. Asylum seekers should be allocated to all EU nations, not 
only those bordering the Mediterranean. On Thursday, at their Brussels summit, our 
leaders must take the political decision to forge a Europe of solidarity. 
 
Finally, we must change and harmonise our immigration policies, establishing quotas 
based on Europe’s skills shortages. Not all migrants will be accepted but there should at 
least be a clear process. Such a process of receiving migrants would put into place a 
more noble means of selection than mere death at sea. 
 
The writer is the founder of Médecins Sans Frontières and France’s former minister of 
foreign affairs 
 
December 4, 2013 5:58 pm 
EU considers asylum overhaul in bid to halt migrant deaths 
By James Fontanella-Khan in Brussels 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a184279c-5d06-11e3-81bd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Brussels is considering a dramatic overhaul of EU asylum policy to allow people in 
conflict zones to apply for refugee status from outside Europe in an effort to prevent 
tragedies such as the drowning of hundreds of migrants off the Italian coast in October. 
The European Commission, the EU’s executive arm, raised the idea on Wednesday as 
it proposed several measures to bolster the patrolling of the Mediterranean, including 
€14m in annual additional funding for Frontex, its border control agency. 
 
Allowing migrants to seek asylum from outside the EU would be a shift in the EU’s 
existing policy, which forces them to undertake often perilous trips to reach European 
soil before giving them the right to apply for refugee status. 
 
Migrants escaping war and persecution in their home countries often resort to paying 
hefty sums to smugglers to reach the Italian shores on rickety ships. Since 1993 at least 
20,000 people have died en route to the EU, according to the International Organisation 
for Migration. 
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The surge in refugees on border states, such as Italy and Greece, has also provoked 
resentment from national governments and citizens that they are forced to bear the 
burden for an inadequate EU policy. 
 
Refugees’ rights advocates welcomed the commission’s change in stance. Some 
argued that it represented a concrete measure for European leaders to translate 
promises of help into action in the aftermath of the Lampedusa tragedy, in which more 
than 360 migrants died after their ship sank. 
 
“Allowing a legal route will help refugees and will play an important role in ending the 
smuggling of people,” said Michael Diedring, secretary-general of the European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles. 
 
The commission gave few details on how the application process would work but 
promised to refine its ideas in the coming months. 
 
Some critics questioned whether applying for asylum in the EU would be practical for 
civilians trapped in a war zone. But refugee rights advocates said that Switzerland had 
successfully used such a model for migrants escaping turmoil in Libya and Tunisia. 
For the plan to go ahead, the commission will need the backing of member states. 
Earlier this year EU ministers agreed that more had to be done to deal with the influx of 
migrants but similar calls were made in the past and little action followed. 
 
“Two months ago the tragedy in Lampedusa triggered a very wide and emotional 
reaction across Europe – a chorus of voices calling for actions to avoid such disasters in 
the future,” said Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs. 
 
“I call on member states to make full use of this unique opportunity to show that the EU 
is built on solidarity and concrete support. Now is the time to act.” 
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December 5, 2013 5:49 pm 
Title: Deadly gamble EU asylum proposal is well-intentioned but 
flawed 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f44a5f26-5dbc-11e3-b3e8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
In the past two decades, as many as 25,000 migrants have died attempting to reach Europe via the 
Mediterranean. Yet it is a passage chanced every year by thousands who are without hope. 
Brussels is now considering allowing people in conflict zones to claim refugee status before reaching 
Europe, allowing successful applicants to travel safely by official means. 
This well-intentioned policy would not change the fact that there are more victims of international 
conflict than bystanders are willing to help. Nor would it replace the high-stakes endurance test that the 
EU currently operates at its borders with a less callous way of rationing asylum awards. People denied 
help in their war-torn home countries would flock to Europe’s gates just as before. 
 
Stepping up border patrols, as Brussels also proposes, would make it harder for refugees to reach 
Europe. This policy, while less obviously humanitarian, is more likely to prevent deaths. Indeed, given EU 
governments’ international obligations, it is the only way of deterring people from embarking on a 
voyage that may claim their lives. 
 
Democracies have a noble tradition of sheltering exiles who would otherwise be at risk of persecution 
because of their beliefs. However, none has proved willing to offer such protection to the population of 
an entire country. European policy should recognise this. There are other ways for the EU to prove that 
it is a force for good. 
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2014 
Title: EU to Beef Up Border Agency to Deal With Migrants 
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AUG. 27, 2014, 2:47 P.M. E.D.T.  
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/08/27/world/europe/ap-eu-italy-immigration.html 
ROME — The European Commission agreed Wednesday to Italian demands to replace Rome's 
politically unpopular emergency operation for rescuing would-be refugees crossing the 
Mediterranean with an EU-wide project. 
The European commissioner for home affairs, Cecilia Malmstrom, announced plans to beef up 
the European border patrol agency at a news conference in Brussels alongside Italy's interior 
minister. She urged all EU member states to contribute planes, ships and personnel to the 
"Frontex Plus" operation she hopes to launch by November. 
Italy began its 9.5 million euro ($13 million) a month "Mare Nostrum" operation last October 
after 360 migrants drowned off the Sicilian island of Lampedusa. 
Refugee numbers have since swelled as thousands of people have fled conflicts in Syria, Iraq and 
across the Mideast and Africa, boarding unsafe smugglers' boats in Libya bound for Europe. So 
far, nearly 110,000 people have been rescued since January, but at least 1,889 others have died 
making the perilous crossing, the U.N. refugee agency said. 
Italy has demanded the EU do more to help out, arguing that it shouldn't bear the burden alone 
since most migrants want to settle in northern Europe, not Italy. 
Malmstrom termed the new EU operation as a way to "complement" Italy's rescue efforts. But 
Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano was adamant that Europe — not Italy — was now 
taking the lead in dealing with Mediterranean immigration issues. He said the Italian operation 
would be phased out as soon as the beefed-up Frontex operation was up and running. 
Malmstrom stressed that the size and scope of the new operation was still being worked out, but 
she said it would be far less ambitious than "Mare Nostrum." 
Critics have said Italy unintentionally encouraged more refugees to risk the crossing since Italian 
ships were at the ready so close to Libyan shores. A more modest air and sea rescue operation, 
they argue, might dissuade some from making the trip. 
Malmstrom said that in addition to the concrete offers needed for Frontex's expanded operations, 
EU member states must also increase their willingness to take in refugees. She called for the EU 
to open more legal ways for refugees to resettle "so people don't have to embark on these terrible 
boat trips and buy a ticket to death." 
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September 4, 2014 7:58 pm 
Title: Europe’s growing refugee burden 
Attempt to storm a Calais ferry is latest worrying signal 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/29928e2e-3427-11e4-b81c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
This year the number of illegal migrants coming to Italy across the Mediterranean has 
reached 100,000, well beyond the previous annual record of 60,000 in 2011. The figure 
for illegal immigrants coming into Greece through Turkey rose by nearly 150 per cent in 
the first seven months of this year. More generally, the number of refugees worldwide 
has passed 50m for the first time since the second world war. 
 
But it is more important to see the drama in Calais in a wider context. The EU as a bloc 
has been far too reticent in dealing with the challenge of irregular immigration. An 
important step was taken last month when the EU replaced Italy’s humanitarian naval 
operation in the Mediterranean with a union-wide effort. But the EU still spends only 1 
per cent of its budget on migration policy. As a new team takes over the reins of power 
in Brussels, it needs a much bolder approach, one based on three principles. 
 
First, illegal migration into the EU is going to get worse. The crises in Syria and Iraq are 
likely to bring more population displacement. The chaos in Libya has left the maritime 
border in disarray. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of this year and the 
upheaval in Ukraine risk creating yet more refugee flows. 
 
Secondly, not enough EU member states are sharing the burden of granting asylum. 
Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Sweden took in 70 per cent of those granted 
refugee status in the EU last year. But others, notably the eastern European states, 
have been far less generous. 
 
Thirdly, the EU needs to use its considerable economic clout to encourage African 
states to manage migration outflows. Some such as Morocco and Tunisia are willing to 
work with the EU. A much bigger challenge is posed by Eritrea from which 4,000 young 
people are fleeing each month to avoid conscription. While the Eritrean regime is a 
reprehensible one, some kind of accord is needed to slow the numbers leaving the 
country. 
 
Immigration has become a neuralgic political issue in most EU states. The debate over 
the free movement of citizens within the EU has made it harder for national leaders to 
welcome those from outside the bloc. What governments need to realise, however, is 
that illegal migration is not a problem that can be wished away. 
 
September 15, 2014 6:04 pm 
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Title: Up to 500 feared dead after traffickers ‘ram’ migrant boat 
By Duncan Robinson in Brussels  
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e3a2ab4-3cf3-11e4-a2ab-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
Roughly 130,000 migrants have entered the EU by sea since the start of the year, with 
Italy accounting for 118,000 of the arrivals, sparking disagreement between the EU and 
its member states on how to deal with them. 
 
An Italian naval patrol called Mare Nostrum – Italian for “Our Sea” – was set up late last 
year after 366 migrants died off the coast of Sicily when their boat capsized. The patrol, 
which costs the Italian government about €9m per month to operate, rescued 2,380 
people last weekend alone, according to the Italian navy. 
 
Plans for Frontex, the EU’s border agency, to take over part of this task have been 
attacked by charities as too limited after it emerged that Frontex would not operate in 
international waters – restricting it to a 12-mile range from southern Europe’s shores. A 
spokesperson for the UN’s refugee agency warned that, if the scope of the operation 
was reduced, “we will have more people dying”. 
 
John Dalhuisen, Amnesty International’s Europe and central Asia director, said: “The 
response of EU member states to the refugee crises in the Middle East and north Africa 
has been shameful. 
 
“The increasing death toll in the Mediterranean Sea highlights the ineffectiveness of the 
EU’s current asylum and migration policies and practices.” 
 
A representative for Baroness Ashton, the EU’s outgoing foreign policy chief, wrote on 
Twitter: “We wish to express our condolences to the families and friends of the victims. 
[They] fell victim to unscrupulous networks of human smugglers and died trying to reach 
Europe. The EU is committed to continued action aimed at attempting to prevent such 
tragedies from happening again.” 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Must Put Up Resources for Mediterranean Rescues: Amnesty 
By REUTERS SEPT. 30, 2014, 6:12 A.M. E.D.T.  
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Link: http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/09/30/world/europe/30reuters-eu-migrants-
italy.html 
In August, the European Commission said its border control agency Frontex would reinforce 
Italy's mission, which costs about 9 million euros ($11.4 million) a month to operate, but 
members states have been slow to pledge money or vessels. 
Amnesty said Frontex would need more resources and a clear search-and-rescue mandate before 
it could replace Mare Nostrum. 
October 29, 2014 6:37 pm 
Title: Europe’s rudderless strategy on boat people 
The plight of African refugees should not be ignored 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c82e01a4-5f64-11e4-986c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
This year, the number of illegal migrants seeking to reach Italy across the Mediterranean has 
passed 100,000, well beyond the previous annual record of 60,000 in 2011. 
 
It is an influx that is putting huge pressure on some of Europe’s most recession-battered 
economies. Countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece are struggling not just to police 
their own vulnerable borders, but also to deal with the inevitable humanitarian problems 
that refugees bring in their wake. 
 
Italy has been particularly stretched by its laudable desire to deal humanely with the 
flow. Following the deaths of 366 people in 2013 when their boat capsized off the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, the Italian navy has run a search-and-rescue operation 
called Mare Nostrum, which focuses on saving lives. It has rescued more than 100,000 
to date. 
 
What has angered Rome is that the Italians feel they are alone in their efforts. The 
costly operation has received no support from EU partners, even though many migrants 
enter Italy as a first step to reach other nations. 
 
That the EU is finally pushing the boat migration issue up its list of priorities is welcome. 
Next month, for instance, Brussels will introduce Operation Triton, its own humanitarian 
naval operation around Italian shores, under the aegis of Frontex, the union’s border 
agency. 
 
This is, however, more of a band aid than a solution. Only a minority of EU member 
states will contribute. Some, such as Britain, argue that such operations are 
counterproductive, encouraging the refugee flow because migrants know they will be 
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rescued. The view may have superficial logic. But it is a questionable calculus given the 
evident desperation of those migrants who seek to make the journey. 
 
Unlike Mare Nostrum, Triton will not have an explicit search-and-rescue mandate, and 
will operate with a third of the Italian operation’s budget. It is at best a supplement and 
suggestions by Italy’s interior minister that it lead to the winding up of Mare Nostrum 
have been greeted with dismay. 
 
Europe needs to take illegal migration much more seriously. The budget for Frontex is 
tiny at €100m a year – a drop in the bucket next to the €60bn the union spends on farm 
subsidies. Yet the migration problem is going to grow worse. The crises in Syria and 
Iraq are likely to lead to yet more dislocation. The chaos in Libya has sucked in people 
traffickers and left the maritime border in disarray. 
 
Tougher border controls are clearly only part of the answer. Member states need to do 
more to share the burden of granting asylum. Germany, France, the UK and Sweden 
took in 70 per cent of those granted refugee status in the EU last year. Others should do 
more. 
 
The EU should also use its economic clout to encourage African states to manage 
outflows and crack down on criminal gangs that profit from the refugee trade. Some 
countries such as Morocco are already working with Brussels, policing their borders in 
return for assistance and more openings to work legally in Europe. 
 
Ultimately, however, Europe must understand that there is no border security without 
common prosperity. This means opening more of its internal markets to its neighbours. 
The alternative is to continue accepting ever more of their people instead. 
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Title: Italy to End Sea Rescue Mission That Saved 100,000 Migrants 
By REUTERS October 31, 2014, 2:18 P.M. E.D.T.  
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/10/31/world/middleeast/31reuters-italy-migrants-
eu.html 
Italy has long called for the EU to do more to help migrants. Earlier this month, Rome finally 
agreed to start working with a more limited rescue mission called Triton, overseen by EU border 
control agency Frontex. 
Twenty-one EU countries are contributing, but the mission will be limited to patrolling the 
waters within 30 nautical miles from the Italian coast, while Mare Nostrum reached all the way 
across the Mediterranean to the coast off Libya. 
Any migrants picked up will still be brought to Italian ports and housed in immigration centers, 
though the vast majority of those who have been rescued over the past year did not stay in Italy 
for long, moving quickly onto other EU countries. 
Earlier this month, speaking on the anniversary of the Lampedusa tragedy at a meeting of his 
left-wing party faithful in northern Italy, Renzi said Mare Nostrum would not be abandoned until 
"the EU comes up with something just as good or better". 
Noury at Amnesty said it was "clear" that Renzi had broken his word. 
"He was speaking to a crowd that wanted to hear those things, but today Alfano said the 
opposite. There's no coherence between what Renzi promised and what happened today," Noury 
said. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
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Italy financial times 
 
2004 
 
World Briefing | Africa: Migrants Kept At Sea By Italy And Malta 
Published: July 10, 2004 (no author) 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/10/world/world-briefing-africa-migrants-kept-at-sea-by-italy-
and-malta.html 
 
Thirty-seven African migrants picked up by a German rescue ship in the Mediterranean 
have spent almost three weeks aboard the ship, the Cap Anamur, because Italy and Malta 
refuse to let them land. The migrants, from several countries, say they were picked up on 
June 20 after leaving Libya in a rubber boat, hoping to reach Italy. The Cap Anamur arrived 
in Sicily on July 1, but the Interior Ministry refused the landing. Malta has said the migrants 
are Libya's responsibility. The ship, which is chartered by the German Doctors Emergency 
Union, is now anchored off Sicily. 
 
September 14, 2004.  
Title: Italy urges Libya to tighten borders as concerns grow over illegal 
immigrants,  
Author: Tony Barber 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21c43c8c-05ee-11d9-bff2-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
The centre-right Italian government yesterday urged Libya to make greater efforts to stem a 
rising tide of illegal immigrants into Italy, as authorities on the island of Sicily reported the 
arrival of yet another boat-load of people. 
 
Italy's foreign ministry summoned the Libyan chargé d'affaires in Rome and asked for "an urgent 
and tangible signal" that Libya would tighten its border controls, particularly on the North 
African coastline, the starting point of many migrants' journeys across the Mediterranean. 
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Context:  
Last Sunday, in what Italian officials said was the largest influx of illegal immigrants to arrive on 
a single vessel, 478 people packed on a 25-metre-long boat landed before dawn on the tiny island 
of Lampedusa, 200km south-west of Sicily. 
Two more boats carrying a total of 300 people arrived only hours later, one on Lampedusa and 
the other on Sicily. The Sicilian police said 20 more migrants had come ashore yesterday after 
guiding a rubber speedboat past coastguard patrols. 
 
Rocco Buttiglione, a government minister who will shortly become Italy's next European 
commissioner with responsibility for immigration, is proposing to build reception centres in 
North Africa, partly funded by European governments. These would hold would-be migrants 
before they cross the Mediterranean. 
 
According to Italian government figures, a crackdown on illegal immigration has brought 
significant results over the past year. Between July 2003 and June 2004, the number of illegal 
immigrants arriving in southern Italy fell to 9,985 from 19,294 in the previous 12-month period. 
 
October 4, 2004  
Title: ITALY UNDER FIRE AFTER DEPORTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Authors: Tony Barber and Frances Williams 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/832b637a-1646-11d9-b835-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Italy's centre-right government on Monday faced domestic and international criticism after 
deporting illegal immigrants to Libya without letting them apply for asylum. 
 
Government ministers said they would continue to fly back illegal immigrants because the ability 
of authorities on Italy's Mediterranean shores to cope with ever larger numbers of new arrivals 
was strained to the limit.  
Giuseppe Pisanu, interior minister, said: “We are confronting this emergency with the necessary 
determination and we will continue along these lines.(…) 
“The assault on the Italian coast is organised by criminal gangs that ruthlessly cash in on illegal 
immigration.” 
 
But centre-left opposition politicians in Italy and human rights groups such as Amnesty 
International warned that the government might be contravening international rules banning 
“collective expulsions”. Gavino Angius, leader of the Democrats of the Left, the largest 
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opposition party in parliament's upper house, said: “This new practice appears in clear conflict 
with the right to asylum recognised by our country.” 
UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency in Geneva, said it had asked the Italian and Libyan 
authorities for access to the people involved in the forced returns, so far without success. 
Raymond Hall, director of the agency's Europe bureau, said: “We recognise the very strong 
pressures these continuing arrivals are generating but all those who request asylum should have 
access to a fair procedure to assess their possible protection needs.” UNHCR staff in Italy have 
been told by Italian officials that people from Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia were being allowed 
to submit claims in Lampedusa but others thought to be primarily Egyptians were being sent to 
Libya. 
 
“This method of sorting by nationality could put individual cases in need of international 
protection at risk,” the agency said. 
Title: On Italian Isle, Migrant Plight Draws Scrutiny 
By IAN FISHER 
and RICHARD BERNSTEIN 
 
Published: October 5, 2004 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/05/international/europe/05asylum.html?_r=0 
But the conservative government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also seemed 
intent on discouraging others from trying to cross over. 
"The desperate people who think they can land in Italy illegally must know that they 
will be sent back to where they came from as soon as they have received humanitarian 
aid," Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu said in a statement. 
But the move came under immediate and strong criticism. Italy, the critics said, has 
too long resisted efforts for a comprehensive immigration policy within the European 
Union. And by returning the migrants immediately, they said, the government could 
not identify people genuinely seeking asylum. 
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2004, October 13 
 Trek from war zone ends in hunt for food at town dump 
 
Author: Roula Khalaf 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/442eb102-1cb5-11d9-8d72-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Germany + Italy  
 
Controversial proposals by Italy and Germany to set up transit camps in North Africa to keep the 
refugees away are news to the asylum seekers. They ask whether setting up such camps, 
denounced by human rights groups, would open up opportunities for work in Morocco. "If we 
can't work, we can't get married, we can't live properly, then these camps won't help us," says 
Vassi. 
Lampedusa route is now the road less travelled to Europe 
By David White 
October 11, 2004 3:00 am 
 
Determined to stop the incoming boatloads, Silvio Berlusconi, Italian prime minister, has been to 
Libya twice in two months. 
There are plans for joint coastal patrols and for the supply of Italian equipment and training, 
made possible by the recent lifting of the EU's long-standing arms embargo against Libya. Italy 
has been pressing the EU to establish Libyan "reception centres" to filter would-be refugees. 
Even more controversially, this month it began sending Lampedusa arrivals back to Libya. 
Libya is the overland end-point for migrant trails from both the Horn of Africa, via Sudan, and 
West Africa. Some aim to stay in Libya, others to carry on to Europe. Figures for the number of 
foreigners already living illegally in Libya range from 1.5m to 2.5m, in a country with fewer 
than 6m citizens. 
The International Centre for Migration Policy Development, an intergovernmental body based in 
Vienna, estimates that in 2001 Italy received an annual inflow of 100,000 clandestine migrants 
from all sources, out of perhaps 800,000 who entered the 25 countries of the EU. 
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2007: 
 
For African Migrants, Europe Gets Further Away 
By IAN FISHER 
Published: August 26, 2007 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/europe/26mediterranean.html 
 
Italy’s job has been, in many ways, more difficult: Facing resistance in a Parliament it 
controls only narrowly, the center-left government has not made any major changes in 
immigration procedures. And Libya, the launching point for many of those heading to Italy, 
is far less reliable than more democratic nations like Morocco or Senegal. 
 
Libya has in recent months, however, been more helpful, possibly because it is working 
toward a closer relationship with Europe. Its leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, has forged 
informal agreements with Italy to crack down on smugglers and patrol its own borders to 
keep those fleeing other African countries from entering and then heading north from its 
shores. 
2009 
Authors:  Michael Imeson in Valletta and Stanley Pignal.  
Title: Malta seeks EU action over immigrants,  
Date: June 4, 2009.  
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a8d2b17c-509e-11de-9530-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
 
Italy, by contrast, has been criticised for adopting a policy of forcibly returning hundreds of 
people found on boats in its territorial waters to Libya, from where most of the boats depart.  
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October 11, 2009 6:53 pm 
UN warns EU against scapegoating migrants 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
The head of the UN refugee agency has called for the European Union to overhaul its 
“dysfunctional” asylum policy amid concerns that attitudes to foreigners are hardening in the 
financial crisis. 
 
Antonio Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, warned against turning asylum seekers 
into scapegoats, as events in Calais and the Mediterranean seemed to show a waning in Europe’s 
tolerance for those seeking international protection. 
 
Speaking to the Financial Times, Mr Guterres expressed “concern” at the situation in the 
Mediterranean, where reports suggest that dozens of potential asylum seekers have drowned after 
being barred access to European shores. 
 
Italy, in particular, has enraged human rights groups with its policy of sending boats carrying 
African migrants back to Libya, where most of them originate, without first establishing if their 
claims for asylum are valid. Mr Guterres said: “The European problem will not be fixed by 
dumping protection to Libya. 
 
These agreements can solve the problems of countries in relation of the flows of population but 
do nothing to protect the human rights of people.” 
 
Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, threatened last month to block all EU business 
when the European Commission confirmed that it had sent a letter to the Italian authorities 
seeking more information on the matter. 
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2011: 
 
February 22, 2011 8:35 pm 
UN refugee agency issues plea 
By Giulia Segreti in Rome 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a8425da-3eb7-11e0-834e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
The UN refugee agency appealed on Tuesday to Libya’s neighbours in Europe and north Africa 
not to turn back people fleeing the bloodshed as Italy’s foreign minister warned of “immigration 
of epochal dimensions”. 
 
Franco Frattini, Italian foreign minister, said in Cairo on Tuesday: “We are worried about 
a civil war and immigration of epochal dimensions towards the European Union.” 
Umberto Bossi, the leader of Italy’s anti-immigrant Northern League and a crucial ally of 
prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, said Libyan migrants arriving in Italy should be sent to 
other European countries. 
 
“So far they haven’t arrived and we hope they will not come. If they do come we will 
send them to Germany and France,” he told reporters. 
 
Italian naval forces backed by aircraft from several European allies have stepped up 
patrols in the central Mediterranean to detect and prevent border crossings, the 
European Union border security agency said on Tuesday. 
 
The Italian centre-right government has been slow in condemning the suppression of 
the protests in Libya, with which Italy has close economic ties. 
 
Libya is Italy’s biggest provider of crude oil and trading partner, supplying the country 
with almost a quarter of its oil requirements and 12 per cent of its gas needs. 
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February 27, 2011 5:13 pm 
100,000 flee Libya for Egypt and Tunisia 
By Stanley Pignal in Valletta, Malta 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55da5990-427b-11e0-8b34-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
European countries with Mediterranean coasts, such as Italy and Malta, have warned of 
thousands of migrants trying to cross over on boats or rafts, possibly seeking asylum. 
Rough seas and gale-force winds have made all crossings impossible so far but the 
weather improved on Sunday. Crossings take about 36 hours in small boats. 
Roberto Maroni, the Italian interior minister, said last week that up to 300,000 people 
could reach European shores because of the crisis, a figure others dispute. 
 
The sea-crossing migration route used to attract up to 40,000 people a year until 2009, 
when a deal between Italy and Libya effectively stopped the flow. As part of a wide-
ranging agreement, Libya agreed to patrol its coast to prevent any Europe-bound 
departure and to take back those intercepted by the Italian coastguard. The 
arrangement was widely denounced by human rights groups and the European Union. 
 
Most of the migrants then were Somalis or sub-Saharan Africans. Experts have raised 
the prospect that those flows could not only resume during the chaos but be 
supplemented by fleeing Libyans. 
 
The EU is co-ordinating a small border-patrol mission in the Mediterranean, requested 
by Italy after 6,000 Tunisians landed on Lampedusa, south of Sicily, this month. 
 
2013 
 
October 12, 2013 3:26 pm 
Latest migrant deaths fuel Italian and Maltese calls for EU action 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a9793e84-3348-11e3-bf1b-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
 
(…) see Malta (…) As he spoke, Italian patrol boats were rescuing 235 more people, 
including children, from more migrant boats in distress some 70 nautical miles south of 
Lampedusa. 
 
Enrico Letta, Italy’s prime minister, has already pressed for the crisis to be included on 
the European Council agenda at its October 24-25 meeting although Europe has long 
struggled to come up with a comprehensive response to the crisis. 
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“These are people who are fleeing war to save their lives, they’re not people looking for 
work,” Andrea Pettini, a senior official of the Italian Red Cross told SkyTG24 television. 
According to estimates by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, around 32,000 
migrants have arrived in southern Italy and Malta so far this year, about two-thirds of 
whom have filed asylum requests. 
 
Italy, deep in recession and pressed by EU budget rules to rein in public spending, has 
seen its reception facilities on Lampedusa and other parts of Sicily strained to breaking 
point and it has called repeatedly for more help to confront a crisis it says is a European 
emergency. 
 
The hundreds of deaths have also set off a fierce political debate in Italy over tough 
rules intended to combat clandestine immigration which make it an offence to offer 
assistance to illegal migrant boats. 
 
Cecilia Malstrom, European home affairs commissioner, has called this week for 
Europe’s frontier agency Frontex to be strengthened to be able to deploy search and 
rescue operations in a zone stretching from Cyprus to Spain. 
 
She repeated the call after Friday’s disaster. “In the aftermath of the Lampedusa 
tragedy we heard solidarity expressions from all EU countries, but these will remain only 
empty words if they are not followed by concrete actions.” 
 
2014 
 
April 22, 2014 2:04 pm 
Italy’s right calls for end to navy’s rescue of African migrants 
By Guy Dinmore and Giulia Segreti in Rome 
Rightwing parties in Italy have called for the suspension of the EU-backed mission to 
rescue migrants who make the dangerous sea crossing from north Africa, putting 
immigration back on the agenda ahead of next month’s European parliamentary 
elections. 
 
More than 1,200 African migrants were escorted ashore in Sicily by Italy’s navy and 
coast guard over the Easter weekend, bringing to nearly 22,000 the total that have 
arrived on Italian shores this year. Eritreans and Syrians fleeing war have made up the 
largest groups. 
 
Matteo Salvini, leader of the opposition rightwing Northern League party, said he would 
table a motion in parliament to suspend Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation which he said 
was encouraging the exodus. 
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His call was backed by some senior members of former prime minister Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party. Maurizio Gasparri, who is also deputy speaker of the 
senate, said Mare Nostrum had become a “taxi service” for migrants and that Italy was 
in effect assisting the “merchants of death” who profit from human trafficking. 
Mare Nostrum, which translates as “Our Sea”, was the ancient Roman name for the 
Mediterranean. 
 
Italy launched the naval mission in October, with the backing of Frontex, the EU’s 
border control agency, in response to the deaths of more than 300 migrants who 
drowned close to the Sicilian island of Lampedusa when their boats sank. 
 
This led senior EU officials to pledge greater efforts to prevent a repeat of that tragedy 
but Italy complains that EU austerity cutbacks have undermined those promises. 
Il Giornale, a Milan daily owned by the Berlusconi family, made the latest events its 
front-page story on Tuesday, slamming the EU and “useless” Frontex, noting that Mare 
Nostrum was costing Italy €9m a month while Frontex had only provided a total of some 
€13m since last October. 
 
Il Giornale also railed against the European parliament for passing a law making it 
illegal for Italian naval forces to send migrants back to Libya. 
 
Commentators for newspapers more sympathetic to Matteo Renzi’s coalition 
government slammed the Northern League and Forza Italia for turning human suffering 
into a campaign issue. 
 
Last week in a speech to parliament, Angelino Alfano, interior minister, called on the EU 
to act more decisively in supporting Frontex and overcoming the reluctance of EU 
member states to share Italy’s burden. 
 
Mr Alfano also reiterated Italy’s call for a revision of the so-called Dublin convention that 
regulates the handling of migrants and refugees. Brussels in December said it would 
consider an overhaul of EU asylum policy that would allow people in conflict zones to 
apply for refugee status from outside Europe, rather than making desperate journeys 
across desert and sea to reach safety. 
 
Responding to heckling last week from Northern League parliamentarians, Mr Alfano, 
leader of the New Centre Right party, said: “I would like to remind the League that 
19,000 human lives have been saved and that we will never barter 19,000 deaths with a 
percentage point at the elections . . . That is what you are doing.” 
 
Elections for the European parliament will take place in May. Italy will elect 73 
members. 
 
Outstanding quote : Mr Alfano, leader of the New Centre Right party “I would like to 
remind the League that 19,000 human lives have been saved and that we will never 
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barter 19,000 deaths with a percentage point at the elections . . . That is what you are 
doing.” 
 
Title: Italy Threatens to Release Refugees Into EU Unless Help 
Increases 
By REUTERSMAY May 13, 2014, 9:50 A.M. E.D.T. 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2014/05/13/world/africa/13reuters-italy-
migrants.html?gwh=CE38B8AA2401B8441A9E40D4B5BCD08B&gwt=pay&_r=0 
ROME — Italy threatened to allow refugees to cross its borders into neighboring countries on 
Tuesday unless the European Union takes charge of a sea operation to manage the flow of 
migrants crossing in boats from North Africa. 
Interior Minister Angelino Alfano demanded more help after the Italian navy task force 'Mare 
Nostrum' rescued more than 200 migrants and recovered 17 bodies when the boat carrying them 
sank off the Libyan coast. 
"The European Union has two options: either it comes to the Mediterranean to put the EU flag on 
Mare Nostrum or we will let migrants with right of asylum leave for other countries," Alfano 
wrote on messaging site Twitter. 
The European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmstrom, did not immediately 
respond to a request for comment. 
With less than two weeks before European parliamentary elections, immigration has become a 
hot political topic. 
Italian politicians have long demanded more help from the rest of the European Union to deal 
with the crisis, which disproportionately affects the bloc's southernmost countries. 
They have called for a change to rules which oblige asylum seekers to remain in the country in 
which they first arrive. 
 
 
Italy to Push EU to Lead Sea Mission to Rescue Migrants 
By REUTERSJUNE June 17, 2014, 11:36 A.M. E.D.T. 
(Reporting by Steve Scherer; Editing by Mark Trevelyan) 
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ROME — Italy will ask the European Union next week to take over responsibility for rescuing 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean in crowded boats from North Africa, a task that is costing 
its navy 9 million euros ($12.25 million) (7.21 million pounds) a month. 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi wants EU border agency Frontex to lead the mission, known as 
Mare Nostrum or "Our Sea", which has rescued about 50,000 migrants this year. 
At a June 26-27 EU summit in Brussels, "Prime Minister Renzi will present a plan to transform 
Frontex to take on the duties of the Mare Nostrum mission", Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti 
said in a radio interview on Tuesday. 
Mare Nostrum began last October after 366 people fleeing African countries drowned when their 
boat capsized a mile from Sicily. The tragedy focused world attention on the desperate risks 
taken by many migrants, whose plight has been highlighted by human rights groups and Pope 
Francis. 
Italy has repeatedly called for more EU involvement in recent months as the number of sea-
borne migrants, most of them seeking asylum, has surged to levels last seen during the 2011 
Arab Spring uprisings. 
"Faced with this situation, one must decide not to let people - children and mothers - die at sea," 
Pinotti said. 
She defended the mission from critics including the anti-immigrant Northern League party, 
which says the migrants board dangerous vessels at their own risk and argues that Mare Nostrum 
should be abandoned. 
Because immigration centres are groaning under the number of new arrivals, Italy would also 
like the EU to help manage the huge number of refugees, Interior Ministry Undersecretary 
Domenico Manzione told Reuters separately on Tuesday. 
Most of the more than 40,000 migrants who reached Italy by sea last year were fleeing Syria's 
civil war and Eritrea's harsh military service, and the trend has continued this year, the U.N. 
refugee agency said. 
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) last week told Reuters EU countries could 
take in more refugees rescued in international waters without changing the EU's strict asylum 
rules, known as the Dublin Regulation. 
The Dublin Regulation requires the country where an asylum seeker first arrives to handle their 
application, putting extra pressure on countries on the EU's outer edge, like Italy, to take them in. 
But those rescued in international waters could be hosted by any EU country, perhaps according 
to a negotiated quota system, said Carlotta Sami, southern Europe's UNHCR spokeswoman. 
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"The high commissioner's suggestion is worth considering," said Manzione, who is in charge of 
immigration issues at the ministry. 
"It's also true that if Mare Nostrum becomes a European operation, then the ships that pick them 
up should be considered European territory, and refugees eligible to seek asylum throughout the 
region." 
 
July 9, 2014 7:00 pm 
Italy deserves EU’s help on migrants 
The plight of boat refugees from Africa cannot be ignored 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7d5c14f8-0772-11e4-81c6-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
The disaster led the Italian government to take a commendable stance. Until 2011 Italy 
had blocked immigrants at sea, returning many to Libya, their main point of departure. 
After Lampedusa, Italy began a search-and-rescue effort called Mare Nostrum – or “Our 
Sea” – which focuses on saving lives. So far this year the Italian navy has picked up 
more than 65,000 survivors, far higher than the previous peak in 2011 of 56,000. 
 
What angers Mr Renzi and the Italians is that they feel they are acting alone in their 
effort to save lives. Italy pays €9m a month to fund the Mare Nostrum operation but 
receives little support from EU partners, even though many migrants enter Italy as a first 
step to reach other nations. 
The Italians are also irritated that other EU governments are refusing to share the 
burden of relocating these people. True, Germany last year received 100,000 asylum 
seekers. But most EU states, fearful of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment, have 
offered asylum to only a few hundred. 
 
Italy’s strategy over the refugees has been criticised by some politicians. They argue 
that Mare Nostrum encourages the refugee flow because migrants know they will be 
rescued. But while arrivals in Italy may have soared, migrants to Greece have also risen 
as the fighting in Syria intensifies. 
 
 
 
 
Italy to End Sea Rescue Mission That Saved 100,000 Migrants 
By REUTERS October 31, 2014, 2:18 P.M. E.D.T.  
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Interior Minister Angelino Alfano said the Mare Nostrum or "Our Sea" mission would end to 
make way for a smaller European Union scheme - and to help relieve the strain on Italy's public 
finances amid a three-year economic slump. 
"Mare Nostrum is closing down because it was an emergency operation," Alfano told a news 
conference. 
Alfano said Italy had spent 114 million euros to operate the mission over the past year and the 
closure would reduce spending "to zero". 
Italy would still respect the rules of the sea and respond to SOS calls, he said, adding that cutting 
spending would not necessarily lead to more tragedy. 
"The number of people who die is not proportionate to the number of euros spent," Alfano said. 
 
France 
 
2004 
 
October 2, 2004 7:49 pm 
EU aims to turn back would-be migrants 
By Raphael Minder in The Hague 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/980c0914-140e-11d9-aa94-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Dominique de Villepin, French interior minister, said the EU's goal should be to ensure 
that sub-Saharan illegal immigrants who have travelled to North Africa in order to move 
to Europe can be efficiently returned to their country of origin. 
 
He added: "The idea is very simply that when people arrive (in North African transit 
countries), they can be gathered and then sent back to where they come from, be it by 
bus or other means.'' 
 
2011 
 
February 19, 2011 3:35 am 
EU to step up Mediterranean control 
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By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
 
France and Spain are understood to be among the countries that will provide support for the 
mission, which will be coordinated by the EU’s Frontex border agency. 
 
 
April 7, 2011 2:27 pm 
France steps up efforts to block migrants 
By Stanley Pignal in Paris and Guy Dinmore in Rome 
(France-Italy) 
France has stepped up its efforts to block north African migrants from entering its 
territory from Italy, which is seeking help from other European Union countries to spread 
the burden following a recent surge in arrivals. 
 
The French interior ministry on Wednesday issued a circular tightening the rules under 
which non-EU citizens can remain in France, in effect blocking the settlement on its 
territory of migrants who have arrived in Italy in recent months. 
 
More than 25,000 immigrants on 390 boats have landed on European shores since the 
outbreak of turmoil on the Mediterranean’s southern shores, mainly Tunisians crossing 
over to the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa, off Sicily. 
 
Italy has been accused by Paris of tacitly encouraging the flow of these migrants to 
France, where most say they want to end up. 
Under EU rules that underpin the Schengen free-movement zone, the country in which 
illegal immigrants first arrive is responsible for their processing as asylum seekers, or 
their extradition out of the EU. 
 
Rome was on Thursday discussing a plan to soften those rules by granting 
“humanitarian” temporary residence permits to thousands of Tunisians, in effect turning 
the new arrivals into legal migrants and giving them the ability to travel to other 
European countries. 
 
But Paris has sought to deter such an outcome. The chief of staff of Claude Guéant, 
France’s hardline new interior minister, “reminded” local authorities that a residence 
permit was insufficient in itself to be allowed to remain in France. 
 
Under France’s interpretation of EU free-movement rules, residence permits must be 
accompanied either by a valid passport or a separate authorisation to travel issued by 
the Italian authorities – neither of which the new arrivals are likely to possess. 
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Additionally, the migrants must be able to show they have enough resources to sustain 
themselves, to the tune of €62 a day, and that they do not pose a threat to public order, 
according to a copy of the letter leaked to Le Figaro. Stays are limited in any event to 
three months. 
 
Mr Guéant was appointed to the interior ministry in February with a mandate from 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy to crack down on migration ahead of the presidential 
election next spring. 
 
His Italian counterpart Roberto Maroni, himself an immigration hardliner, insisted on 
Thursday that the permits alone were enough to ensure free travel in the Schengen 
zone and used a parliamentary address to criticise France’s “hostile” approach. 
 
“Given that the large majority of these people who have arrived in Italy have said they 
want above all to go to France, we maintain that there should be a joint initiative 
between France and Italy to manage this phenomenon,” he said. 
 
An Italian opposition MP was rebuked by the speaker of the house when he held up a 
banner in parliament saying “Maroni Assassin” in reference to Wednesday’s shipwreck 
off the coast of Lampedusa that left 250 people missing and feared drowned. 
 
Coast Guards and others continue their rescue efforts, with little hope of finding 
survivors amid rough seas. 
 
Mr Guéant and Mr Maroni will meet on Friday in Rome to discuss the issue, ahead of a 
regularly scheduled meeting of EU interior ministers in Luxembourg on Monday. A 
summit between Mr Sarkozy and Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi is planned for 
April 26. 
The spat between Paris and Rome encapsulates a broader rift pitting most countries 
with Mediterranean shorelines – who want migration to be treated as a European issue 
– and others further inland who are loath to take in migrants who have arrived in other 
EU countries. 
 
Mr Maroni said he will call for the activation of a “burden sharing” process at Monday’s 
meeting, whereby other countries would volunteer to take in migrants that have landed 
in Italy. But previous calls for European solidarity have yielded few results. 
 
 
 
 
 
April 12, 2011 3:01 am 
Italy’s release of migrants strains EU ties 
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By Stanley Pignal in Paris and Joshua Chaffin in Brussels 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0c7f70cc-646e-11e0-a69a-00144feab49a.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
But Rome has sought to circumvent the rules by granting “humanitarian” temporary residence 
permits to thousands of Tunisian refugees, making them eligible – in its eyes – to travel 
throughout the Schengen area. 
It is that decision which prompted France and Belgium to raise the prospect of 
resurrecting borders in the EU. 
 
“It is becoming necessary to check if people who arrive from other member states do 
indeed meet the criteria for entry on to our territory,” said Melchior Wathelet, Belgium’s 
immigration minister. 
 
France, for its part, unveiled measures to bolster police checks near its frontier with 
Italy, flouting the spirit if not the letter of the Schengen accord, which bans systematic 
border checks. 
 
Its non-systematic border checks have in the past month alone intercepted 2,800 
Tunisians coming in from Italy, 1,700 of which have been sent back there and 200 
straight back to Tunisia. The rest are being processed. 
 
Italy’s decision comes amid frustration that fellow member states are not heeding its 
calls for aid to cope with an influx of refugees from North Africa. 
 
In recent weeks, Roberto Maroni, the interior minister, and other government officials 
have issued dire warnings about the refugee situation. But Rome’s action appears to 
have angered other governments, several of whom suspect it has overstated the extent 
of the problem. 
 
“This is not the way Europe should work,” said Geerd Leers, the Dutch minister for 
immigration and asylum. 
 
By contrast, some EU countries did agree to take some refugees from Malta, the EU’s 
smallest country by size and population, which has also repeatedly asked for 
assistance. 
 
 
 
April 17, 2011 6:30 pm 
France blocks migrant train 
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By Stanley Pignal in Paris 
French authorities temporarily blocked train services from Italy on Sunday, in an attempt 
to prevent recently arrived Tunisian migrants and their supporters from crossing into 
France. 
 
Trains carrying migrants and activists were prevented from leaving Ventimiglia, the last 
Italian outpost before the French border, prompting a formal protest from the Italian 
foreign ministry. 
 
The closure of the train line was ordered by the prefect of the Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur region. The French interior ministry said the train lines were closed because 
protests originating on Italian soil had no permits to continue once in France. 
 
“It is not a question of closing the borders, rather it is a matter of public order,” she said. 
Despite there being no border controls between France and Italy, France has already 
intercepted more than 2,000 Tunisians who travelled through Italy, most of them via the 
Mediterranean island of Lampedusa. More than 25,000 migrants have arrived on Italian 
shores from Tunisia and Libya in recent months. 
 
Under EU rules that underpin the Schengen free-movement zone, it is the country in 
which illegal immigrants first arrive that is responsible for their processing as asylum 
seekers, or their extradition out of the EU. 
 
Rome’s handing out of “humanitarian” permits, which started Saturday morning, aims to 
get around the rules by in effect turning the new arrivals into legal migrants, with 
ensuing rights to travel to adjacent countries. 
 
Paris says the permits alone are insufficient to travel in France. Under its interpretation 
of EU free-movement rules, migrants must also be able to show either by a valid 
passport or a separate authorisation to travel issued by the Italian authorities – neither 
of which the new arrivals are likely to possess. 
 
Additionally, the migrants must be able to show they have enough resources to sustain 
themselves, to the tune of €62 a day, and that they do not pose a threat to public order. 
Stays are limited in any event to three months. 
 
France and Italy’s interior ministers met this month to discuss the issue. Both Claude 
Guéant and Roberto Maroni adopt a hardline stance on migration matters, with the 
support of their respective national leaders. Migration questions are expected to feature 
prominently in a planned meeting of Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi planned for 
April 26. 
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Germany 
 
 
2004 
 
September 17, 2004 3:00 am 
Title: Berlin to push for EU migrant camps 
By George Parker in Brussels 
 
Germany is to propose new plans this month to create migration camps in north Africa 
as part of a plan to tackle illegal immigration to the European Union. 
Otto Schily, German interior minister, says he is increasingly worried about the number 
of immigrants risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean, many of them ending their 
journey in Germany. 
 
Mr Schily wants to set up EU-funded camps in north Africa to receive illegal migrants 
rescued or halted as they try to reach Europe. He said such centres might also be used 
to process asylum claims. 
 
The proposal will be presented at the end of the month during a meeting of European 
interior ministers. 
 
The idea is controversial both inside and outside Germany, and Mr Schily rejected 
suggestions that he was proposing European versions of the US detention centre at 
Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. 
 
But the idea is gaining ground in the EU, just over a year after a similar British proposal 
was overwhelmingly rejected by EU member states. 
 
Germany was once one of the opponents of plans for EU reception centres in third 
countries but Mr Schily has made an about-turn on the issue and is now supported by 
Rocco Buttiglione, a senior Italian politician designated EU justice and home affairs 
commissioner. 
 
Italy, a favourite landing point for boat people, is pressing Libya for greater co-operation. 
"We have a very delicate situation on the Mediterranean sea," Mr Schily said in Berlin 
recently. 
"A lot of people are trying to come across the sea to reach the borders of the EU, and a 
lot of people lose their lives," he said. 
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"If we stop these boats we have to create a shelter for people. 
 
"If we stop illegal migration, we have to return people to their country of origin." 
Mr Schily wants the EU to operate search and rescue missions in the Mediterranean, 
and to work with north African countries to tackle the problem. 
 
He said ministers should consider whether EU centres in north Africa could also be 
used to process asylum and immigration claims, a plan opposed by human rights 
groups. 
 
The idea is opposed by the Green party within the German coalition government, and 
by several EU members, with feelings particularly strong in Scandinavia. Tony Blair, 
prime minister, brought forward similar ideas at an EU summit in Greece in June 2003, 
but has said little on the subject since the plan was dismissed out of hand. 
 
September 30, 2004 
 
Proposals by Otto Schily, Germany's interior minister, for migration camps in north 
Africa were attacked by members of the government coalition parties yesterday, 
undermining an initiative that will be discussed at a European Union summit tomorrow. 
Mr Schily has joined Italy in recent weeks in proposing the creation of the camps, 
possibly in Libya, to process potential immigrants and repatriate illegal arrivals to the 
EU. 
 
Italy has said recently that it may draw up bilateral agreements with Libya regarding the 
control of refugees across the Mediterranean. Several EU countries, especially from 
Scandinavia, are believed to have doubts about the camps plan. Britain made a similar 
proposal last year but has since backed away from the idea. 
 
Mr Schily justified his proposals this month by saying "if we stop boats we have to 
create a shelter for people. If we stop illegal migration we have to return people to their 
country of origin." 
 
 
Title: One African's 10-Year Odyssey Reflects a Growing European 
Concern 
By RICHARD BERNSTEIN  
 
Published: December 5, 2004 
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/international/africa/05refugee.html 
 
Over the last few months, the European Union has been deadlocked over a German 
proposal to try to intercept more of these people before they get to Europe and to 
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hold them in "reception centers" in North Africa while their applications for asylum 
are processed. During this period, Italy has returned thousands of them to their places of origin. 
 
Title: Europe's African Refugee Crisis: Is the Boat Really Full? 
By SPIEGEL Staff 
Written 15 April 2014 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/european-refugee-crisis-worsens-in-
mediterranean-a-964304.html 
 
Since Italy began rescuing Africans from the Mediterranean after the last 
major tragedy in October, the number of refugees coming to Europe has risen 
dramatically. Fears of economic immigrants could become a top issue in 
Europe's spring election. 
 
A Dramatic Increase in Refugees 
Meanwhile, the scope of Europe's unresolved refugee problem has taken on a new 
dynamic with the explosive growth of refugees coming to Italy. The government in 
Rome has already rung the alarm bells, with Interior Minister Angelino Alfano warning 
that 300,000, or perhaps even 600,000, people in Libya alone were ready to board 
smuggling boats bound for Europe. "We can't take them all," he said. 
'This Is Not an Italian Problem' 
Italy has long been calling for changes to be made to the EU's 2003 Dublin regulation, 
which stipulates that asylum applications can only be processed in the country where 
refugees first set foot on EU soil. "This is not an Italian problem," Foreign Minister 
Federica Mogherini said. "Refugees are in the EU as soon as they arrive in Italy." 
In light of the fact that the Dublin regulation has essentially failed, politicians in 
Germany are viewing the rising numbers of refugees with increased concern. A 
spokesman for the German Interior Ministry warns that officials in Berlin assume that "a 
number of boat refugees will continue their journeys to Germany to apply for asylum 
here." The numbers seem to support that claim. During the first quarter of 2014, the 
number of asylum seekers in Germany rose by 76 percent against the same time period 
last year. Increased attention is being paid to the issue in German states as well, which, 
together with local communities, are responsible for providing accommodations for 
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refugees. In Lower Saxony, Interior Minister Boris Pistorius, of the center-left Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), has asked his staff to provide him with regular updates on the 
situation in the Mediterranean. "We're going to have difficulties providing 
accommodations," he warns. 
Still, Berlin officials haven't exactly been sympathetic to calls for help from Italy. 
Officials in the Interior Ministry don't see any reason for special program to take in 
additional refugees in response to the situation in Italy. The spokesman notes that 
Germany itself is currently taking in far more asylum seekers than Italy. Last year, 
Germany registered 127,000 new asylum seekers, compared to only 27,000 in Italy. 
Martin Schulz, the Social Democrats' leading candidate for elections to the European 
Parliament, has a different take. He argues that the affected countries have been left in 
the lurch by the EU for some time now. "In areas facing particular hardship as a result 
of immigration, the distribution of refugees amongst the entire EU needs to be 
organized more equitably," he argues. "Financial assistance should also be supplied to 
those who are doing more than others." The leading candidate for the conservative 
Christian Democrats, Jean-Claude Juncker, is also calling for "greater solidarity in 
receiving refugees." He says that reaching agreement on implementing a quota system 
-- a controversial method that would require EU countries not bordering on the 
Mediterranean to take in a set number of additional refugees to help alleviate the 
burden -- should be added to the agenda of the next EU summit. 
One of Europe's Most Divisive Issues 
The unresolved refugee problem has returned to the fore in Europe just as it prepares 
for May's European Parliament elections. Once again, the EU is showing itself to be a 
union of national interests -- and refugees have long been among the most contentious 
issues in the 28-member bloc. And Germany hasn't distinguished itself either. After the 
drama off Lampedusa last fall, then-Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich of the 
conservative Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), hastily ensured Germans that the EU's asylum policies 
wouldn't be changed in any way. 
Remarks like that set the tone in Europe and EU leaders subsequently delayed taking 
any steps toward fundamental reform. When Schulz, currently president of the 
European Parliament, called on other member states to be more generous than Italy in 
taking in refugees, he faced a barrage of criticism back home in Germany. In times of 
widespread euro-skepticism and double-digit unemployment among young adults in 
euro crisis countries, the line went, proposals like that don't fly with the public. They 
merely put wind in the sails of radical opponents of Europe. 
And that goes to the heart of the dilemma currently facing Europe's mainstream 
political parties. They have every reason to fear that a broad debate over the EU's 
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failed refugee policies could become a draw for right-wing populists. Addressing the 
problem, Juncker said recently: "We have to fight to prevent gains by the right-wing 
radicals in the European election." 
'Being on Some Overloaded Boat Is Not an Admission Ticket' 
In Germany, Bernd Lucke, spokesman for the nascent euro-critical party Alternative for 
Germany (AFD), is calling for refugees who enter the country illegally be taken 
immediately to a "safe African country." "We have to make it clear that being on some 
overloaded boat is not an admission ticket to the EU. Otherwise, more and more people 
will undertake this risky trip," he says. 
Andreas Scheuer, general secretary of the CSU, leaves no doubt that his party plans to 
position itself clearly within the anti-immigration camp during the election. "Asylum 
policies and the issue of poverty migrationwill play an important role in the campaign 
for the European Parliament, he says. "We have learned from experience that it is 
asylum in Germany that is sought by those who land in Italy." Noting that the number 
of people applying for asylum in Germany is already higher than it has been in years, 
he adds: "We cannot carry the weight of the entire world's pain." 
With lines like, "those who deceive are out," tough talk on refugees and related policies 
has become part of the CSU's standard repertoire. Whereas Chancellor Merkel's CDU is 
taking a more distanced approach to the challenge presented by the anti-euro AfD, its 
Bavarian counterpart is engaging in direct confrontation -- its callous reaction to the 
sufferings of refugees in Italy reflects that. 
Things could have turned out differently. The tragedy in Lampedusa could easily have 
served to trigger a deep and critical look at European refugee policy. Instead EU leaders 
limited any new measures to those focused on preventing such jarring catastrophes 
from happening again. 
Eurosur is the abbreviation given to the European Border Surveillance System, 
a sophisticated monitoring system consisting of satellites, drones and radar systems. 
The program, developed at a cost of around €340 million ($470 million), has been in 
operation in several EU member states since December. But it is extremely 
controversial because it has many applications: It can be used to save refugees, 
intercept them or even keep them out. 
But Eurosur is not a solution for the refugee issue. Indeed, the situation continues to 
escalate, with the number of illegal border crossings into the EU now even larger than it 
was at the peak of the Arab Spring in 2011. Seventy percent of the refugees coming 
across the Mediterranean originate in Libya, which has become a failed state following 
the toppling of dictator Moammar Gadhafi. Italian Foreign Minister Mogherini has noted 
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that the situation in Libya makes addressing the refugee problem all the more difficult 
given that talks with the government there are a virtual impossibility. 
Is the Boat Full? 
The number of asylum seekers in Germany has likewise risen continuously in recent 
years. Indeed, astonishingly few apply for asylum at the EU's external borders in Italy, 
Spain or Poland. Relative to its number of inhabitants, Italy is only in 15th place; 
Germany is in seventh. Relative to their populations, smaller member states like Malta 
or Sweden take in three times as many refugees as Germany does and the total 
percentage of all refugees in Germany remains at a figure far below 1 percent of the 
entire population. 
So is the boat full, as the old populist rhetoric goes? It's a controversial issue, especially 
if you ask the German people directly. A survey conducted by pollster Forsa in March 
found that only one in three Germans wants Germany to take in more refugees. 
Hamburg Mayor Olaf Scholz of the SPD, who is closely involved in the issue of migration 
in a city with a high population of immigrants, nevertheless pleads for a more liberal 
visa policy. He says that preparedness to take in refugees and tolerance is still 
substantial but asks, "What happens if the people say: That's enough?" 
German Development Minister Gerd Müller of the CSU suggests one cannot forget the 
old idea of addressing the refugee problem at its source: Africa. He recently ordered his 
staff at the ministry to come up with a special program for refugees. But the main 
driving force behind his dedication to the issue is that of preventing a further exodus to 
Europe. A 100-day progress report from the ministry makes clear its desire to 
"vanquish the causes of flight." 
When it comes to Africa, though, things have been heading in the opposite direction. 
While Germany slightly increased its development expenditures last year, funds for 
Africa have decreased at a rapid pace. According to calculations by the non-government 
organization ONE, which focuses on reducing poverty around the world, Germany cut its 
development spending in Africa by half a billion euros in 2013. The organization claims 
that no other donor country has scaled back its participation to the degree Germany 
has. At best, the €100 million that Berlin has since been pledged to Africa can be 
viewed as a damage control effort. 
BY NICOLA ABÉ, CHRISTIANE HOFFMANN, HORAND KNAUP, KAROLINA KUHLA, 
WALTER MAYR, PETER MÜLLER, GORDON REPINSKI AND GREGOR PETER 
SCHMITZ 
Translated from the German by Daryl Lindsey 
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UK 
 
2004 
 
October 1, 2004 7:49 pm 
EU aims to turn back would-be migrants 
By Raphael Minder in The Hague 
 
The European Union's interior ministers on Friday entered a preliminary agreement to 
finance and manage immigration transit camps in North Africa. 
 
The agreement is a turnround from a year ago, when EU governments rejected a 
British-led plan to check asylum seekers at immigration camps outside the EU's 
borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 11, 2009 6:53 pm 
UN warns EU against scapegoating migrants 
By Stanley Pignal in Brussels 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/81fcb4b8-b687-11de-8a28-00144feab49a.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
October 25, 2004 6:28 pm 
EU ministers agree loose commitment on asylum 
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By Raphael Minder in Luxembourg and Jimmy Burns in London 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/59822094-26aa-11d9-9157-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
 
With Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, under domestic pressure over Britain's relations 
with Europe, Antonio Vitorino, the EU's outgoing justice commissioner, yesterday urged 
governments not to use Brussels as a scapegoat for their own inability to co-ordinate 
better and faster on issues such as asylum. 
 
"The European instruments are not sufficient because there are a lot of national 
exceptions and a low level of acceptance," Mr Vitorino said. "We need to move to a 
second stage with a clear timetable because target dates are helpful to put pressure on 
countries to move forward." 
 
One of the most sensitive issues is whether the EU should take decisions on asylum 
and immigration issues by qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. 
 
Mr Blair yesterday defended himself against claims by the opposition Conservative 
party that he was ceding control of UK borders to the EU. "There is no question of 
Britain giving up our veto on our border controls," he said. 
 
The UK has a long-standing right to opt out from EU decisions on asylum and 
immigration, but the government has taken an ambivalent position by looking to slow 
EU convergence in an area where it faces no immediate obligations. 
 
Mr Blair yesterday tried to turn such ambivalence to his political advantage by claiming 
that it was serving UK interests. "With the Treaty of Amsterdam seven years ago, we 
secured the absolute right to opt in to any of the asylum and immigration provisions that 
we wanted in Europe," he said. "Unless we opt in we are not affected by it." 
 
An agreement to switch to qualified majority voting was enshrined into the Amsterdam 
treaty and reinforced by the Nice treaty agreed in December 2000. But it remains potato 
sensitive in the UK, where the Conservatives, under eurosceptic leader Michael 
Howard, have attacked the Labour government for yielding more powers to Brussels. 
The British stance on immigration, shared by countries such as Ireland and Denmark, 
has frustrated France, Spain and others that see a common asylum policy as a key tool 
in the fight against clandestine immigration. 
 
Southern European governments are under pressure to find ways to deal with the 
growing wave of asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean from North Africa. 
 
October 26, 2004 3:00 am 
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Title: The level of interest in the asylum issue has remained high even 
as the number of applications for refugee status has fallen 
By Rohit Jaggi 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d4bfaf0-26ec-11d9-9157-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
 
Asylum seekers are not allowed to work despite evidence that they would prefer to support 
themselves, and they cannot claim welfare benefits. They must be housed but can expect to be 
placed anywhere in the UK. If destitute, a single asylum seeker is entitled to receive from the 
state almost half of what a pensioner is guaranteed - less than £40 a week. John Gieve, the top 
civil servant at the Home Office, said in the summer the UK had a "very generous" asylum 
system. However, the government says that Britain is merely implementing the 1951 United 
Nations Convention on Refugees, which gives anyone the right to apply for political asylum, 
more fully than other countries, which bend the rules to keep people out. In 2001 the UK was 
ranked only 32nd in the world for the number of asylum seekers it accepted. Even within the 
European Union it was ranked only 10th. While David Blunkett, home secretary, stressed 
yesterday that "there is no question of the UK being forced [by the EU] into so-called 'joint 
processing' of asylum seekers", it has already been co-operating with fellow EU states over 
controls on immigrants. 
 
 
 
October 26, 2004 3:00 am 
Title: The level of interest in the asylum issue has remained high even 
as the number of applications for refugee status has fallen, writes 
Rohit Jaggi. 
By Rohit Jaggi 
 
HIGH LEVEL OF INTEREST IN SPITE OF LOWER NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS The level of 
interest in the asylum issue has remained high even as the number of applications for refugee 
status has fallen, writes Rohit Jaggi. In the second quarter of this year there were 7,920 
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applications for asylum in the UK, an 11 per cent fall from the previous quarter, and a 26 per 
cent fall on the same quarter in the previous year. For the whole of 2003 there were 49,405 
applications, compared with 84,130 in 2002. At the end of last year there were 23,900 
applications outstanding, compared with 41,300 outstanding at the end of 2002. But the debate 
is about more than just numbers. "The figures are way down so it isn't about demographics," 
says Neil Durkin of Amnesty International, the human rights organisation. "There does seem to 
be something close to xenophobia in some of the reporting. "It's also a way of giving the 
government a hard time for perceived laxness - whereas in fact the opposite is the case." 
Asylum applications are down 70 per cent from 2002, in excess of a pledge made by Tony Blair 
to halve applications by September 2003 compared with a year before. Asylum seekers are not 
allowed to work despite evidence that they would prefer to support themselves, and they cannot 
claim welfare benefits. They must be housed but can expect to be placed anywhere in the UK. If 
destitute, a single asylum seeker is entitled to receive from the state almost half of what a 
pensioner is guaranteed - less than £40 a week. John Gieve, the top civil servant at the Home 
Office, said in the summer the UK had a "very generous" asylum system. However, the 
government says that Britain is merely implementing the 1951 United Nations Convention on 
Refugees, which gives anyone the right to apply for political asylum, more fully than other 
countries, which bend the rules to keep people out. In 2001 the UK was ranked only 32nd in the 
world for the number of asylum seekers it accepted. Even within the European Union it was 
ranked only 10th. While David Blunkett, home secretary, stressed yesterday that "there is no 
question of the UK being forced [by the EU] into so-called 'joint processing' of asylum seekers", 
it has already been co-operating with fellow EU states over controls on immigrants. At the 
beginning of this month Des Browne, immigration minister, announced the moving of all 
immigration checks on Eurostar passengers to France and Belgium. Mr Browne said the 
introduction of checks in France in July this year had cut asylum applications at the Waterloo 
terminus of the Eurostar rail service by 90 per cent. Mr Blunkett said Britain had helped 
Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Greece patrol their sea borders and had offered help 
to new EU members that border Russia and Ukraine. 
October 31, 2004 5:48 pm 
Brussels agenda: Missed objectives 
By Raphael Minder 
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On Friday EU government leaders are expected finalise a programme that will set the 
EU's policy goals in justice and home affairs for the coming five years. 
One of the more pressing issues on their agenda will be whether to switch by next April 
to a qualified majority voting system for asylum and immigration issues, which would 
make it easier to avoid the kind of deadlock often brought about by unanimity voting 
procedures. 
 
The expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 member states has forced a rethink of the way 
the EU monitors its external borders. At the same time, governments, in particular in 
southern Europe, have grown increasingly frustrated about the lack of progress in 
curbing illegal immigration and avoiding the kind of humanitarian tragedies that have 
seen hundreds of people drown in the Mediterranean as they attempted to reach the 
shores of Italy and Spain. 
 
Yet recognition of this common challenge has run headlong into concerns about 
maintaining national sovereignty, in particular in countries like the UK. Alongside 
defence and taxation, justice and home affairs is arguably the one area of policy where 
EU governments appear most reluctant to cede control to Brussels and the EU's 
institutional mechanism. 
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Last updated: June 24, 2011 9:05 am 
Title: Cameron keeps UK out of Greek bail-out 
By George Parker and Joshua Chaffin in Brussels 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7de28b2c-9dd1-11e0-b30c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
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There is more solidarity between Britain and Germany over their opposition to a change 
to Europe’s asylum rules, intended to ease the pressure on countries like Malta and 
Italy facing an influx of refugees from northern Africa. 
 
The European Commission has suggested a mechanism to allow a temporary 
suspension of rules which allow EU countries to deport asylum seekers back to the 
country in which they first entered the bloc. 
 
Mr Cameron has vowed to oppose the suspension of the so-called Dublin Regulations, 
but he is in good company: only nine countries – mainly from the Mediterranean area – 
support the move. 
 
 
2014 
 
 
October 31, 2014 6:35 pm 
Title: Mediterranean migrants test our humanity – and we have failed 
Letting refugees drown is an indecent policy, writes Paddy 
Ashdown (former leader of the liberal democrats) British. 
 
Over the years, British politicians have clashed with EU officials on everything from the size of 
bankers’ bonuses to the power consumed by vacuum cleaners to how knobbly a carrot can be 
before it no longer counts as a vegetable. But this week Brussels put forward a conclusion on a 
matter of life and death that elicited a harmonious murmur of agreement from Whitehall: that the 
best way to discourage refugees from north Africa from seeking a better life is to let them drown. 
In 2013, 700 people, many of them women and children, are believed to have died 
trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. This year the figure is 3,000; the number 
of people setting out from the north African coast has probably increased by a similar 
proportion. About 180,000 have made it safely to European shores so far this year. 
Humanity and respect for life are basic European values. But in a crowded continent 
whose near neighbour is one of the world’s most impoverished and volatile regions, 
these principles are being tested. 
 
(…) 
This week the UK government said that Frontex ships would not be in breach of their 
international obligations to rescue those in peril at sea. The ships, ministers assured 
parliament, will be safely tucked away in European territorial waters, far away from the 
drowning refugees. It is a cynical justification, and one that belies the claim that this 
policy is motivated by a genuine care for the welfare of refugees. 
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What should European nations, including the UK, be doing instead? Helping the Italians 
rather than abandoning them to do our dirty work would be a good start. Brussels could 
also do more to pressure the governments of Egypt and other north African departure 
nations to act against the traffickers – and provide them with the technical help to do so. 
 
 
 
Immigration Poses Political Problem for Island UK 
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESSNOV. Nov.3, 2014, 1:22 P.M. E.S.T.  
Link: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2014/11/03/world/europe/ap-eu-britain-eu-
immigration.html 
Mr Guterres has also called for the UK to consider taking in at least some of those migrants in 
Calais who have families already in the UK. EU rules stipulate that asylum seekers must be 
processed in the country in which they first arrive in the bloc but differing attitudes towards 
refugees mean that the fate of those who apply for international protection largely depends on 
which country they arrive in. 
For British politicians of every stripe, immigration is increasingly seen as a problem to be curbed 
rather than an opportunity to be embraced. The 28-nation European Union, to which Britain 
belongs, appears a bureaucratic burden, not a strengthening alliance. 
This increasingly isolationist mood has begun to alarm the U.K.'s EU neighbors. Even Germany, 
among the most sympathetic to British views, has warned that an attempt to restrict immigration 
from other member states — an idea floated by Prime Minister David Cameron that goes against 
a core EU principle — could lead to Britain leaving the union. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel's spokesman, Steffen Seibert, said Monday that "freedom of 
movement inside the European Union is not negotiable for Germany." 
(…) But leading British politicians — wary of losing voters to UKIP — are increasingly 
reluctant to make a pro-immigration case. 
That's a mistake, according to former Prime Minister Tony Blair. In a recent interview with 
Progress magazine, Blair called UKIP a party that had a "nasty core of prejudice" and said other 
politicians should not let it frame the debate. 
He said Cameron should tell UKIP: "'You don't understand the way the world works today, your 
policies will take us backwards and we're not going there.” 
 
November 6, 2014 6:50 am 
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Australia’s ‘stop the boats’ asylum policy divides opinion 
Jamie Smyth in Sydney 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82225b4c-6563-11e4-91b1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
With hundreds of thousands of African migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea 
every year to enter Europe, EU states are reviewing their policies. Last week the Italian navy 
ended a naval operation that has saved up to 150,000 migrants’ lives over the past 12 months. 
The UK has also withdrawn support for an EU search and rescue operation, saying it 
encourages more people to attempt the dangerous voyage. 
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2009 
Title: Title: Malta seeks EU action over immigrants,  
By Michael Imeson in Valletta and Stanley Pignal. 
June 4, 2009.  
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a8d2b17c-509e-11de-9530-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
 
Malta's prime minister has pleaded for more help from the European Union to deal with a rising 
tide of illegal immigrants from north Africa, as the bloc's interior ministers meet today in 
Luxembourg to discuss how to help those member states most exposed to immigration flows. 
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Lawrence Gonzi, speaking to the Financial Times, said plans being formulated by the 
European Commission were "definitely a very important step forward" but expressed 
disappointment that fellow EU states had not agreed to take on some of the asylum 
seekers currently landing on the Mediterranean island. Though Jacques Barrot, the 
EU's commissioner for justice, has asked member states to show "solidarity with the 
most exposed states" by agreeing to take on refugees to ease Malta's burden, all 
indications suggest interior ministers will opt for a far more limited form of burden-
sharing. 
 
Content: 
 
Member states have so far balked at volunteering to take in more asylum seekers, 
preferring to support the most affected states with financial and logistical support 
instead. 
 
More than 67,000 people sailed across the Mediterranean to Europe's shores last year, 
half of them landing in Italy and Malta, according to the UNHCR, the United Nations' 
refugee body. Most of the crossings take place in the summer. 
Malta has not been the only state to struggle under the stress of regular boat-loads of 
illegal immigrants, but its small size and population - both the smallest in the EU - have 
put it under particular strain. 
 
Mr Gonzi called for "more action with respect to repatriation of individuals who do not 
qualify for refugee status", while at the same time stressing that "we want to be ethically 
correct and follow our international obligations". 
 
Wider EU Context: 
 
The entire EU approach to asylum and immigration is set to be overhauled by the end of 
the year, as the previous five-year framework, known as the Hague programme, 
expires. 
The meeting of justice and interior ministers will also consider what steps the EU needs 
to take for its members to accept former detainees from the Guantánamo Bay prison 
camp, which the US wants to close by January 2010. 
 
 
2011: 
 
Last updated: February 24, 2011 12:14 pm 
Title: Libya refugees flee to Malta 
By Stanley Pignal in Valletta 
Link: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4bba604-3ff5-11e0-811f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cmJTzXze 
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Hundreds of foreigners fleeing the violence in Libya have arrived in neighbouring Malta, with 
numbers expected to swell on Thursday as relief boats arrive on the Mediterranean island. 
 
No boats have yet arrived from North Africa since political turmoil gripped the region last 
month. However, nearly 6,000 Tunisians overwhelmed the Italian island of Lampedusa, 
200km west of Malta, after the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia collapsed last month. 
The Maltese refugee agency is looking at sites it could use to process a sudden inflow 
of migrants seeking political refuge. 
 
The government has asked for “solidarity” from its European Union partners in dealing 
with the situation, underlining that the island cannot cope with large-scale arrivals from 
Libya. 
 
Along with other Mediterranean EU members including Italy, France and Greece, it 
called for more border-patrolling resources and the possibility to send migrants that land 
in Malta to other European countries for processing. 
 
A small mission of EU coordinated maritime border patrols is now operational over parts 
of the Mediterranean 
 
 
 
2013 
 
October 12, 2013 3:26 pm 
Title: Latest migrant deaths fuel Italian and Maltese calls for EU action 
 
ROME, October 12 – Italian calls for Europe to do more on the migrant crisis grew on 
Saturday and Malta’s prime minister said the Mediterranean was becoming a 
“cemetery” after another boat sank off Sicily, killing dozens more people. 
Italian and Maltese navy ships recovered 34 bodies and rescued 206 migrants after 
their boat sank about 60 nautical miles south of Sicily on Friday and rescued more than 
200 others in separate incidents on Saturday. 
 
Friday’s disaster came just over a week after at least 339 people drowned when a boat 
sank less than a kilometre from Lampedusa, a tiny island between Sicily and Tunisia 
that has become the main entry point into Europe for migrant boats. 
Over the past two decades, arrivals from north Africa have become a regular feature in 
favourable summer sailing conditions, but this year the crisis has been worsened 
by instability in Egypt and Libya and the civil war in Syria. 
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“I don’t know how many more people need to die at sea before something gets done,” 
said Joseph Muscat, Malta’s prime minister, in an interview with the BBC. He said he 
would join Italy in pressing for action at the next European Council. 
“The fact is that as things stand, we are just building a cemetery within our 
Mediterranean Sea,” he said. “Until now we have encountered statements, words but 
little more than that.” 
 
2014 
 
Title: Valletta – How Malta is being squeezed between the EU’s 
asylum and migration policies 
 
WRITTEN BY 
  
Isabelle Calleja Ragonesi 
Head of the Department of International Relations at the University of Malta 
Published on June 15 2014 
http://europesworld.org/2014/06/15/valletta-how-malta-is-being-squeezed-between-the-
eus-asylum-and-migration-policies/#.VYsLxPntmkp 
Among the great international relations controversies since the end of the Cold War has 
been the tension between state security and that of humans, notably in the case of 
global migration flows. A sizable number of people seeking asylum in Europe encounter 
the paradox of the Schengen agreement, which facilitates internal freedom of 
movement in the EU, but requires the reinforcement of the EU’s external borders. 
The result of this has been a robust pan-European asylum policy, but migration policies 
are still under the aegis of each member state. The 2003 Dublin regulation requires 
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migrants to apply for and live out their asylum in the member state they first entered. 
This has created a mess of overlapping and exclusive jurisdictions which leave both the 
asylum seeker and those states that have become their destinations of choice in a 
security dilemma. 
This is certainly the case for Malta. Its shores are the most southern border of the EU, 
and while it’s an island state of only 316 square km, it has a search and rescue area in 
the Mediterranean Sea of 250,000 square km that stretches from Tunisia to Greece. 
The UNHCR refugees agency noted in 2013 that per capita, Malta receives the highest 
number of asylum seekers of all industrialised countries. Just over 84% of those who 
made asylum applications were accepted, yet the international focus has been on 
Malta’s detention policy, which has seen asylum seekers incarcerated for up to 18 
months, often in sub-standard conditions. Human Rights Watch, the UN High 
Commission for refugees, and Maltese NGOs have all criticised this policy, and two 
recent cases brought against Malta at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
have reprimanded this practice for breaching human rights and failing to provide asylum 
seekers with a secure environment. The court’s  ruling recommended changes to 
Maltese law and policy. 
The Maltese government has slowly improved the situation. At present, a few hundred 
people are still in detention, with the stays varying between three and eight months, 
though lengthier in the case of those who have been rejected. In the past year, a shake-
up has ensured that those running the centers are competent and keen to see change. 
Malta’s home affairs minister has said that the government will be taking all necessary 
steps to comply with the relevant ECHR judgments. Amendments to Malta’s immigration 
and refugees legislation will enable anyone detained to challenge that from the initial 
stages onwards, and not just when the duration of detention is excessive. Other 
amendments will address such issues as the review of detention orders. 
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Meanwhile, though, the security of small Mediterranean states like Malta remains in 
limbo. According to the EU’s Frontex agency, the central Mediterranean region was the 
busiest migration route used by irregular immigrants over the past five years. And North 
Africa’s political instability is expected to lead to “high migration pressure” this summer. 
So long as EU asylum and migration policies remain out of sync, migrant flows will not 
supply the EU’s labour market needs. In Malta, the cry is that just as the walls of 
detention centres need to come down, the walls created by Dublin II must also be 
removed. 
 
 
 
 
